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Abstract
The standard semantics employed for description logics (DLs) adheres to the
open world assumption (OWA). On one hand, such an assumption facilitates a
modeler to formally represent problem domains with out explicitly expressing
full information, which sometimes is even not possible. This is probably one
of the main reasons of founding the Web Ontology Language (OWL) based on
DLs. On the other hand, OWA proves to be the main cause of the impotence of
DLs of capturing non-monotonic reasoning: where new information invalidates
the previously concluded information. Non-monotonic reasoning has several
applications in real life scenarios. For example, logic programming community,
parallel to the OWL community, in general focuses on non-monotonic reasoning.
These short-comes of DLs lead to the quest for a formalism as suitable as DLs
meanwhile capable of capturing some “kind” of non-monotonic reasoning.
Several work has been done on extending DLs with some non-monotonic feature.
Epistemic extensions of DLs (called epistemic DLs sometimes) is probably one
of the earliest work in this direction. Such extensions enhance expressivity and
querying capabilities of these DLs by knowledge base introspection. The existing
approaches in this respect are limited to less expressive DLs like ALC: the
least expressive DL which is boolean complete whereas in real life applications,
modeling problems require expressivity beyond ALC.
The aim of this work is to extend epistemically the most expressive DL SROIQ
which is the foundation of OWL 2 DL. We argue that unintended effects occur
when imposing the semantics traditionally employed on very expressive DLs like
SROIQ. Consequently, we identify the most expressive DL for which the current
approach can still be adapted. For the epistemic extension of SROIQ and alike
expressive DLs, we suggest a revised semantics that behaves more intuitively in
these cases and coincides with the traditional semantics on less expressive DLs.
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ABSTRACT
Different languages can be used for formalizing knowledge bases and queries. The
use of an epistemically extended formalisms as query language has been highly
advocated in literature. Motivated by several use cases of using an epistemic DL
as a query language we introduce a way of answering epistemic queries to DL
knowledge bases by a reduction to standard DL reasoning. Hence, we can use
off-the-shelf highly optimized DL reasoners for answering epistemic queries.
Finally, to evaluate our method of answering epistemic queries, we implement a
tool that utilizes the introduced technique of reducing epistemic query answering
to the standard DL reasoning tasks. We perform several experiments that show the
practical feasibility of the tool.
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An important task in modeling a domain of interest is conceptualization: to identify
different concepts and relationships between the concepts.. In computer science
and other relevant fields, this process is usually called ontology modeling. An
ontology provides a formal method of describing information about a particular do-
main. Besides several application areas like the life sciences, automobile industry,
software engineering, etc, probably the most prominent one is the Semantic Web.
The Web Ontology Language (OWL) [OWL WORKING GROUP 2009] is currently
the single most important formalism for realizing semantic technologies. Some
other prominent languages include Common Logic [ISO/IEC 24707:2007 2007],
F-Logic [KIFER et al. 1995], KIF [GENESERETH and FIKES 1992],
OKBC [GROUP 1998] etc. OWL is based on description logics (DLs)–family
of knowledge representation formalisms. At the very basics, DLs are fragments
of first-order logic and thus employ the open-world assumption (OWA) for
their semantics. Hence such formalisms are capable of modeling domains with
incomplete information like the Semantic Web. Nevertheless, there are application
scenarios where a close-world approach is demanded. This usually requires
closing (if not completely) a certain part of the ontology in consideration. Thus a
hybrid formalism1 that allows for viewing certain part of an ontology under the
close-word assumption (CWA) would be highly suitable for such scenarios. A
Query language with such capability is the main objective of this work.
1Here by a hybrid formalism when mean combination of different formalisms e.g., description
logic with a non-monotonic formalism.
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
The following section discusses the usual assumptions taken in the logic based
formalisms regarding reasoning. In Section 1.2, we present an overview of de-
scription logics. Section 1.4 sets the goals and objectives of this work. The last
Section provides some guidelines for the readers.
1.1 The Two Assumptions of the Reasoning World
One of the most basic question regarding the semantics of a given formal logic is
if the semantics uses the open-world assumption or the closed world assumption.
In the open-world assumption or OWA, the absence of information does not
allow concluding negative information. For example, given the only fact that
Taylor2 produces a wine called Taylor’s Port. There is no further information that
Taylor produces other wines. Under the OWA, it is not allowed to conclude that
Taylor’s Port is the only wine produced by Taylor. In other words, the available
information is under no condition considered to be complete. Such an assumption
is very useful when modeling a domain with incomplete information. An other
application scenario includes representation of knowledge (on discovery) of a
problem domain. In such a scenario we start by representing knowledge at hand
without making an assumption about its completeness. We add on new knowledge
as we discover while still holding the conclusions entailed previously.
Semantic Web is a prime example where one requires OWA in general. The
very nature of the world wide web (WWW) advocates the need for assuming the
incompleteness of information. In fact, with the huge amount of dynamic data on
WWW, there is no way of being sure (at least not practically) if the information
available is complete at all. The OWA is really handy in describing the information
on the web i.e., we utilize the available information on the web for reasoning
tasks while restricting the conclusions of new information from the available
information only.




In contrast to OWA, in the close-world assumption or CWA, the absence of
information implies the negation of the information i.e., if a certain fact is not
known, then it is assumed to be false3. As an example suppose it is unknown if
Taylor’s Port is a red wine, then we conclude that Taylor’s Port is not a red wine.
Note that CWA is natural4 in the sense that we human generally employ this
assumption in daily life reasoning and argumentation. A classical example is
reading a timetable. On observing that there is no train leaving Karlsruhe at 14:00
to Paris stated in the timetable, we conclude that in actual there is no train for Paris
at that time from Karlsruhe. Whereas, it might be the case that there is a mistake in
the timetable and indeed a train is leaving at 14:00 to Paris. Databases are another
example where CWA is used. Whatever is stated in a database is assumed to be
complete.
An important difference between the two assumptions can be observed on the avail-
ability of new information. In the OWA, the previous consequences of a given in-
formation retains. In contrast, in CWA we may have to retract from the previous
concluded information once new facts are available. That is, newly added infor-
mation might invalidate the previous consequences. In the previous wine example,
under CWA we concluded that Taylor’s Port is not a red wine. Now suppose we
come to know (via some fact or deduction) that it is indeed the case that it is a red
wine, we have to retract from what we had concluded earlier. Thus we can no more
say that Taylor’s Port is a red wine. Hence, reasoning in CWA is defeasible.
1.2 Description Logics
Description logics (DLs) provide the formal basis for the Web Ontology
Language [BAADER et al. 2007]. DLs correspond to a family of knowledge
representation formalisms that can be used for specifying conceptual knowledge
of an application domain in a machine-processable way. There are several
related formalisms that fall into this family. Less expressive DLs include the
EL family [BAADER et al. 2005]. As tractable formalisms, these DLs have been
3The truth-value of the given fact is considered to be false.
4Such reasoning is sometimes also called commonsense reasoning
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used in modeling huge ontologies like SNOMED CT,GALEN etc. Meanwhile
SROIQ is one of the most expressive DLs. However reasoning in SROIQ
is computationally far harder than in EL. For example checking whether cer-
tain information follows from an ontology formulated in SROIQK requires
NEXPTIME [PAPADIMITRIOU 1994]. This trade-off between expressiveness
and computational complexity gives rise to different DLs. Depending on the
expressiveness of DLs, different OWL profiles [MOTIK et al. 2009] correspond
to different DLs, for example, OWL 2 EL corresponds to the EL family. Note
that reasoning tasks in DLs are decidable. In fact, DLs can be seen as decidable
fragments of first-order logic (with equality) [BAADER et al. 2007]. Nevertheless,
we use different syntax than the traditional first-order one (see Chapter 2).
The basic syntactic notions in a description logics are of individual names
representing individual elements in a problem domain, atomic concepts repre-
senting classes of which elements can be member of and atomic roles repre-
senting binary relations among the elements. From first-order logic perspec-
tive, concepts are unary predicates, roles are binary predicates and individual
names are constants. Different description logics allow for different sets of
constructs for constructing complex concepts and roles from the atomic con-
cepts, atomic roles and individual names. For example the description logic
ALC [SCHMIDT-SCHAUSS and SMOLKA 1991] allows for basic boolean con-
structs: disjunction (union) (t), conjunction (intersection), negation (complement)
(¬) and constructs (for quantifying over the elements) namely existential quantifi-
cation (∃) and universal quantification (∀). The complex concept
RedWine u ∃madeFromFruit.Fruit
is an example of ALC concept representing all red wines which are made of some
fruit.
In DLs, concept inclusion axioms are used to describe the subclass relationship
between two concepts. We use the symbol v to represent this inclusion. For
4
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example, the axioms RedWine v Wine5 state that every red wine is a wine i.e.,
the class Wine is a super-concept of the class RedWine. In other words, RedWine
is a sub-concept of the class Wine. Thus every individual in class RedWine
must be in class Wine as well. To state a membership relationship between an
individual and a class or between two individuals, we use assertions. For example,
Wine(taylor-port) states that taylor-port is member of the class Wine. Similarly, the
assertion like hasMaker(taylor-port, taylor) with hasMaker a role, is used to state
that the relation of hasMaker holds between taylor-port and taylor.
Like in other logical formalisms, we have the notion of theory in DLs as well.
Theories in DLs are called knowledge bases (also called ontologies). A knowledge
base is a set of concept inclusion axioms and assertions.
The semantics of DLs is based on the first-order logic semantics and thus adheres
to the open-world assumption. We have the notion of interpretations composed
of a domain. In an interpretation, a concept is interpreted by a subset (called
the extension of the concept) of the domain, a role is interpreted by a binary
relation (called the extension of the role) over the domain and an individual name
is interpreted by a member (called the interpretation of the individual name) of
the domain. Usually we are interested in specific interpretations of a knowledge
base which satisfy6 all the axioms of the knowledge base. Such interpretations are
called models.
Like first-order logic, we have different notions of reasoning tasks in DLs: incon-
sistency checking asks for the consistency (existence of a model) of a knowledge
base. Concept satisfiability checking is to test if a given concept is interpreted by
a non-empty subset of the domain within an interpretation. Instance checking for
a given individual name and concept verifies if the interpretation of the individual
is a member of the interpretation of the concept. Another reasoning task of high
interest is the query checking to a knowledge. The typical kind of query to a
5It is a usual practice in DL community to represent concepts by words starting with an uppercase
letter, whereas roles and individuals are represented by words starting with a lowercase letter.
6satisfaction conditions are formally defined in Chapter 2
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knowledge base Σ is to check if an axiom of the form C(a) or r(a, b) is entailed
by Σ i.e., we check if the interpretation of a belongs to the extension of C in all the
models of Σ and similarly if the interpretations of a and b occur as an order-pair in
the extension of r in all the models of Σ. We denote these queries as Σ |= C(a)?
and Σ |= r(a, b)?. Due to the OWA taken by the semantics in DLs, consequently
the answer of a query to a knowledge base is YES if the axiom in the query is
entailed by the knowledge base and NO if the negation of query is entailed. The
answer if UNKNOWN, otherwise. Note that the incompleteness of knowledge
does not let us conclude NO as an answer to a query in case we can not conclude
YES as an answer.
Deciding the aforementioned reasoning tasks requires inventing algo-
rithms and implementing tools (DL system) based on these algorithms.
Over a period of couple of decades, such systems have evolved into
highly efficient and practically feasible inference engine. Some of the
early systems include KL-ONE [SCHMIDT-SCHAUSS 1989], KRYP-
TON [BRACHMAN et al. 1985], NIKL [KACZMAREK et al. 1986], KAN-
DOR [PATEL-SCHNEIDER 1984], LOOM [MACGREGOR and BATES 1987]
CLASSIC [BORGIDA et al. 1989], KRIS [BAADER and HOLLUNDER 1991], etc.
(see Chapter 8 of [BAADER et al. 2007] for a detail discussion). These early
system were not suitable for many practical application scenarios: either they
were not efficient enough or lacked completeness in the sense that only correct
answers could be identified by these system. Nevertheless they paved the way to
the modern systems. Most of the modern DL system are some optimized imple-
mentation of tableaux algorithms. Some are specifically designed for performing
reasoning tasks in less expressive DLs. For example, CEL [BAADER et al. 2006]
and ELK [KAZAKOV et al. 2012] are a highly optimized reasoner for the EL
family. For expressive DLs, some reasoners include Pellet [SIRIN et al. 2007],
RacerPro [HAARSLEV et al. 2012], FacT++ [TSARKOV and HORROCKS 2006],
etc.
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1.3 Toward a Richer Query Language
A query to a DL knowledge base is to check if a certain DL axiom is entailed by
the knowledge base. Similar to knowledge bases, we have several choices from
the DLs family for formulating these axioms . We call the DL for formulating
the knowledge base (query) as knowledge base (query) language. An important
question here is “Is it of interest to distinguish between the knowledge base lan-
guage and the query language?”. This question can be raised for any logic-based
knowledge representation formalism. Most of the time a query answering task can
be translated into some other basic reasoning tasks. Regardless of how expressive
a query language is, sometimes it does not suffice. Hector J. Levesque was the first
to observe this in-adequacy and argued for the need for a richer query language
in knowledge representation formalisms [LEVESQUE 1984]. He advocated the
idea of extending a querying language by the attribute knows denoted by K (also
called epistemic operator, used akin to modalities in modal logics). This operator
enhances the query language by knowledge base introspection capabilities. Reiter
makes a similar argument of in-adequacy of the standard first-order language for
querying in the context of databases [REITER 1992].
We now consider some examples in the context of description logics, that demon-
strate the in-adequacy of a DL as a query language. Consider a DL knowledge base
Σ containing the following axiom:
Wine v RedWine tWhiteWine, and
Wine(taylors-port)
stating that every wine is either a red wine or a white wine and that Taylor’s Port
is a wine. Now consider the query Σ |= RedWine(taylors-port)? asking if Taylor
Port is a red wine. Due to the incompleteness of information the answer to the
query is UNKNOWN i.e., we do not know if Taylor Port is a red wine or a white
wine. The epistemic operator (K) enables us asking such introspective question. To
perform an introspection of Σ, consider the query Σ |= KRedWine(taylors-port)?.
This query asks whether it is known that Taylor’s Port is a red wine. The answer
is simply NO as from the given axioms all we can conclude is that Taylor’s Port
7
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is a red wine or it is a white wine. Our knowledge regarding the type of wine
Taylor’s Port belongs to, is incomplete. Note that disjunction allows for modeling
incomplete information. Now adding the axiom
KWine v KRedWine t KWhiteWine
to the knowledge base enforces the condition that for any thing which is known
to be wine, its type (red or white) needs to be known as well. Such axioms are
sometimes called as integrity constraints as they require certain properties to be
satisfied by individuals of a problem domain.
Another construct to model incompleteness in DLs is via the existential quantifica-
tion. Suppose Σ contains the axiom
∃locatedIn.Region(taylors-port)
asserting that Taylor’s Port has some region as its origin. Again all we know is
that there is some region as the origin of this wine. Thus the answer to query Σ |=
∃locatedIn.Region(taylors-port)? is YES as so is asserted in Σ. On introspecting if
it is known what is the origin of Taylor’s Port, we get a negative answer i.e., the
answer to the query Σ |= ∃KlocatedIn.KRegion(taylors-port)? is NO.
The enhanced reasoning capabilities due the operator K has motivated many
researchers in extending DLs with this operator (cf. [DONINI et al. 1998],
[DONINI et al. 1992b], [DONINI et al. 1995], [DONINI et al. 1997],
[MEHDI et al. 2011], [MEHDI and RUDOLPH 2011b], etc.) Note that this is
not a straight forward task as introducing K in DLs introduces non-monotonicity
in the semantics.
1.4 Aims and Objectives
The previous section identifies the added value of enriching a query language
with the epistemic operator K for introspecting knowledge bases. The OWA taken
for the semantics of DLs allows us modeling incomplete information in a very
simple manner. This makes DLs very suitable for representing knowledge on the
8
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Web. Hence, the web ontology language (OWL) is founded with DLs as the basis.
Nevertheless, sometimes it is important for decision making to get answers for
queries under closed-world assumption. This has lead to investigate introspective
reasoning in DLs via the introduction of the epistemic operator K. The importance
of enriched DLs, for example, has been demonstrated in ([GRIMM et al. 2006])
via several application scenarios (specially in web services discovery).
Besides significantly additional capabilities, extensions of DLs with K have not
founded their way into the OWL specification. Classical work on such extensions
focuses on extending tableaux algorithms for less expressive languages. Some
recent work considers even more expressive formalisms capable of capturing the
epistemic extension of DLs but focuses mainly on theoretical aspects. Thus, to the
best of our knowledge, there is no reasoner capable of utilizing the K-operator for
introspection of the knowledge bases. We believe this is one of the main obstacles
in adapting query languages extended with the epistemic operator in practice.
The main objective of this work is to investigate the epistemic extension of ex-
pressive DLs and to devise an inference engine that match in performance with the
current state-of-the-art standard DL reasoners. The main objectives for this work
are:
• extending DL SROIQ with the operator K
• implementing an inference engine for reasoning in such an extension
In achieving our objective, we have identified three sub-goals:
Investigate the Traditional Approach of Extending DLs with K
The first epistemic extension explored was for the description logic
ALC. This extension was called ALCK where K stands for the operator
K [DONINI et al. 1992b]. The semantics employed for such an extension is based
on the possible-world approach: interpretations in DLs correspond to possibles
worlds in ALCK. The interpretation of the operator K depends on all the possible
worlds: claiming the “knowing” of some information requires the non-existence
9
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of a possibility of falsehood of the information. While considering a set of
possible worlds for the semantics, the question is how to interpret concepts,
roles and individuals across the worlds and what of sets to allow as domains
of interpretations? In classical or traditional semantics a fixed countable set is
assumed as the set of all interpretations under consideration. Meanwhile, the
semantics also enforces the uniformity of the interpretation of individual names.
These two assumptions are respectively called as the common domain assumption
and the rigid term assumption. However, later we will see that when extended
expressive DLs like SROIQ [HORROCKS et al. 2006] with the K operator,
certain constructs restrict the domains of interpretations to finite sets only, thus
contradicting the common domain assumption. Further, the rigid term assumption
enforces the unique assumption7 as well. Our first goal in this work is to identify
DLs for which the traditional semantics is applicable when extended with the
operator K. Further, we need to devise techniques for deciding the reasoning tasks
in such extensions.
Invent New Semantics for Expressive DLs like SROIQ
Since the traditional semantics is not adaptable for expressive DLs extended with
the operator K, the next goal is to come up with a new semantics for such exten-
sions. A comparison between the new semantics and the traditional one is to be
addressed as well.
Implement Efficient Inference Tool
Probably the most obvious reason of the epistemic extensions of DLs not making
their ways into OWL is the unavailability of efficient tools. Though, several highly
optimized inference engines are available for deciding reasoning tasks in DLs,
to the best of our knowledge, none of these engines are utilizable for epistemic
extensions of DLs. Thus as the final goal of this work, we strive for inventing an
efficient and practically feasible inference engine for the epistemic extensions of
7Under the unique name assumption (UNA) distinct individual names are interpreted by distinct
elements of the domain.
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expressive DLs.
Each of these sub-goals are addressed in different chapters of this work on which
we put light in the next section.
1.5 Guide to the Reader
The thesis in hand is divided into four parts. The first part introduces the basic
notions required as preliminaries. We also briefly discuss relevant literature in
this part. The goals set in the previous section are addressed in the second and
third part. These two parts in fact describe the main contribution of our work. In
the final part, we conclude this thesis by first discussing related work and then
presenting some final remarks along with a summary of the future work. We now
outline each part:
Chapter 1. This chapter introduces the reader to the research objective of this
work in an informal manner.
Part I: Foundation
Chapter 2. Formal introduction to description logics is presented in this chapter.
It mainly discussed the most expressive DL called SROIQ. Most of the DLs are
just fragment of SROIQ. After formally introducing the syntax and semantics of
SROIQ, the chapter offers an overview of different reasoning tasks in SROIQ.
Chapter 3. Some important non-monotonic logic formalisms are the topic of this
chapter. This lays foundations for understanding the non-monotonic extensions of
DLs which are discussed in Chapter 4.
Chapter 4. This chapter presents a bird-eye-view of different non-monotonic ex-
tensions of DLs including epistemic extension, thus provide a thorough under-
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standing of different research directions. Meanwhile we also discusses several
recent hyrbid8 formalisms against which we need to compare our approach.
Part II: Epistemic Queries and DLs
The main contribution of this thesis are presented in the chapters in this part.
Chapter 5. Examples and application scenarios are discussed to motivate the need
of enriching query languages with the operator K.
Chapter 6. The first sub-goal set in Section 1.4 is the topic of this chapter. We
identify the expressive DLs upto which the classical approach of embedding the K
operator in the query language can be taken. We then devise an algorithm for an-
swering the epistemic queries under the classical semantics. The results presented
in this chapter
Chapter 7. Extending expressive DLs like SROIQ with K is not possible under
the classical approach. This chapter presents a new semantics for such expressive
DLs. The semantics is back-ward compatible in the sense that for less expressive
DLs it behaves identical to the classical semantics so far the entailment of axioms
from a knowledge base is concerned. A reasoning technique for deciding reasoning
tasks is presented as well.
Part III: Implementation and Evaluation
This part highlights our contribution from the practical point of view i.e., we dis-
cuss implementation and evaluation of a inference engine we developed based on
the techniques introduced in the previous chapters.
Chapter 8. Based on the reasoning techniques introduced in Chapter 7, a tool is
implemented. The tool is based on black-box approach thus off-the-shelf reason-
ers can be used for performing reasoning. The practical feasibility of the tool is
advocated by some tests and evaluation results.
8By a hybrid formalism we mean combination of two or more different formalisms.
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Part IV: Conclusion
Chapter 9. In this chapter we compare our approach with some existing one. A
thorough comparison with the formalism presented in [MOTIK and ROSATI 2010]
is a minor contribution of this work as well.
Chapter 10. Some concluding remarks are presented in this chapter. We identify
some future goals.
1.6 List of Publications
Our results presented in this work are published at several conferences. The
content of Chapter 6 is based on our work presented in [MEHDI et al. 2011].
In [MEHDI and RUDOLPH 2011b] we presented a new semantics of epis-
temic extensions of expressive DLs which we discuss in Chapter 7. The
inference tool we present in Chapter 8 is based on a method we pre-
sented in [MEHDI and RUDOLPH 2011b, MEHDI and RUDOLPH 2011a] and
the optimization techniques we invented for our tool were presented in
[MEHDI and WISSMANN 2013].
One final remark, a basic familiarity with propositional and first-order logic is as-











Description Logics (DLs) are family of logic-based knowledge representation
formalisms. As decidable fragments of first-order logic, different DLs differ in
expressiveness and thus differ in computational complexity of the usual reasoning
tasks defined for DLs like knowledge base consistency, entailment of axioms from
a knowledge base etc. While light-weight DLs e.g., EL++ [BAADER et al. 2008]
are less expressive but common reasoning tasks in such formalisms can be solved in
polynomial time. Whereas expressive DLs like SROIQ [HORROCKS et al. 2006]
retain expressiveness at the cost of higher computational complexity.
Similar to other logic formalism, DLs have well-defined syntax and semantics
along with different reasoning tasks . In this chapter we formally introduce
SROIQ. Section 2.1.1 present syntax of SROIQ along with the notions of
knowledge base and several axioms. Semantics of DLs are based on the semantics
of first-order logic. Section 2.1.2 introduces semantics for SROIQ by present-
ing the notion of interpretation. Finally several reasoning tasks are introduced in
Section 2.2.
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2.1 Introducing Description Logic SROIQ
2.1.1 Syntax
As for the signature of SROIQ, we assume three finite and disjoint sets NC ,
NR and NI of concept names, role names and individual names respectively.1
Additionally, we have two special concepts, namely the top concept (>) and the
bottom concept (⊥). The set NR is partitioned into two sets namely, Rs and Rn of
simple and non-simple roles respectively. The set R of SROIQ roles is
R := U | NR | N−R
where U is called the universal role. Further, we define a function Inv on roles such
that Inv(R) = R− if R is a role name, Inv(R) = S if R = S− and Inv(U) := U .
SROIQ Concepts
The set of SROIQ (complex) concepts description or simply concepts2 is the
smallest set satisfying the following properties:
• every concept name A ∈ NC is a concept,
• >(top concept) and ⊥ (bottom concept) are concepts, and
• if C,D are concepts, R is a role, S is a simple role, a1, . . . , an are individual
names and n a non-negative integer then following are concepts:
1Finiteness, in particular for NI , is required for the further considerations. However note that the
signature is not bounded and can be extended whenever this should be necessary.
2In the sequel, by roles and concepts we mean SROIQ roles and SROIQ concept descriptions
unless stated otherwise.
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≤ nS.C (at least number restriction)
≥ nS.C (at most number restriction)
{a1, . . . , an} (nominals / one-of)
SROIQ Knowledge Bases
To define a SROIQ knowledge base, first we need to define its basic components.
RBox: A SROIQ RBox contains axioms specifying conditions on the roles. An
SROIQ RBox axiom is either a
• role inclusion axiom: (RIA) R1 ◦ · · · ◦ Rn v R where R1, . . . , Rn, R ∈ R
and if n = 1 and R1 ∈ Rs then R ∈ Rs, otherwise R ∈ Rn, or a
• role characteristic: Dis(R,R′) (role disjointness) with R,R ∈ Rs.
Now a SROIQ RBox R is a finite set of RBox axioms such that the following
condition is satisfied: There is a strict (irreflexive) total order ≺ on R such that
• S ≺ R iff Inv(S) ≺ R for R 6∈ {S, Inv(S)}and
• every RIA is of the form R ◦ R v R, Inv(R) v R, R1 ◦ . . . Rn v R,
R ◦R1 ◦ · · · ◦Rn v R or R1 ◦ · · · ◦Rn ◦R v R where R,R1 . . . , Rn ∈ R
and Ri ≺ R for 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
These conditions ensures the decidability of the reasoning
tasks [HORROCKS et al. 2006]. We usually call an RBox regular if it satis-
fies these conditions.
TBox: We first define GCIs. A SROIQ general concept inclusion axiom (GCI) is
an expression of the form C v D, where C and D are concepts. Now a SROIQ
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TBox is a finite set of SROIQ GCIs. TBoxes represent schema-level knowledge
i.e., by TBox we represents extensional knowledge of a problem domain.
ABox: A SROIQ ABox is a finite set of SROIQ ABox axioms which are of one
of the following types:
• C(a) called concept assertion
• R(a, b) called role assertion
• a .= b called equality assertion
• a 6 .= b called inequality assertion
Having defined all these notions, we now define SROIQ knowledge bases.
Definition 1. A SROIQ knowledge base is a tuple (T ,R,A) where T is a
SROIQ TBox,R is a SROIQ RBox and A is a SROIQ ABox.
We will drop the term SROIQ and simply refer to knowledge bases, TBoxes,
ABoxes, RBoxes, concepts and roles whenever it is clear from the context.
Sometimes knowledge bases are also called ontologies. We use these words
interchangeably.
2.1.2 Semantic
As a fragment of first-order logic, the approach to defining the semantics of
SROIQ is model-theoretic. Like in first-order logic, the semantics of SROIQ
does not allow us concluding falsehood of information given that its truth is not de-
ducible. This behavior is due to the open-world assumption taken in the SROIQ
semantics. Though having short-comes in certain scenarios, this enables us model-
ing incomplete information. For example, it is easy to express the fact that “every
person has parents who themselves are persons” without even specifying person
along without event listing the individuals explicitly. The TBox GCI
Person v ∃hasParent.Person
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formalizes this fact. Note that in formalism adhering to close-world semantics,
e.g., logic program, specifying the fact would require stating all people along with
their parents explicitly which simply is not possible in general.
For the semantics of SROIQ we have the notion of interpretations.
Definition 2. A SROIQ interpretation I = (∆I , ·I) is composed of a non-empty
set ∆I called the domain of I and a mapping function ·I such that:
• AI ⊆ ∆I for every concept name A;
• RI ⊆ ∆I ×∆I for every R ∈ NR;
• aI ∈ ∆I for every individual name a.
Further the universal role U is interpreted as a total relation on ∆I i.e., UI =
∆I ×∆I . The bottom concept ⊥ and top concept > are interpreted by ∅ and ∆I
respectively.
The mapping .I is extended to concepts as following where C,D are SROIQ
concepts, R is a role and S is a simple role, n is a non-negative integer and #M
represents the cardinality of a set M .
(¬C)I = ∆I \ CI
(∃S.Self)I = {x | (x, x) ∈ SI}
(C uD)I = CI ∩DI
(C tD)I = CI ∪DI
(∀R.C)I = {x ∈ ∆ | ∀y.(x, y) ∈ RI → y ∈ CI}
(∃R.C)I = {x ∈ ∆ | ∃y.(x, y) ∈ RI ∧ y ∈ CI}
(≤ nS.C)I =
{




x ∈ ∆ | #{y | (x, y) ∈ SI ∧ y ∈ CI} ≥ n
}
({a1, . . . , an})I = {aI1 , . . . , aIn}
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Similarly, the interpretation of the inverse of a role R is defined as follows:
(R−)I = {(x, y) | (y, x) ∈ RI}
Having defined interpretations, we now see how to interpret axioms in a given
interpretation. Given an axiom α (TBox, RBox or ABox axiom), we say an inter-
pretation I satisfies α, written I |= α, if it satisfies the corresponding condition
given in Table 2.1. Similarly I satisfies a TBox T , written I |= T , if it satisfies all
the axioms in T . The satisfaction of an RBox and an ABox by an interpretation is
defined analogously. We are mainly interested in interpretations that satisfy all the
components of a knowledge base.
Axiom α I |= α, if
C v D CI ⊆ DI
R1◦ · · · ◦Rn v R RI1 ◦ · · · ◦RIn ⊆ RI
Dis(S,T) SI ∩ T I = ∅
C(a) aI ∈ CI
R(a, b) (aI , bI) ∈ RI
a
.= b aI = aI
a 6 .= b aI 6= bI
Table 2.1: Semantics of SROIQ axioms
Definition 3. A given interpretation I satisfies a knowledge base Σ = (T ,R,A)
(written I |= Σ) if it satisfies T ,R and A in which case we call I a model of Σ.
Having defined the semantics of SROIQ, we next introduce several reasoning
tasks based on the notion of satisfaction.
2.2 Reasoning Problems in SROIQ
The very goal of a logic-based knowledge representation formalism is to deduc-
tively provide implicit information from the explicitly stated information. Deduc-
tion is usually understood in terms of entailment.
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Definition 4. For a given SROIQ knowledge base Σ and SROIQ axiom α we
say, Σ entails α (written as Σ |= α) if and only if for each model I of Σ we have
that I |= α.
Based on Definition 3 and Definition 4, we define the following reasoning tasks.
• consistency checking: in this task, we test if a given knowledge base is
consistent i.e., if it has a model.
• subsumption checking: for a given knowledge base Σ the subsumption
checking of a concept C by a concept D requires checking if Σ |= C v D.
• concept satisfiability checking: for a given knowledge base Σ and concept
C, the satisfiability checking requires finding a model I of Σ such that we
have CI 6= ∅. On the existence of such a model, the concept C is said to be
satisfiable with respect to Σ.
Note that satisfiability problem is reducible to subsumption problem: C is
unsatisfiable iff C is subsumed by ⊥.
• instance checking: for a given knowledge base Σ, concept C and individual
name a, this task checks if Σ |= C(a) in which case we say a to be an
instance of C.
Sometimes entailment of certain axioms is also called query answering. Formally,
Definition 5. We now define the notion of query answering. A queryQ to a knowl-
edge base Σ is of the form Σ |= α? where α is an axiom. In this work, we only
consider concept assertions as axioms in a query3. The answer to the query Q
(denoted by ans(Q)) is defined as follows:
ans(Q) =

YES if Σ |= α
NO if Σ |= ¬α
UNKNOWN otherwise
where by ¬α we mean ¬C(a) for α = C(a).
3This we do for the sack of simplicity. Our notions are applicable to other forms of axioms as
well.
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Before concluding this chapter one final remark. DLs are fragments of first-order
logic. Hence, any DL axiom (knowledge base) is expressible as first-order formula
(theory). Here we do not provide a description of this translation rather we refer




There come several formalisms that are “non-monotonic” in the sense that they
capture defeasible inference: inferencing where conclusions are based on the avail-
able information and thus retractable in the light of new information. To be more
formal, let Θ represent a theory in some logic L. Let Th(Θ) represents the set of
all formulas that are deducible from Θ i.e.,
Th(Θ) = {φ|Θ |= φ for an L formula φ}
Non-monotonicity of a logic depends on the behavior of the consequence relation
|=.
Definition 6. A logic L is non-monotonic if and only if Th(Θ) 6⊆ Th(Θ ∪Θ′) for
some theory Θ′.
Had L be a monotonic logic like DLs, the addition of new information does not
invalidate the previous drawn conclusions and thus would have been a monotonic
logic i.e., Th(Σ) ⊆ Th(Σ ∪ Σ′) with Σ and Σ′ theories of L. Note that Σ ∪ Σ′
represent the addition of new information.
Defeasible inferencing or reasoning are commonly observable in daily life.
Common sense reasoning is a prime example. In Section 1.1 of Chapter 1, we
presented the timetable example of trains from Karlsruhe to Paris. Lets consider a
daily life example where we make decisions considering certain facts by defaults.
When going for grocery on weekdays, by default we assume that the market is
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open. Though we do not know with certain if so is the case. Nevertheless we
take the decision based on the knowledge acquired due to routine. However, it
is quite possible that the market might be closed due to some construction work.
On knowing this, we can not further conclude that the market is open. Thus, we
retract from our conclusion which we would make by default and may choose
another market.
In this chapter we will present an overview of some important non-monotonic for-
malisms. We distinguish them in three categories:
• classical Non-Monotonic Formalisms
• logic Programs
• expressive Non-monotonic Formalisms
In the following we discuss these formalisms in detail. This will prove as prelimi-
nary in understanding non-monotonic reasoning in description logics which is the
topic of Chapter 4.
3.1 Classical Non-monotonic Formalisms
Some early non-monotonic formalisms include [MCDERMOTT and DOYLE 1980,
MCDERMOTT 1982, REITER 1980, MOORE 1983a, MCCARTHY 1980] but here
we limit ourselves to the following ones.
3.1.1 Default Logic
Default logic is one of the earlier approaches to capturing default reasoning. Con-
sider the following classic example in artificial intelligence. From the daily life,
we know that almost every bird flies except for penguins and some others. Given
a particular bird, we want to conclude that it flies so far we do not know if its one
of the exceptional birds. As described in [REITER 1980] at first it seems that a
first-order sentence representing the above rule:
∀x.Bird(x) ∧ ¬DisableBird(x)→ Fly(x)
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where DisableBird(x) is a disjunction of all birds that cannot fly i.e.,
DisableBird(x) = Penguin(x) ∨ Kiwi(x) ∨ Ostrich(x) ∨ . . .
Now given that tweety is a bird, we still are unable to conclude that tweety can
fly. The reason is that all we know is just that tweety is bird but we do not have
any information whether tweety is a Penguin, an Ostrich or a Kiwi, etc. Naturally
we want that by default every bird can fly and thus so does tweety i.e., if tweety
is a bird and there is no information regarding if it is one of the disabled birds,
conclude that it can fly. By the absence of information here we mean that it is
consistent to assume that a bird can fly. We now introduce the notion of default
rules for representing such defaults.
Definition 7. A default rule (or just default) is of the form:
ϕ : ψ1, . . . , ψn
ξ
where ϕ,ψ1, . . . , ψn, ξ are closed first-order formulas1. Further, we call
• the formula as the prerequisite,
• ψ1, . . . , ψn as the justifications, and
• ξ as the consequent
of the default rule.
A default rule as in the above definition is read as “If ϕ holds and it is consistent
to assume that ψ1, . . . , ψn hold, then conclude ξ”. For the above bird example, the
default rule thus can be represented as follows,
Bird(x) : Fly(x)
Fly(x)
which is read as “If x is bird and it is consistent to assume that x can fly, then infer
that x can fly”.
1Instead of first-order logic, one can define the notion of default for any other logic.
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In Default Logic, theories are thus a set of formulas and axioms along with a set of
default rules. We called them as default theories.
Definition 8. A default theory T is a pair (W,D) consisting of a set of formulas
W and a set of defaults D.
As for the semantics of default logic, we have already mentioned that a de-
fault ϕ,ψ1,...,ψnξ is to be interpreted as “if ϕ holds, and it is consistent to assume
ψ1, . . . , ψn, then conclude ξ” [ANTONIOU 1996]. To this end we present the no-
tion of extensions based on a fixed-point operator defined below.
Definition 9. Given a default theory T = (W,D) withD containing defaults of the
form ϕ : ψ1, . . . , ψn/ξ, for any set of closed formulas E, let Γ(E) is the smallest
set satisfying:
• W ⊆ Γ(E)
• Th(Γ(S)) = Γ(E)
• if (ϕ : ψ1, . . . , ψn/ξ) ∈ D and ϕ ∈ Γ(E), and ¬ψ1, . . . ,¬ψn 6∈ S, then
ξ ∈ Γ(E)
where by Th(Γ(E)) we mean the set of all closed formulas deducible from Γ(E).
We called the set E as an extension of T if and only if Γ(E) = E i.e., E is the fixed
point of Γ.
Note that we can think of an extension of a default theory as a set of accept-
able beliefs [REITER 1980]. For our bird example, let TB = (WB, DB) be
the theory representing the scenario. Here we simplify the example by assum-
ing the set WB = {Bird(tweety),Disabled(tweety) → ¬Fly(tweety)} and DB =
{Bird(tweety) : Fly(tweety)/Fly(tweet)}. Now let EB a set closed formulas such
that
EB = {Bird(tweety),Disabled(tweety)→ ¬Fly(tweety),Fly(tweety)}
It is easy to see that EB is an extension of TB . Thus, by default we can con-
clude that tweety can fly. Now if only later we come to know that tweety is
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one of the disable birds i.e., if Disable(tweety) holds. Then ¬Fly(tweety) must
hold as well. Consequently we get WB = {Bird(tweety),Disabled(tweety) →
¬Fly(tweety),¬Fly(tweety)}. Hence we need to retract from our previous conclu-
sion that Fly(tweety) and thus EB is no more an extension. In this case, the only
extension of TB is the set
{Bird(tweety),Disabled(tweety)→ ¬Fly(tweety),¬Fly(tweety)}
For further discussion regarding different types of default rules and theories and
their characteristics we refer the interested reader to [ANTONIOU 1996].
3.1.2 Autoepistemic Logic
Autoepistemic logic is a nonmonotonic formalism invented in early 80s by
Moore [MOORE 1983a]. This logic enables us of questioning our own knowledge
i.e., introspective capabilities. Thus the world “autoepistemic” coined to mean re-
flection upon self-knowledge. For example, assuming that John is a regular student,
consider the question “Is there a quiz next week?”. Since there was no announce-
ment about it in the lecture hall, John replies “No, else I would have known about
it.” Note that, we can not claim of John’s knowledge to be complete. He is just
making a conjecture in reply negatively. Suppose only later John comes to know
via the homepage of the coarse that indeed there is a quiz next week. Now John
knows about the happening of the quiz and thus the conclusion drawn earlier is
not valid any more. Notice the difference between default reasoning and autoepis-
temic reasoning. The former deals in capturing reasoning by defaults whereas
the latter is context-sensitive. Conclusions drawn by an agent in autoepistemic
logic are based on the knowledge of the agent or what the agent believes. Dif-
ferent agents believe differently and thus draw conclusions differently. We quote
Moore [MOORE 1983a]
“...The nonmonotonicity associated with autoepistemic statements
should therefore be no more puzzling than the fact that ‘I am hungry’
can be true when uttered by a particular speaker at a particular time,
but false when uttered by a different speaker at the same time or the
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same speaker at a different time. So we might say that, whereas default
reasoning is nonmonotonic because it is defeasible, autoepistemic rea-
soning is nonmonotonic because it is indexical.”
Formally, we now define the language of autoepistemic logic.
Definition 10. Autoepistemic (AE) formulas 2 are the smallest set satisfying the
following:
• each closed first-order formula is an AE formula
• if ϕ is an AE formula, then so is Kϕ
• if ϕ and ψ are AE formulas, then so are ¬ϕ and (ϕ ∨ ψ)
An autoepistemic (AE) theory is then just a a set of AE-formulas.
The symbol K before a formula reflects knowledge/belief about it. For example,
Kϕ can be read as “I know/believe ϕ”. Lets make an statement about Brazilians
liking football. We want to state that if I do not know whether a Brazilian likes
football, then I conclude that he likes football. We formalize this by the following
AE formula:
Brazilian ∧ ¬K¬likesFootball→ likesFootball
The original semantics for autoepistemic logic is based on the notion of au-
toepistemic interpretations [MOORE 1983a, MOORE 1983b]. Here we rather take
the possible-world approach for the semantics as introduced in [MOORE 1984].
For this we define the notion of autoepistemic interpretations which are de-
fine in terms of S5 structures. As a remainder, S5 structures are Kripke struc-
tures [KRIPKE 1971, BLACKBURN et al. 2006] where the accessibility relation is
an equivalence relation.
Definition 11. An autoepistemic interpretations is a S5 structure (I,R,W ) where
I is an first-order interpretation, W is a set of first-order interpretations and R is
an accessibility relation i.e., R := W ×W 7→ W . The interpretation of an AE
2Again we consider first-order autoepistemic logic here, though the notions can be defined for
other logics as well.
30
3.1. CLASSICAL NON-MONOTONIC FORMALISMS
formula ϕ such that ϕ does not contain K i.e., ϕ is a first-order logic formula, can
be defined analogous to first-order logic by considering the interpretation I only.
For a given AE formula of the form Kϕ, (I,R,W ) satisfies Kϕ or Kϕ is true in
(I,R,W ) (written (I,R,W ) |= Kϕ) iff J |= ϕ for each J such that (I, J) ∈ R.
To decide entailment of an AE theory, we are interested in certain autoepistemic
interpretations defined as follows:
Definition 12. For a given AE theory T , an autoepistemic interpretation (I,R,M)
is called an autoepistemic model of T iff
• (I,R,M) |= ϕ for each ϕ ∈ T , and
• the accessibility relation R is total i.e., every world is accessible from every
world.
We write (I,R,M) |= T
In [MOORE 1987] such S5 structures are called complete S5 structures. Note that
for an autoepistemic model (I,R,M), since the accessibility is a total and equiv-
alence relation, we simply write (I,M). We can further simplify the notation by
representing the model (I,R,M) just by M . The justification for this simplifica-
tion is that since R is total, hence if we have (I,M) |= ϕ for some AE formula ϕ,
then (J,M) |= ϕ for each J ∈M . In other words, we have
∃I ∈M : (I,M) |= ϕ⇔ ∀I ∈M : (I,M) |= ϕ
Now an autoepistemic model M of theory T is just a set of interpretations such
that (I,M) |= T for all I ∈M . We will use similar notion of autoepistemic mod-
els for epistemic extension of description logics defined in the subsequent chapters.
Coming back to the example about a Brazilian liking football, consider the AE
theory
T = {Brazilian ∧ ¬KlikesFootball→ likesFootball,Brazilian}
An autoepistemic model of T is the set M containing all the interpretations which
contain the propositions Brazilian and likesFootball.
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3.1.3 Circumscription
Circumscription is yet another way of formalizing nonmonotonic reasoning intro-
duced by McCarthy [MCCARTHY 1980]. Unlike default logic and autoepistemic
logic, in circumscription for certain predicates we minimize (circumscribe) the set
of objects for which the predicates are true. For a given first-order theory T , the
set of predicates which we want to circumscribed is denoted by circ(T ).
Lets consider the following first-order theory T containing the following formulas
∀x.(Bird(x) ∧ ¬Disable(x)→ Fly(x))
Bird(tweety)
Under the classical first-order logic, we can not deduce Fly(tweety) as we can
not prove Disable(tweety). In circumscription, we circumscribe the predicate
Disable i.e., we minimize the set of all objects c for which Disable(c) is true.
In our example, since there is no evidence about tweety being a disable bird.
Thus we add the formula ∀x.(¬Disable(x)) to the set circ(T ). Now concluding
that Fly(tweety) requires considering certain models of T . In this example, we
consider only models I of T in which DisableI = ∅. This allows us to conclude
¬Disable(tweety) and consequently Fly(tweety). Note that later if we come to
know the fact Disable(tweety), we eliminate all the models I of T for which the
set DisableI is strictly larger than {tweety}. In that case, we have to retract from
the conclusion Fly(tweety).
The above example explains circumscription in an informal way. A detailed de-
scription of the formalisms is given in ([ANTONIOU 1996, MCCARTHY 1980]).
3.2 Logic Programs
Rule-based formalisms are well-studied approaches to knowledge representation.
Some are fragments of first-order logic like datalog and others are even not com-
parable with first-order logic. The community of rule-based formalisms is now
very old and several annual conferences focus on such formalisms including ICLP,
LPNMR, ILP etc. Here we focus on a non-monotonic rules only. For first-order
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(monotonic) rules, one can refer to [KRÖTZSCH 2010, HORROCKS et al. 2004]
etc. The formalisms with non-monotonic rules usually known as normal logic
programs (NLPs).
To define an NLP, the signature A is a countably infinite disjoint set of constants,
predicate symbols and functions symbols along with a countably infinite set of
variables. A term over A is defined as follows:
• all the variables and constants are term
• if t, . . . , tn are terms and f is function symbol of arity n then, f(t1, . . . , tn)
is a term as well.
An atom overA is of an expression of the form P (t1, . . . , tn), where P is an n-ary
predicate and t1, . . . , tn are terms. Then a literal is an atom A or default negated
atom not A. ByHwe represent the set of all ground atoms and call it the Herbrand
Base of A.
Definition 13. A Normal Logic Program (NLP) is a set of rules r of the form:
H ← B1, . . . , Bn, not C1, . . . , not Cm
where H,B1, . . . , Bn, C1, . . . , Cm are atoms and m,n ≥ 0 are finite integers.
Further, H is called the head of r, where as B1, . . . , Bn, C1, . . . , Cm are the body
atoms of r. A fact is a rule with empty body i.e., a rule of the form H ←. We
abbreviate a fact H ← by H .
As an example of NLP consider the program P containing the following rule
picnic← sunny, not strike
The negation not (usually called as the default negation) introduces nonmono-
tonicity in reasoning. It is in contrast to the classical negation ¬. Default negation
is interpreted as “if is un-provable”. Thus the above rule states that if it is a sunny
day and it is not provable that there is a strike, then we go to picnic. Note that
if later we come to know that there indeed is a strike, we can no more conclude
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picnic, thus retracting from our previous conclusion.
There is no one semantics that the logic program adheres to. Among many, the
two-valued stable model semantics [GELFOND and LIFSCHITZ 1988] and the
three-valued well-founded semantics [GELDER et al. 1991] are probably the most
popular ones. Stable model semantics is two-valued in the sense that truth values
true or false are assign to the atoms in the semantics whereas the three-valued
may also assigns a third value of unknown. A recent semantics for NLPs called
the minimal hypothesis semantics is presented [PINTO and PEREIRA 2011] which
is two-valued as well but exhibits certain characteristics like commulativity,
relevance, model existence etc (cf. [PINTO 2011] for thorough discussion). In this
work, we mainly focus on the stable models and well-founded semantics. Note that
the answer set programming [GELFOND and LIFSCHITZ 1991, LIFSCHITZ 2008]
is based the stable model semantics. In the following we assume that
the reader is familiar with definite logic programs and their seman-
tics (cf [NILSSON and MALUSZYNSKI 1995, LLOYD 1987] etc. ).
3.2.1 Stable Model Semantics
We first describe the notion of two-valued interpretations. A (two-value) interpre-
tation I for an NLP P is a set of ground literals such that
I = I+ ∪H \ I+
whereHP is the Herbrand base of P and I+ ⊆ HP is the a set of atoms. An atom
A is true in an interpretation I iff A ∈ I+ whereas a literal not A is true in I iff
A 6∈ I+. We say I satisfies a rule r of the form
H ← B1, . . . , Bn, not C1, . . . , not Cm
iff H is true in I whenever B1, . . . , Bn, not C1, . . . , not Cm are true in I . Finally
I is a model of P iff I satisfies all the the rules in P .
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The stable models of NLP are defined in terms of Gelfond-Lifschitz opera-
tor [ALFERES and PEREIRA 1996].
Definition 14. Let I be a two-value interpretation of an NLP P . The GL-
transformation of P modulo I is the program P|I obtained from P by deleting:
• each rule with a literal not B in its body from P such that B ∈ I;
• all the negative literals in the bodies of the remaining rules.
Since P|I is a positive or a definite program (i.e., without negative literals), it has
unique minimal model that is its minimal Herbrand Model J . The GL-operator Γ
is then defined as Γ(I) := J .
The fixed-point of the operator Γ preserves the modelhood of P i.e., Γ(I) is a
model of P as well. The stable models of P are defined based on Γ(P ).
Definition 15. Given a two-valued interpretation I , we say I is a stable model of
an NLP P iff Γ(I) = I . An atom A is true under the stable model semantics of P
iff A belongs to all the stable models of P .
As an example consider the following program:
P = {picnic← sunny, not strike
sunny}
Let M = {sunny, picnic}. Thus, we get
PM = {picnic← sunny
sunny}
Now the minimal (Herbrand) model of PM is {picnic, sunny} which is the same
as M . Hence, M is a stable model of P . In fact, it is the only stable model of P .
Thus, we can say that sunny (and similarly picnic) is true under the stable model
semantics of P .
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Note that there are programs with more than one stable models. E.g., the program
with only rules
A← not B
B ← not A
has two stable models namely {A} and {B}. Meanwhile there are programs with
no stable models at all. For example, the program
{A← not A}
has no stable models.
3.2.2 Well-Founded Semantics
Again we first define the notion of three-valued interpretations. The three-valued
interpretation I of a given NLP P is defined as a set T ∪ not F where T and F
are disjoint subsets of H(P ) containing atoms true respectively false in I . The
truth values of the remaining atoms are undefined (the third truth value). Note
that every two-valued interpretation by definition is a three-value interpretation as
well. In such a case, we have T ∪ F = H(P ).
In well-founded semantics, models are three-valued interpretations. We can de-
fine the well-found semantics based by extending GL-operator of the stable model
semantics. Like in two-valued interpretations, every positive program has three-
valued least model [PRZYMUSINSKA and PRZYMUSINSKI 1990].
Definition 16. Given an NLP P , let I be three-valued interpretation. The extended
GL-transformation of P modulo I is the program P|I obtained by:
• deleting each rule with a literal not B in its body from P such that B ∈ I;
• replacing in the remaining rules of P literals of the form not B by u3, for
which B is unknown;
• deleting all the negative literals in the bodies of the remaining rules.
3u represent the third truth value i.e., the unknown
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P|I is a program without negative literals and thus has a unique three-valued least
model J . We define Γ ∗ (I) = J
Based on the operator Γ∗, we now define partial stable models. For a given NLP P ,
a three-valued interpretation I of P is called partial stable model of P iff Γ∗ (I) =
I . The well-founded semantics is then defined as following:
Definition 17. Given an NLP P , let I(P ) represents the set of all partial stable
models of P . An interpretation I ∈ I(P ) is called well-founded model of P iff I is
the least partial stable model of P in the sense that I ⊆ J for each J ∈ I(P ).
To compute a well-founded model of program, we can use Γ∗ iteratively starting
with the empty interpretation (cf. [ALFERES and PEREIRA 1996] for details and
an example.).
3.3 Expressive Formalisms
In this section, we introduce the logic of minimal knowledge and negation as
failure usually abbreviated as MKNF [LIFSCHITZ 1991] which is very similar to
the logic of minimal belief and negation as failure (MBNF) [LIFSCHITZ 1994].
MKNF is expressive enough to capture many of the existing nonmonotonic
formalisms. We introduce MKNF for propositional logic whereas the notions can
easily be extended to the first-order logic (see [MOTIK and ROSATI 2008]).
Definition 18. Given a set of proposition letters {p1, . . . , pn}, the set of (proposi-
tional) MKNF formula is the smallest set such that:
• every propositional letter pi (1 ≤ i ≤ n) is an MKNF formula,
• if ϕ is an MKNF formula, so are ¬ϕ, Kϕ and not ϕ
• if ϕ and ψ are MKNF formula, so is ϕ ∨ ψ
Where we use ϕ ∧ ψ and ϕ → ψ as an abbreviation to ¬(¬ϕ ∨ ¬ψ) and ¬ϕ ∨ ψ
respectively. An MKNF theory is then just a set of MKNF formulas.
37
CHAPTER 3. NONMONOTONIC LOGIC FORMALISMS
For the semantics of MKNF, the possible-world approach is adapted by defining
the notion of MKNF interpretation. As usual, an (propositional) interpretation is a
set of atoms. We denote the set of all interpretations with I.
Definition 19. An MKNF interpretation is a tuple (I,WK,Wnot ) such that I is
an interpretation whereas WK and Wnot are set of interpretations. The truth
value of an MKNF formula in (I,WK,Wnot ) is defined as follows:
• if ϕ is an atom (proposition letter), ϕ is true in (I,WK,Wnot ) iff ϕ ∈ I .
• ¬ϕ is true in (I,WK,Wnot ) iff ϕ is not true in (I,WK,Wnot ).
• ϕ ∨ ψ is true in (I,WK,Wnot ) iff either ϕ is true in (I,WK,Wnot ) or ψ
is true in (I,WK,Wnot ).
• Kϕ is true in (I,WK,Wnot ) iff ϕ is true in (J,WK,Wnot ) for all J ∈WK.
• not ϕ is true in (I,WK,Wnot ) iff there is an interpretation J ∈Wnot such
that ϕ is not true in (J,WK,Wnot ).
If a formula ϕ is true in an MKNF interpretation (I,WK,Wnot ), we write
(I,WK,Wnot ) |= ϕ. An MKNF theory T is true in (I,WK,Wnot ) (written as
(I,WK,Wnot ) |= T ) iff for each formula ϕ ∈ T we have (I,WK,Wnot ) |= ϕ.
For a given MKNF theory T , a set of interpretations M is called an MKNF model
of T if and only if
1. (I,M,M) |= T for each I ∈M , and
2. M is a maximal set with this property i.e., there is no set M ′ with M 6= M ′
and M ⊆M ′ such that (I,M ′,M) |= T .
The requirement of the maximality of M introduces non-monotonicity of reason-
ing in MKNF. It is this requirement that enforces the minimality of knowledge.
The more the worlds (interpretations) are there in M for an MKNF interpretation
(I,M,N), the fewer are the formula of the form Kϕ that are true in (I,M,N). As
an example consider the MKNF theory T given as follows
T = {Ksunny ∨ Kcloudy}
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where sunny and cloudy are just propositional letters. Since there is no MKNF
formula in T with not occurring in it, we can drop the third component of the
MKNF interpretations we consider. This is possible as third component is relevant
only for interpreting formulas containing not . Note that there are two MKNF
models of T : the first is the set of all interpretations in which sunny is true and the
second is the set of all interpretations in which cloudy is true.
The prime interest of introducing the MKNF formalism is its capability in cap-
turing most of the approaches to nonmonotonic reasoning. We elaborate it in the
following.
MKNF and NLPs
A normal logic program P can be translated into an MKNF theory PMKNF such
that every stable model of P corresponds to an MKNF model of PMKNF. Formally
let r be a rule in P and suppose it has the following form:
A← B1, . . . , Bn, not C1, . . . , not Cm
Then its translation rMKNF is given as following
rMKNF = KB1 ∧ · · · ∧ KBn ∧ not C1 ∧ · · · ∧ not Cm → A
Now P can be translated into PMKNF as following
PMKNF = {rMKNF | r ∈ P}
We now establish correspondence between stable models of P and MKNF models
of PMKNF. For any set of atoms I , let ω(I) represents the set of all supersets
of I i.e., ω(I) = {J | I ⊆ I}. Suppose that M(P ) represents the set of all
stable models of P , then the set of all MKNF models PMKNF is given as by the
set {ω(M) | M(P )}. This relationship has been proved in (Theorem 1.Part B
[GELFOND and LIFSCHITZ 1988]).
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MKNF and Default Logic
For a given default rule r of the form
ϕ : ψ1, . . . , ψn
ξ
It’s translation is represented by rMKNF and given as the the following MKNF
formula
rMKNF = Kϕ ∧ not ¬ψ1 ∧ · · · ∧ not ¬ψn → Kξ
Similarly, a set of default rulesD can be translated into an MKNF theory DMKNF
given as follows:
DMKNF = {rMKNF | r ∈ D}
For a default theory (W,D) and a formula ϕ4, we have that ϕ is in every extension
of (W,D) if and only if W ∪ DMKNF |= ϕ. For proof and technical details we
refer to [GELFOND and LIFSCHITZ 1988].
The first-order version of MKNF is presented in [MOTIK and ROSATI 2008]. It
is one of the most expressive hybrid formalisms5 that can expresses most of the
approaches to nonmonotonic reasoning in OWL.
We have seen so far different approaches to defeasible reasoning. These ap-
proaches have been extended to embed non-monotonic reasoning of some kind
in description logics. In the next chapter, we put light on some of the important
ones.
4Note that earlier we defined default logic for the first-order logic, but here we consider proposi-
tional default logic only and thus ϕ is a propositional formula
5Hybrid in the sense that it can capture combination of first-order logic with logic programs.
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Towards Defeasible Reasoning in
OWL
In this chapter we provide an overview of different approaches to nonmonotonic
reasoning in OWL. We have seen different nonmonotonic logic in the previous
chapter. A somewhat similar development of formalisms can be observed in OWL
community when it comes to defeasible inferencing. Probably the most mature
work in this respect include approaches presented in [MOTIK and ROSATI 2008]
and [KNORR et al. 2008]. We discuss the former in detail in this chapter. The
latter is a similar approach but not directly comparable with our work. Hence, we
will briefly introduce it. In the following section we outline some of the drawbacks
of using DLs and thus OWL for representing knowledge.
4.1 Short-comes of Description Logics
Historically, DLs can be seen as a successor of the framed-base sys-
tems [MINSKY 1974] and semantic networks [QUILLIAN 1968]. As the semantics
of DLs is first-order based, this leaves out several features of framed-base system
that are important for modeling a problem domain. In [DONINI et al. 1998], these
features have been classified into different groups of which we are interested only
in two:
• query features: there are scenarios where a somewhat enriched query lan-
guage is required. Some example were presented in Section 1.3 of Chapter 1.
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• nonmonotonic features: capabilities to captures incomplete information.
These lack of expressiveness in DLs is due to the open-word assumption in seman-
tics. Consequently, introspection and nonmonotonic inferencing cannot be cap-
tured in standard DLs [MOTIK and ROSATI 2008] and hence DLs are impotent in
• axiomatizing integrity constraints e.g., the constraint that ‘for each wine, the
sugar level should be known’ is impossible to be expressed in DLs,
• handling close-world reasoning i.e., to draw conclusion when certain facts
can not be proved,
• reasoning by default e.g., by default birds can fly.
Besides, to acquire decidability in DLs, several syntactic restrictions are imposed.
For example in DLs we are not allowed to formalize a non-tree-like-relationship.
Yet another drawback, though not a serious one, is the lack of higher arity
predicates symbols other than unary and binary. Sometimes, there are rela-
tionships that can be expressed more intuitively using predicates with higher.
Although, such relationships can be expressed using binary predicates only via
reification [HITZLER et al. 2009], it is a quite tedious and unintuitive task as most
of the time, humans are responsible for modeling a problem domain.
The quest for a richer formalism i.e., a formalisms composing all the features of
DLs and still enable to overcome the aforementioned problems, has led several
researchers to looking for new or hybrid formalisms (formalisms obtained from
combining different formalisms e.g., DLs with rules.) In the following section we
discuss some important work in this respect.
4.2 Defeasible Reasoning in DLs
We distinguish the approaches to non-monotonic reasoning in DLs into three cat-
egories. The first group covers classical approaches to non-monotonicity in DLs.
A combination of DLs with ruled-based formalisms are discussed in the second
group. Finally the more expressive approaches are discussed in the third group.
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Note that we did a some similar categorization of non-monotonic formalisms in
Chapter 3. This indeed is intentional as we observe a similar trend in the devel-
opment of embedding nonmonotonic features in DLs as in nonmonotonic logic
formalisms community.
4.2.1 Classical Approaches
The approaches we present here are default and DLs, circumscription in DLs, and
autoepistemic reasoning in DLs. Although we present an overview to the first two,
our main focus in this Section is on autoepistemic reasoning in DLs as it is highly
related to our work.
Defaults and Description Logics
One of the early approaches to nonmonotonic reasoning in DLs is the embedding of
defaults in DLs presented in [BAADER and HOLLUNDER 1992]. We have already
seen that pure DLs are incapable of capturing reasoning by defaults. Normally the
embedding of defaults in DLs introduces undecidability of reasoning. However,
[BAADER and HOLLUNDER 1992] acquires decidability by restricting the appli-
cation of defaults to the named individuals only: individual names that explicitly
occur in a knowledge base. Note that DLs are fragments of first-order logic, and
a DL knowledge base Σ can be considered as a theory (ΣFOL, ∅) in default logic
where ΣFOL represents the first-order equivalent theory of Σ. However in the fol-
lowing we stick to the notion as per [BAADER and HOLLUNDER 1992] where only
ABoxes are considered.
A DL default theory/knowledge base is a pair (K,D) whereK is a DL KB andD is
a finite set of defaults rules with concepts as their prerequisites, justifications and
consequents. For example, consider the knowledge base
K = {Bird v FlyingBird t NonFlyingBird, Bird(tweety)}
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stating that every bird is either a flying bird or a non-flying bird and that tweety is a
bird. Now the default rule that birds fly by default can be formalized as following
Bird : FlyingBird
FlyingBird
Hence, for a set D containing the above rule, (K,D) is a DL default theory.
As for semantics, we still have the notion of extensions but we do not dis-
cuss it here. A thorough discussion along with some examples can be found in
[BAADER and HOLLUNDER 1992].
Circumscription
The idea of non-monotonic inferencing via circumscription of predicates can eas-
ily be applied to DLs as DLs are fragments of first-order logic. In DLs, con-
cepts as well as roles can be circumscribed. Note that in circumscription we have
preferential semantics in the sense that we prefer some models (namely, the min-
imal ones) with respect to the set of circumscribed predicates. Similarly, for a set
M ⊆ NC ∪ NR of concepts and roles (that are to be circumscribed), we define a
preference relation <M with respect to M on interpretations. For any two inter-
pretations I and J , we say I <M J if
• ∆I=∆J
• aI = aJ for each a ∈ NI
• for each concept C ∈ M (role R ∈ M ), we have that CI ⊂ CJ (RI ⊂
RJ )1
• for each concept C ∈ NC ∪ NR \M (role R ∈ NC ∪ NR \M ), we have
that CI = CJ (RI = RJ )
Now the reasoning tasks can be defined as in DLs but considering the min-
imal models only. For further details see [BAADER and HOLLUNDER 1992,
BONATTI et al. 2009]. A form of nonmonotonic inferencing called local closed-
word reasoning via circumscription is presented in [KRISNADHI et al. 2011] where
1By ⊂ we mean strict subset relation i.e., C ⊂ D iff C ⊆ D but C 6= D.
44
4.2. DEFEASIBLE REASONING IN DLS
as [GRIMM and HITZLER 2009] presents a tableaux based algorithm for reasoning
in circumscriptive ALCO2.
Autoepistemic Description Logic
The formalisms discussed now are the most relevant ones regarding our work. In
fact, the epistemic extension of DLs like SROIQ that we present in this work,
are just motivated by these early approaches: we mainly extend the notions of
autoepistemic logic to expressive DLs as well as invent new reasoning techniques.
Early work on extending DLs with the epistemic operator K in-
clude [DONINI et al. 1992b, DONINI et al. 1992a] where the logic ALCK
(DL ALC extended with the operator K) is presented. The syntax of ALCK
is very much similar to ALC except that we now allow for K to occur within
concepts. Formally, an ALCK concept C is defined as follows:
C ::= A|¬C|C t C|C u C|∃R.C|∀R.C|KC
where A is a concept and R is an ALCK role defined as
R ::= P |KR
with P a role name.
The notion of axioms, TBox, RBox, ABox and knowledge base can be defined
similar to standard ALC but now considering ALCK concept and roles.
As for the semantics, we define the notion of ALCK interpretation base on the
possible world approach similar to the one presented in [LIFSCHITZ 1991]. Such
an approach is quite straight forward for propositional logic: each world corre-
spond to the set of proposition that are true in that world (see Section 3.1.2).
Similarly in (any fragment of) first-order logic with some modal operator (like
K here), each world corresponds to an interpretation. However several issues need
2A DL that allows for nominals besides being boolean complete.
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to be addressed once the interpretations are more than just set of proposition let-
ters [FITTING and MENDELSOHN 1998]. Here two main questions are:
1. Do the domains of interpretation vary across the worlds?
2. Do the interpretation of individual names vary across the worlds?
To address these issue the following two assumptions are made in defining the
semantics of ALCK.
• All the interpretations under consideration are defined over a fixed infinite
domain. This is also called as the common domain assumption (CDA).
• The interpretation of individual names is fixed i.e., in every interpretation an
individual is mapped to the same element of the domain. This is termed as
the rigid term assumption (RTA).
Based on these two assumptions, the notion of ALCK interpretations is defined as
follow:
Definition 20. An ALCK interpretation is a pair (I,W) where I is an ALC in-
terpretation andW is a set of ALC interpretations. Let ∆ represent the common
domain of the interpretation under consideration. Interpretation of concepts and
roles are then given as following:
>I,W = ∆
⊥I,W = ∅
(C uD)I,W = CI,W∩DI,W
(C tD)I,W = CI,W∪DI,W
(¬C)I,W = ∆ \ CI,W
(∃R.Self)I,W = {x | (x, x)∈RI,W}
(∃R.C)I,W = {x | ∃y.(x, y)∈RI,W ∧ y∈CI,W}
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Note that for the ALCK concepts of the form KC (and similarly for roles of the
form KR), the interpretation of KC is defined as the intersection of the extensions
of C in all the interpretations inW . Thus the operator K is interprated in the same
way as the operator  in modal logic. The intuition is that for a given x ∈ ∆, we
say x is known to be a member of the class represented by C if x is a member of
the class in each possible world (interpretation).
The notion of satisfiability of axioms, TBox, RBox, ABox and knowledge base is
obvious e.g., for ALCK concept C and D, an ALCK interpretation I,W satisfies
a GCI C v D if and only if CI,W ⊆ DI,W in which case write I,W |= C v D.
The notion of models in ALCK is defined as follow:
Definition 21. Given anALCK knowledge base Σ and a set ofALC interpretation
W such that
• I,W satisfies all the axioms in Σ i.e., I,W |= Σ for each I ∈ W .
• W is a maximal set with this property i.e., there is no setW ′ of ALC inter-
pretation such thatW ⊂W ′ and I,W ′ |= Σ.
The second condition indeed induces nonmonotonic behavior in the reasoning
since only maximal sets of interpretations are preferred as models. Hence, the
semantics is preferential. As an important remark, note the correspondence
between ALCK interpretations/models and the MKNF interpretations/models
defined in Section 3.3.
In [DONINI et al. 1998], the notion of answer to a query is presented which we use
in this work as well. Given anALCK knowledge base Σ, anALCK concept C and
an individual name a, a query is of the form Σ |= C(a)?. The answer to a query Q
of the form Σ |= C(a)? is denoted by ans(Q) and is defined as following:
ans(Q) =

YES if Σ |= C(a)
NO if Σ |= ¬C(a)
UNKNOWN otherwise
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There are several scenarios where a DL enriched with the operator K is useful (cf.
[DONINI et al. 1998, DONINI et al. 1992b]). We will come back to the usefulness
of epistemic extension of DLs in Chapter 5.
4.2.2 Description Logic and Rules
When it comes to combining DLs with rules there are several choices for types
of rules. Approaches to such combinations can be categorized into: monotonic
rule (e.g., rules in datalog) and nonmonotonic rule approaches. Here by latter
we mean a rule that allows for default negation ‘not ’. In this work, we focus
only on the latter. For the monotonic rule approaches we refer the interested
reader to [KRÖTZSCH 2010]. In the following we discuss some of the important
hybrid formalisms (i.e., formalisms combining rules and description logic) that
are capable of capturing defeasible reasoning of some kind. Note that a direct
combination of rules (both monotonic and nonmonotonic) with DLs leads to
undecidability. Different techniques have been introduced to acquire decidability
by restricting the interaction of rules with DLs axioms in one way or the other.
DL+ log
In DL+log [ROSATI 2006a], a knowledge base K is a tuple (Σ,P) with Σ a DL
knowledge base and P a set of rules of the form
H1 ∨ · · · ∨Hl ← B1, . . . , Bm, not C1, . . . , not Cn
called disjunctive rules (due to the presence of disjunction in the head)3. Note
that a normal logic program rule is a disjunctive rule with l = 1. Further the set
of predicates is partitioned into DL and non-DL predicates. As a restriction, DL
atoms (atoms constructed with a DL predicate) cannot occur in the scope of not .
Note that a DL atom correspond to an assertion in DLs. Information exchanged
between Σ and P is via these atoms.
3We refer to [PINTO 2011] for a details on disjunctive rules and disjunctive logic programs.
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For the semantics of DL+log, stable model ap-
proach [GELFOND and LIFSCHITZ 1991, GELFOND and LIFSCHITZ 1988] is
adapted. Let ∆ be a countably infinite set called universe. By P∆ we mean
the program obtained by replacing every rule r in P with a set of rules by
substituting variables in r with elements of ∆ in all possible ways. Now let I be a
first-order interpretation such that IΣ and IP represent projection of I to Σ and P
respectively. Then I is a model of K if and only if
• IΣ is a model of Σ i.e., IΣ |= Σ
• IP is a stable model of I(P∆) where I(P∆) represents the program
obtained by replacing every DL atom A in a rules of P∆ with true if I |= A
and false if I 6|= A.
In general DL+log is undecidable until week DL-safety is ensured which requires
variables in DL atom occurring as a head in some rule, to occur in a body of
non-DL-atom as well. In other words, new information can be concluded from
head of the rules only for the named individuals. In semantics of DL+log, the
assumption of standard name is taken which we will discuss in Section 4.2.3.
Disjunctive dl-programs
Similar to DL+log, the formalism called disjunctive dl-programs is presented in
[LUKASIEWICZ 2010b]. Syntactically, the difference is that now only function
free atoms are considered i.e., a knowledge base in disjunctive dl-program is a pair
(Σ,P) where Σ is a DL knowledge base and P is a disjunctive program containing
rules with no function symbols and no literal with classical negation.
For the semantics, an interpretation I is a set of ground atoms from the Herbrand
base HPΣof the ground program P∆ where ∆ is a finite set of containing at
least the named individuals. Now I is a model of Σ if the knowledge base
Σ ∪ I ∪ {¬|A ∈ HPΣ \ I} is satisfiable in DL sense. We say I is model of
the knowledge base (Σ,P) if I is a model of Σ and I |= P∆. Intuitively, we
can think of the set of atoms I as the set of facts we belief satisfying P∆ and is
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consistent with the information in the DL knowledge base Σ. Finally, I is a stable
model of (Σ,P∆) if it is I is a model of (Σ,P∆) and it is minimal i.e., there is no
I ′ ⊆ HP∆ with I ′ ⊂ I such that I ′ is a a model of (Σ,P∆).
A nice characteristic of disjunctive dl-program is that a knowledge base
(∅,P) |= A if and only if P |= A i.e., if A is true in all the stable models of P .
This characteristic is usually called as faithfulness [MOTIK and ROSATI 2008].
dl-programs
Finally let us consider dl-programs presented in [EITER et al. 2008]. DL-
programs combine normal generalized logic program with description logic knowl-
edge bases. The rules of generalized logic programs are of the form
H ← B1, . . . , Bm, not C1, . . . , not Cn
where H,B1, . . . , Bm, C1, . . . , Cn are atoms or classical negation (¬) of atoms.
In Section 3.2 of Chapter 3, we have seen normal program and defined the stable
model semantics for such programs. Extending the notion of semantics to the gen-
eralized programs is straight-forward: treat ¬A for an atom A as a new atom (by
renaming it) and apply the same procedure of computing stable models. For de-
tails we refer to [GELFOND and LIFSCHITZ 1991, ALFERES and PEREIRA 1996].
The basic idea of dl-programs is to allow the logic program part for query the DL
knowledge base. To this end, the notion of dl-queries is defined as following:
Definition 22. A dl query Q(t) is one of the following [EITER et al. 2008]:
• a GCI or its negation, or
• a concept assertion of the form C(t) or its negation ¬C(t) for some concept
C and a term T , or
• a (negative) role assertion R(t, t′) (¬R(t, t′)) for a role R and terms t and
t′
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Note terms are used instead of the individual names in the above definition. A
dl-atom is of the form
DL[S1op1p1, . . . , Smopmpm;Q](t)
where Si’s are DL-predicates, pi’s are non-DL-predicates, opi ∈ {∪+,∪-,∩-} and
Q(t) is a dl-query. Intuitively, ∪+/∪- increases/decreases Si by the extension of pi
and ∩- limits Si to pi. Now a dl-rule is of the form
H ← B1, . . . , Bm, not C1, . . . , not Cn (∗)
where besides literals dl-atoms are allowed for Bi’s and Ci’s. A dl-program is a
pair (Σ,P) where Σ is a DL knowledge base and P is a finite set of dl-rules.
For the semantics, the Herbrand base HP contains all the ground atoms formed
from predicates in P and constants in Σ and P . An interpretation I is a consistent
subset of HP . A (non dl-atom) literal A is true in I under Σ iff A ∈ I . We write
I |=Σ A. Similarly for a dl-atom
a = DL[S1op1p1, . . . , Smopmpm;Q](c)
Now I satisfies a under Σ, written I |=Σ a iff Σ ∪
⋃m
i=1Ai(I) |= Q(c) where
Ai(I) =

{Si(e) | pi(e) ∈ I} if opi = ∪+
{¬Si(e) | pi(e) ∈ I} if opi = ∪-
{¬Si(e) | pi(e) 6∈ I} if opi = ∩-
Note the satisfaction of the dl-atom a requires checking if the dl query Q(c) is
entailed by the DL knowledge base embedded with the additional information from
the logic program part through non-dl predicates. These additional information are
the ABox assertion Ai(I). Now I satisfies a rule r of the form (∗) written I |=L r
iff I |=Σ H whenever I |=Σ Bi for 1 ≤ i ≤ m and I 6|=Σ Cj for 1 ≤ j ≤ n.
Based on these notions and on the stable model semantics, the answer sets of a
dl-programs are defined as below:
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Definition 23. Given a dl-program Σ,P , let C represents the set of all constant
occurring in (Σ,P). Then for an interpretation I , the dl-program PC|I is obtained
by
• deleting each rule r from PC such that r contains an atom not A with I |=Σ
A;
• deleting all the atoms of the form not C from the rest of the rules.
Now I is an answer set4 of Σ,P if I |=Σ r for each r ∈ PC|I and I is the least
interpretation with this characteristic i.e., there is no interpretation I ′ such that
I ′ ⊂ I and I ′ |=L PC|I .
In the next section we present some expressive formalisms capable of expressing
most of the approaches mentioned above. One final remark, in [MEHDI et al. 2012]
DLs and logic programs are integrated where the minimal hypothesis seman-
tics [PINTO 2011] is considered for the logic program parts. However, the work
is not directly comparable with our approach here.
4.2.3 Expressive Hybrid Formalisms
We now discuss some modern approaches to extending DLs with non-monotonic
features. All these approaches are based somewhat on the logic of minimal
knowledge and negation as failure (MKNF) [LIFSCHITZ 1991].
In Section 3.3 we discussed the the logic of minimal knowledge and negation
as failure (or MKNF) which is an expressive enough to capture many of the
non-monotonic formalisms. In [LIFSCHITZ 1991], Lifschitz presented the logic
of minimal knowledge and negation as failure (MKNF). Thus MKNF is usually
seen as a unifying framework for different non-monotonic logics as well as logic
programs. As a fragment of first-order logic, DLs are inherently expressible by
(first-order) MKNF. Consequently MKNF is a natural choice for extending DLs
4In [EITER et al. 2008], two notions of answer sets are defined: weak answer sets and strong
answer sets. We limit ourselves to the strong answer sets only and believe that it is sufficient for
understanding the basic idea of the approach.
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with non-monotonic features and rules. Much work has been done in this direction
including [KNORR et al. 2008, MOTIK and ROSATI 2008, MOTIK et al. 2006,
DONINI et al. 2002, MOTIK and ROSATI 2006]. In the following we focus only
on some relevant ones.
Description Logics of MKNF
In [DONINI et al. 2002] the DL ALC is extended with two modal operators K and
A. This extension is called ALCNF . The syntax is similar to that of ALC addi-
tionally considering the operator A.
Definition 24. An ALCNF concept C is a given as
C ::= >|⊥|A|C u C|C t C|¬C|∃R.C|∀R.C|KC|AC
where A is a concept name and R is an ALCNF role given by
R ::= P |KR|AR
with P a role name.
All the other notions (e.g., axioms, TBoxes , knowledge bases etc) can be analo-
gously defined as in standard DLs. The semantics of ALCNF is similar to that of
MKNF presented in Section 3.3 and hence assumes the common domain assump-
tion and the rigid term assumption.
Definition 25. AnALCNF interpretation is a triple (I,M,N ) where I is an ALC
interpretation, andM and N are set of ALC interpretations.
ALCNF concepts are interpreted similar to Definition 20 for concepts without the
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Note that the definition of interpretation of K and A are identical where M is
considered in interpreting K and N is considered in interpreting A. The notion of
satisfiability of an axiom, a Tbox, an ABox and a knowledge base can be defined
easily similar to standard DLs. Similar toALCK, models inALCKNF are defined
by preferring some sets of interpretations over the others.
Definition 26. An ALCNF model of a ALCNF knowledge base Σ is a set of
interpretationsM such that
• (I,M,M) satisfies Σ for each I ∈ M and
• for each set of interpretationsM′, ifM⊂M′ then there is an interpretation
J ∈ M′ such that (J ,M′,M) does not satisfy Σ i.e., we wantM to be a
maximal set.
As demonstrated in [DONINI et al. 2002], ALCNF is expressive enough to
reconstruct several features of framed-based systems which are not realizable in
standard DLs.
First lets consider defaults. A default rule of the form
ϕ : ψ1, . . . , ψn
ξ
can be expressed by the following ALCNF axiom
KI u Kϕ¬A¬ψ1 u · · · u ¬Aψn v Kξ
where KI enforces the applicability of the axiom only to named individuals to
acquire the decidability of reasoning as in [BAADER and HOLLUNDER 1992].
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Impotence of expressing integrity constraints is yet another short-come of standard
DLs which is easily realizable in ALCNF . For example, the following axiom
KPerson < AMale t AFemale
enforces that the gender of every known person shall be specified.
Formalism like ALCNF can be used for expressing closure of a concept or a role.
In this work, we do not focus on these features.
Stable Model Based Hybrid MKNF Knowledge Base
In [MOTIK and ROSATI 2008], the notion of MKNF+ knowledge bases is pre-
sented. The formalism is expressive enough to capture many of the exist-
ing approaches to non-monotonic extension of DLs and approaches to inte-
grate DLs with rules (see [ROSATI 2006b, BAADER and HOLLUNDER 1992,
CALVANESE et al. 2007, EITER et al. 2008, LUKASIEWICZ 2010a] etc). Thereby,
the expressiveness of the underlying language is not restricted to some less expres-
sive DLs rather it can be any fragment of first-order logic. We now formally define
MKNF+ knowledge bases.
Definition 27. An MKNF+ KB K is a pair (O,P) where O is a description logic
KB and P a general logic program. Thus, by definition, every DL KB O is an
MKNF+ KB with empty program part.
The semantics employed for MKNF+ is the standard MKNF semantics as pre-
sented in Section 3.3 except that the standard name assumption is required to be
satisfied by the interpretations under consideration. Let ∆ the common universe of
all the interpretations.
Definition 28. A first-order interpretation I employs the standard name assump-
tion if
• the universe ∆ contains all the constants of a given signature and a count-
ably infinite number of additional constants.
• each term is interpreted by itself i.e., tI = t
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• .= is interpreted as a congruence relation
Interpretations employing the standard name assumption preserve the satisfiability
of formulas (see Proposition 3.2 of [MOTIK and ROSATI 2008]). The interpreta-
tion of formulas are defined similar to Definition 19 in Section 3.3.
A comparison between MKNF+ approaches with the related one is presented
in Section 7 of [MOTIK and ROSATI 2008] where it is shown how MKNF+
knowledge bases can capture most of the approaches to non-monotonic reasoning
in DLs. In Chapter 9 we compare it with our approach in detail.
Well-founded Model Based Hybrid MKNF Knowledge Base
Similar to the MKNF+ knowledge bases, in [KNORR et al. 2008] the notion of hy-
brid knowledge bases based on MKNF is presented but instead of the stable model
semantics, the authors employ the well-founded semantics [GELDER et al. 1991].
Hence the notion of three-valued MKNF structure is presented. A further descrip-
tion of the semantics is out of the scope of this work.
With this we conclude the second part of the thesis. In the next part, we present








Epistemic DLs as Query Languages
The inadequacy of standard KR languages for querying a knowledge base was
initially discussed by Hector J. Levesque in [LEVESQUE 1984] where he suggests
to incorporate the epistemic operator K into the query language. In practice one
encounters many scenarios where a richer query language is highly desirable. In
the context of databases, Reiter motivates the need for a more expressive language
via several examples [REITER 1992]. The prime situation are the ones where some
sort of disjunction or existential quantifies have been used to model incomplete
information. In such cases, querying a given knowledge base usually results in
an unknown answer. For example, given the information that John is either a
graduate or undergraduate student, on asking if John a graduate student is, we
get an unknown answer. This is so as the only information stated about John
is via the disjunction and unlike non-monotonic logic, absence of information
does not allow us concluding the falsehood of the information. Similarly, via
existential quantification one can say there is a course which John attends. Again
we don’t know anything about the course. Thus no conclusion can be drawn about
a concrete course that John is attending unless stated so.
A somewhat similar case we have in description logic. There are several places
where we are interested in decision making when only little information is avail-
able. In the following we discuss several examples emphasizing the need of a richer
language. Indeed, we argue why SROIQK shall be used rather than SROIQ to
get conclusions that can help in decision making.
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In [DONINI et al. 1998, DONINI et al. 1992b], the added value of using ALCK
as querying language for ALC knowledge bases has been discussed. The authors
demonstrated several kinds of queries easily realizable using ALCK as the query
language. Such queries cannot be formulated in ALC. In the following we
consider similar examples thus advocating the use of SROIQK rather than
SROIQ in many scenarios of an application domain. For these examples, we
consider the wine ontology1 which is an ontology formulated in OWL specifying
different wines along with their relationships.
5.1 Incompleteness of Information
As a consequence of the open-world assumption, modeling incomplete information
is one of the fundamental capabilities of OWL. One way of modeling incomplete-
ness is via use of the existential quantification. Let Σ represent the Wine ontology.
Consider the following query.
Σ |= ∃locatedIn.Region(chianti)?
The query asks if according to Σ there is a region as the origin of the wine
chianti. In the wine ontology we have the axioms Wine v locatedIn.Region and
Wine(chianti). Thus the answer to this query is YES as it has been explicitly as-
serted regardless of if the region is known or unknown. But the following query
Σ |= ∃KlocatedIn.KRegion(chianti)?
asks if this region is known. On assuming that all we have in Σ about chianti is the
assertion ∃locatedIn.Region(chianti) or Σ entails ∃locatedIn.Region(chianti) , the
answer to the above epistemic query is NO. Now suppose we later come to know
that the origin of chianti is some Italian regions i.e., suppose there is a region r
such that we have Σ |= locatedIn(chianti, r) and Σ |= ItalianRegion(r). If we ask
the same epistemic query again, we now get YES as an answer. This is so since
1http://www.w3.org/TR/owl-guide/wine.rdf
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we now know about the exact origin of chianti which is the region r known to be
an Italian region.
Lets consider a query dealing with disjunction. In Σ we have
Fruit ≡ NonSweetFruit t SweetsFruit
Now given that CFGrape(CabernetFrancGrape) is a member of class Fruit, the
answer to the query
Σ |= NonSweetFruit t SweetFruit(CFGrape)?
is YES. However as it is not known if CFGrape is a sweet or non sweet fruit,
asking query
Σ |= KNonSweetFruit t KSweetFruit(CFGrape)?
leads to NO.
5.2 Local Closed-world Reasoning
Another use of K-operator is reasoning in a locally closed-world: employ-
ing close-world assumption for the concepts and classes preceded by the K-
operator. Note that in Σ we do not have the assertion that Wine is disjoint from
Region. Hence there are models of Σ where Region(chianti) holds. Nevertheless,
KRegion(chianti) does not hold. Thus the answer to the query
Σ |= KRegion(r)?
is YES only for those individuals r for which either it is explicitly stated in Σ or
provable via deduction that r is a region. Lets consider the behavior of universal
quantification in a closed-world. In Σ the role producesWine relates a wine to its
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maker. For example, we have bancroft as a maker of bancroftChardonnay i.e., we
have the assertion
producesWine(bancroft, bancroftChardonnay)
in Σ. Further Σ also states that bancroftChardonnay is a white table wine i.e., it
contains the assertion
WhiteTableWine(bancroftChardonnay)
Now consider the following query
Σ |= ∀producesWine.WhiteTableWine(bancroft)
asking if bancroft makes white table wines only. Note that there are models of Σ
according to which bancroft produces only white table wine. Meanwhile there are
models stating bancroft as a maker of some other kind of wines. Hence the answer
to this query is simply UNKNOWN. In other words, in standard DLs we cannot
restrict the universal quantification to quantify only over known relationships. This,
however, is easily expressible with the K operator. In this case the query would be
Σ |= ∀KproducesWine.KWhiteTableWine(bancroft)
and thus it is easy to see that the answer to this query is YES since only one wine,
namely bancroftChardonnay is stated to be produced by bancroft and we know that
bancroftChardonnay is a white table wine.
From the above examples, we can observe that the epistemic operator allows us to
view certain concept or properties under the closed-world assumption. Since the
assumption is employed to certain concept or roles, this is usually called as the lo-
cal closed-world assumption. The advantages of local closed-world reasoning has
been discussed in [GRIMM et al. 2006, GRIMM and HITZLER 2007] in the context
of semantic match-making of web services.
Standard DL reasoners like Racer, Pellet, FacT++, etc do not support the epistemic
query answering task. We thus need to device a new algorithm for this purpose. In
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this work, we present a procedure for answering epistemic queries while still using
the standard DL reasoners.
5.3 Integrity Constraint Checking
According to Reiter [REITER 1992], integrity constraints (ICs) are of epistemic
nature in the sense that they are not statements about the world represented by a
KB rather they are statements about what the KB is required to know i.e., what
shall be known given the KB. Formally,
Definition 29. An integrity constraints is a property P that a given knowledge base
needs to satisfy.
Reiter suggests formalizing such constraints as epistemic queries. Then checking
the integrity constraint is just to test if the knowledge base entails the query. We
now demonstrate integrity constraint checking via an example. Suppose we want
to enforce that we know the degree of sugar of every wine we know. This constraint
can easily be expressed by the following axiom:
α := KWine v ∃KhasSugar{Dry}t∃KhasSugar.{OffDry}t∃KhasSugar.{Sweet}
Now if Σ |= α, then we are sure that for every named individual which is known
to be wine, we know (i.e. it can be logically derived) its degree of sugar as well.
Note that in [DONINI et al. 2002], the same constraint would be formulated as
KWine v ∃AhasSugar{Dry} t ∃AhasSugar.{OffDry} t ∃AhasSugar-{Sweet}
where A is an operator for representing default assumptions. The difference is that
in our case we can only enforce the constraint via query checking and thus can
not formulate them within the knowledge base whereas in formalism presented
in [DONINI et al. 2002], constraints can be formulated within the knowledge base
as well.
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The extension of ALC with the K operator, called ALCK, has already been in-
troduced in Section 4.2.1. In this chapter we extend this notion to the description
logic SROIQ. Note that SROIQ is one of the most expressive DL and is the
foundation of OWL 2 DL. For the semantics we adopt the approach presented
in [DONINI et al. 1998] and thus call it the classical (approach to) semantics.
We will see later why we have to restrict the classical semantics to DLs up to
SRIQ\U , which is the DL SROIQ without the nominals and the universal role
(see [KRÖTZSCH 2010] for naming convention in DLs).
6.1 Epistemic Extension of SROIQ
The extension of SROIQ with K is called autoepistemic SROIQ. We repre-
sent it by SROIQK. Syntactically SROIQK is very much similar to SROIQ
except that we now allow for K operator to occur in concepts.
Definition 30. We first define SROIQK roles as follows:
R := P | KP
where P is a SROIQ role. Further we call R = KP a simple role if P is a
simple role.
A SROIQK concept C is defined as
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C ::= A | ¬C | KC | C u C | C t C | ∃R.Self |
∃R.C | ∀R.C |≤ nS.C |≥ nS.C | {a1, . . . , an}
where A is a concept name, R is a SROIQK role, S is a simple SROIQK role,
a1, . . . , an are individual names, and n is a non-negative integer.
Note that by definition every SROIQ concept is a SROIQK concept. The no-
tions of knowledge base, TBox, RBox, ABox and their respective axioms can be
extended from SROIQ to SROIQK in the obvious way1. For example, the
following are SROIQK concepts:
∃KhasMaker.KRegion KWhiteWine KhasSugar.>
Following the approach of [DONINI et al. 1998], in the next section we now define
the semantics for SROIQK.
Classical Semantics
Autoepistemic DLs are basically fragments of first-order modal
logic [FITTING and MENDELSOHN 1998] with a single modal operator K
(similar to the necessity operator ) employing possible world semantics. In Section
4.2.1, we have seen that we need to cope with several conceptual issues in defining
a uniform and intuitive semantics for extended DLs. The classical semantics take
the two assumptions namely:
1. Common Domain Assumption (CDA): All interpretations are defined over a
fixed countably infinite domain ∆.
2. Rigid Term Assumption (RTA): For all interpretations, the mapping from in-
dividual names to domain elements is fixed (it is just the identity function).
These assumptions are imposed in order to ensure that (sets of) domain elements
can be referred to and dealt with uniformly in a cross-domain manner. Further,
without loss of generality we assume ∆ := NI ∪ N. We adapt the possible world
1When clear from the context, we sometimes call SROIQK concepts as epistemic concepts and
similar is the case for notions like role, axioms, TBox, etc.
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approach for the classical semantics of SROIQK . To this end we define the no-
tion of epistemic interpretations where we provide a “context” of relevant models
which are inspected whenever the extension of an epistemic concept or role is to
be determined.
Definition 31. An epistemic interpretation for SROIQK is a pair (I,W) where
I is a SROIQ interpretation andW is a set of SROIQ interpretations, where I
and all ofW have the same infinite domain ∆ withNI ⊂ ∆. For given SROIQK
concepts C and D, role R and simple role S, the interpretation function ·I,W is
then defined as follow:s
aI,W = a for a ∈ NI
XI,W = XI for X ∈ NC ∪NR ∪ {>,⊥}







(C uD)I,W = CI,W∩DI,W
(C tD)I,W = CI,W∪DI,W
(¬C)I,W = ∆ \ CI,W
(∃S.Self)I,W = {x | (x, x)∈RI,W}
(∃R.C)I,W = {x | ∃y.(x, y)∈RI,W ∧ y∈CI,W}
(∀R.C)I,W = {x | ∀y.(x, y)∈RI,W → y∈CI,W}
(6nS.C)I,W = {x | #{y∈CI,W |(x, y)∈RI,W}≤ n}
(>nS.C)I,W = {x | #{y∈CI,W |(x, y)∈RI,W}≥ n}
From the above one can see that KC is interpreted as the set of objects that are
in the extension of C under every interpretation inW . This also makes clear why
the common domain and rigid term assumption have to be imposed; otherwise
the respective extension intersections would be empty. Note that the rigid term
assumption implies the unique name assumption (UNA) i.e., for any epistemic
interpretation I ∈ W and for any two distinct individual names a and b we have
that aI 6= bI .
Similar to the standard DLs, the notion of satisfaction of a SROIQK (TBox,
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RBox or ABox) axiom α by an epistemic interpretation (I,W) is defined as in
Table 6.1.
Axiom α (I,W) |= α, if
C v D CI,W ⊆ DI,W
R1◦ · · · ◦Rn v R RI,W1 ◦ · · · ◦RI,Wn ⊆ RI,W
Dis(S,T) SI,W ∩ T I,W = ∅
C(a) aI,W ∈ CI,W
R(a, b) (aI,W , bI,W) ∈ RI,W
a
.= b aI,W = bI,W
a 6 .= b aI,W 6= bI,W
Table 6.1: Classical Semantics of SROIQK axioms
Note that we write (I,W) |= α whenever (I,W) satisfies α. Given a TBox T we
say (I,W) satisfies T iff (I,W) satisfies all the axioms in T , in which case we
write (I,W) |= T . The satisfaction of an RBox and an ABox in (I,W) can be
defined analogously. Similarly (I,W) satisfies a knowledge base Σ = (T ,R,A),
written as (I,W) |= Σ iff it satisfies T ,R and A.
Next we define the notion of modelhood of an epistemic interpretation. Like in
MKNF we take a preferential semantics approach as well. In other words, not ev-
ery epistemic interpretation satisfying all axioms of a knowledge base is a model.
Indeed, we prefer certain interpretations over the others thus acquiring a non-
monotonic reasoning behavior for SROIQK.
Definition 32. Given a SROIQK knowledge base Σ = (T ,R,A), a setM of
interpretations is called epistemic model of Σ if
• (I,M) |= Σ for each I ∈ M, and
• for each setM′ of interpretations such thatM ⊂ M′ there is an interpre-
tation J ∈ M′ such that (J ,M′) 6|= Σ. In other words,M needs to be a
maximal set.
Based on the definition above we now define the entailment of axioms from a
SROIQK knowledge base.
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Definition 33. A knowledge base Σ epistemically entails2 an axiom α (written
Σ ||= α), if for every epistemic modelM of Σ, we have that for each I ∈ M, the
epistemic interpretation (I,W) satisfies α.
Unlike the standard entailment, we use the symbol ||= to represent the entailment
relation under the classical semantics. The epistemic entailment problem is then to
check if a given knowledge base epistemically entails an axiom.
Note that by definition every SROIQ knowledge base Σ is a SROIQK knowl-
edge base and thus it has a unique epistemic model which is the set of all models
of Σ having infinite domain and satisfying the unique name assumption.
Fact 1. A given SROIQ knowledge base Σ (K-free) has up to renaming only one
unique epistemic model. We denote this model byM(Σ).
In Section 2.2, we have already seen the notion of queries in SROIQ. A very
similar notion can be defined for SROIQK.
Definition 34. For a given knowledge base Σ, an epistemic query Q (to Σ) is of
the form Σ ||= α? where α is an axiom formulated in some epistemic DL. Then the
answer to an epistemic query, denoted by ans(Q), is defined as
ans(Q) =

YES if Σ ||= α
NO if Σ ||= ¬α
UNDEFINED otherwise
Different languages can be used for formalizing a knowledge base and a query. In
this work, we call the formalism used for expressing knowledge bases as the knowl-
edge base language and the formalism used for expressing queries as the query
language. Note that query answering requires entailment checking. In the next
section, we present a technique of entailment checking reasoning in SROIQK.
2We drop the word ”epistemically” whenever it is clear from the context.
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6.2 Epistemic Query Answering under the Classical Se-
mantics
We now present a procedure for answering epistemic queries. More specifically,
we devise an approach for solving the epistemic entailment problem based on
techniques for non-epistemic standard reasoning. The idea is to translate an
epistemic query in to a standard query via intermediate reasoner calls. For
example, suppose the epistemic concept KC occurs as a sub-concept within a
given concept. We compute all individuals known to be in the extension of C..
In other words, we collect individuals a1, . . . , an such that the given knowledge
base entails C(ai) for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. We then replace any instance of KC by the
one-of concept {a1, . . . , an}. Similarly in a recursive fashion we remove every
epistemic sub-concept within a given concept with an semantically equivalent
K-free concept. Consequently, we get a K-free concept. This enables us to
check whether a SROIQK axiom is entailed from a standard DL knowledge
base, using a standard DL reasoner. An important point here is that for an-
swering queries formalized in an epistemic extension of a DL, the underlying
reasoner needs to support the one-of construct. For example, if a query is
formulated in ALCK, then we translate it in ALCO query. As a result we get a
K-free query and thus any standard reasoner forALCO can answerALCK queries.
6.3 DL SRIQ\U as a Query Language
As already mentioned we distinguish the (epistemic) querying language from
the (non-epistemic) knowledge base language similar to the strategies pursued in
[REITER 1992], [LEVESQUE 1984] and [CALVANESE et al. 2007] etc. For the
classical semantics of SROIQK, we consider the epistemic entailment problem
of a SROIQK axiom α from a SRIQ\U knowledge base Σ, where SRIQ\U
is defined as SROIQ excluding nominals and the universal role. The reason for
this choice will become clear in the subsequent chapters.
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The basic, rather straightforward idea to answer an epistemic query Q to a given
knowledge base Σ is to disassemble the axioms in Q, query for the named individ-
uals contained in extensions for every sub-expression preceded by K, and use the
results to rewrite Q into one that is free of Ks. But first note that as a consequence
of the rigid name assumption, every I ∈ M(Σ) satisfies the condition that different
individual names are interpreted by different individuals (this condition per se is
commonly referred to as the unique name assumption), whereM(Σ) is the unique
epistemic model of Σ. In order to enforce this behavior (which is not ensured by
the non-epistemic standard DL semantics) we have to explicitly axiomatize this
condition.
Definition 35. Given a SRIQ\Uknowledge base Σ, we denote by ΣUNA the
knowledge base Σ ∪ {a 6 .= b | a, b ∈ NI , a 6= b}.
The following is an immediate consequence from the definition of the UNA.
Fact 2. The set of models of ΣUNA is exactly the set of those models of Σ that
satisfy the unique name assumption.
In the classical semantics, the common domain assumption constrains the domain
of the interpretations to a common infinite set. However, standard DL reasoning as
performed by DL reasoners adheres to a semantics that allows for both finite and
infinite models. We therefore restrict the knowledge base language to SRIQ\U ,
since we will show that considering only infinite models does not affect results.
The justification for this consideration is that for any finite interpretation we find
an infinite one which satisfies the same set of axioms and hence will make up for
the loss of the former. In the following we prove it formally.
Definition 36. For any SRIQ\U interpretation I, the lifting of I to ω is the
interpretation Iω defined as follows:
• ∆Iω := ∆I × N,
• aIω := 〈aI , 0〉 for every a ∈ NI ,
• AIω := {〈x, i〉 | x ∈ AI and i ∈ N} for each concept name A ∈ NC ,
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• rIω := {(〈x, i〉, 〈x′, i〉) | (x, x′) ∈ rI and i ∈ N} for every role name
r ∈ NR.
Note that Iω is infinite as ∆Iω = ∆I × N where N is the set of non-negative
integers. Next we prove that the extension of a concept in an interpretation I
agrees with that in the interpretation Iω in the follow sense:
Lemma 1. For all 〈x, i〉 ∈ ∆Iω and all SRIQ\U concepts C holds that 〈x, i〉 ∈
CIω if and only if x ∈ CI .
Proof. The proof is by the induction on the structure of C:
• For the atomic concept,> or⊥ it follows immediately from the definition of
Iω.
• Let C = ¬D with D a concept. For any x ∈ ∆I we have that
x ∈ (¬D)I
⇔ x 6∈ DI
⇔ 〈x, i〉 6∈ DIω for i ∈ N (Induction)
⇔ 〈x, i〉 ∈ (¬D)Iω for i ∈ N.
• Let C = C1 u C2 where C1 and C2 are concepts. For any x ∈ ∆I we have
that
x ∈ (C1 u C2)I
⇔ x ∈ CI1 and x ∈ CI2
⇔ 〈x, i〉 ∈ CIω1 and 〈x, i〉 ∈ C
Iω
2 for i ∈ N (Induction)
⇔ 〈x, i〉 ∈ (C1 u C2)Iω for i ∈ N.
• Let C = ∃R.D for a role R and concept D. For any x ∈ ∆I we have that
x ∈ (∃R.D)I
⇔ there is a y ∈ ∆I such that (x, y) ∈ RI and y ∈ DI
⇔ there is 〈y, i〉 ∈ ∆Iω for i ∈ N with (〈x, i〉, 〈y, i〉) ∈ RIω and 〈y, i〉 ∈
DIω (Definition 36 and Induction)
⇔ 〈x, i〉 ∈ (∃R.D)Iω
• Let C =≤ nR.D for a role R and concept D. For any x ∈ ∆I we have that
x ∈ (≤ nR.D)I
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⇔ there are pair-wise distinct y1, . . . , yn ∈ ∆I such that we haves (x, yl) ∈
RI and yl ∈ DI for 1 ≤ l ≤ n
⇔ there are 〈yl, i〉 ∈ ∆Iω for i ∈ N with (〈xl, i〉, 〈yl, i〉) ∈ RIω and 〈yl, i〉 ∈
DIω for 1 ≤ l ≤ n. This steps follows from Definition 36 and Induction.
Further it also follows from the definition that 〈y1, i〉, . . . , 〈yn, i〉 are pair-
wise distinct for i ∈ N. Thus by semantics the final step is equivalent to
〈x, i〉 ∈ (≤ nR.D)Iω .
• The remaining cases can be proved analogously.
We now prove that we can indeed drop off finite interpretations from consideration
when dealing with epistemic models of a SRIQ\U knowledge base.
Lemma 2. Let Σ be a SRIQ\U knowledge base. For any interpretation I we
have that
I |= Σ if and only if Iω |= Σ.
Proof. First we note that from the definition of Iω, for any SRIQ\U role R ∈ R
and (〈x, i〉, 〈y, i′〉) ∈ ∆Iω with i, i′ ∈ N we have that (〈x, i〉, 〈y, i′〉) ∈ RIω
if an only if (x, y) ∈ RI and i = i′ for an interpretation I. Now for any RIA
R1 ◦ . . . Rn v R we have that:
I |= R1 ◦ . . . Rn v R
⇔ I |= RI1 ◦ . . . RIn ⊆ RI
⇔ for any x0, . . . , xn ∈ ∆I , whenever (xi−1, xi) ∈ RIi for 1 ≤ i ≤ n then
(x0, xn) ∈ RI
⇔ for any x0, . . . , xn ∈ ∆I and any j ∈ N, whenever (〈xi−1, j〉, 〈xi, j〉) ∈ RIωi
for 1 ≤ i ≤ n then (〈x0, j〉, 〈xn, j〉) ∈ RIω
⇔ Iω |= R1 ◦ . . . Rn v R.
The second last equivalence holds as by definition (xi−1, xi) ∈ RIi for 1 ≤ i ≤ n
and any non-negative integer j implies that (〈xi−1, j〉, 〈xi, j〉) ∈ RIωi . Similarly
(〈xi−1, ji−1〉, 〈xi, ji〉) ∈ RIωi for 1 ≤ i ≤ n implies that (xi−1, xi) ∈ RIi and that
ji−1 = ji. The same holds for the role R.
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Now consider any role characteristic Dis(S, T ) with simple roles S and T .
We prove the left to right direction only. The other direction can be proved
analogously. Let I |= Dis(S, T ). It means that (x, y) ∈ SI if and only if
(x, y) 6∈ T I for all x, y ∈ ∆I . Now by Lemma 1, (〈x, j〉, 〈y, j〉) ∈ SIω if and
only if (〈x, j〉, 〈y, j〉) 6∈ SIω for any j ∈ N and x, y ∈ ∆I . This by semantic
implies that Iω |= Dis(S, T ).
Consequently we get that I satisfies a role hierarchyR if and only if so does Iω.
Now for any GCI C v D, Lemma 1 implies that for any interpretation I,
CI ⊆ DI if and only if CIω ⊆ DIω . Thus we get that for any TBox T , I |= T if
and only if Iω |= T .
Finally for an ABox A we show that for each assertion in α ∈ A, I |= α if and
only if Iω |= α.
• α is of the form C(a) for a concept C and individual name a:
Now for an interpretation I it follows from the definition of Iω that aIω =
(aI , 0). As we have already shown that aI ∈ CI if and only if (aI , i) ∈ CIω
for i ∈ N. Hence we get that aI ∈ CI if and only if (aI , 0) ∈ CIω .
• α is of the form R(a, b) for a role R and individual names a and b:
Let I be some interpretation such that I |= R(a, b). By semantics it is the
case if and only if (aI , bI) ∈ RI . This by Definition 36 is equivalent to
(〈a, 0〉, 〈b, 0〉) ∈ RIω and thus to (aIω , bIω ) ∈ RIω . By semantics this is the
case if and only if Iω |= R(a, b).
• α is of the form a .= b for individual name a and b:
Again for any interpretation I we have that I |= a .= b if and only if aI = bI
and thus equivalent to 〈aI , 0〉 = 〈bI , 0〉. By Definition 36 this is equivalent
to aIω = bIω and thus by semantics this is the case if and only if Iω |= a = b.
• For the rest of the cases, we can proceed in a similar manner.
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Similar results can not be proved when we consider SROIQ simply because there
are SROIQ knowledge bases with no infinite models at all (see Chapter 7).
6.4 Rewriting of Epistemic Queries
In [MEHDI et al. 2011], we presented an approach for rewriting axioms containing
Ks into K-free ones. The basic idea is that the semantic extension of a concept pre-
ceded by the operator K may contain named individuals only (except of some spe-
cial cases which we describe subsequently). This allows us to collect all the named
individuals into a one-of concept and replace the actual concepts with this one-of
concept thus getting rid of K. We prove this by exploiting certain symmetries on
the model setM(Σ). Intuitively, one can freely swap or permute anonymous in-
dividuals (i.e., domain elements which do not correspond to any individual name)
in a model of some knowledge base without losing modelhood (see Lemma 3.3
in [DONINI et al. 1998]). To this end, we define the following:
Definition 37. Given an interpretation I = (∆I , ·I), a set ∆ with NI ⊆ ∆, and
a bijection ϕ : ∆I → ∆ with ϕ(aI) = a for all a ∈ NI , the renaming of I
according to ϕ, denoted by ϕ(I), is defined as the interpretation (∆, ·ϕ(I)) with:
• aϕ(I) = ϕ(aI) = a for every individual name a
• Aϕ(I) = {ϕ(z) | z ∈ AI} for every concept name A
• Pϕ(I) = {(ϕ(z), ϕ(w)) | (z, w) ∈ P I} for every role name P
We now show that renaming a model of a given knowledge base does not invali-
dates its modelhood.
Lemma 3. Let Σ be a SRIQ\U knowledge base and let I be a model of Σ with
infinite domain. Then, every renaming ϕ(I) of I satisfies ϕ(I) ∈M(Σ).
Proof. By definition, the renaming satisfies the common domain and rigid term as-
sumption. Modelhood w.r.t. Σ immediately follows from the isomorphism lemma
of first-order interpretations [VAN DALEN 1989] since I and ϕ(I) are isomorphic
and ϕ is an isomorphism from I to ϕ(I).
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Note that the model, obtained by renaming a model of a knowledge base, interprets
every individual name a by a itself. Nevertheless, the interpretations of the anony-
mous individuals are not fixed. This allows us to swap every anonymous individual
with another individual which serves as a counterexample for membership in some
given concept D, unless the concept is equivalent to >. Consequently we are able
to to prove that an epistemic concept KD may contain merely named individuals,
given that it is not universal. Now for translating KD into a K-free concept, all
we need to do is to replace it with the concept {a1, . . . , an} such that Σ |= D(a)
whenever D is not universal. In case, ΣUNA |= > v D , we simply replace it with
> in our rewriting procedure. As a justification, it follows from the semantics that





We now formally prove the aforementioned relationship between the named indi-
vidual and the operator K.
Lemma 4. Let Σ be a SRIQ\U knowledge base. For any epistemic concept
C =KD with D a K-free concept such that ΣUNA 6|= D ≡ > and x ∈ ∆, we
have that x ∈ CI,M(Σ) iff there is an individual a ∈ NI with x = aI,M(Σ) and
ΣUNA |= D(a).
Proof. Lets first prove the left to right direction. Suppose that x ∈ CI,M(Σ). Since





To the contrary, suppose that there is no a ∈ NI such that aI,M(Σ) = x and
ΣUNA |= D(a) i.e., x is an anonymous element. By assumption ΣUNA 6|= > ≡ D,
this means that there is a model I ′ of ΣUNA such thatDI
′ 6= ∆I′ . This implies that
there is a y ∈ ∆I′ such that y 6∈ DI′ . Considering I ′ω, we can invoke Lemma 2
to ensure I ′ω |= ΣUNA. Further Lemma 1 guarantees 〈y, i〉 6∈ DI
′
ω for i ∈ N.
Specifically, 〈y, 1〉 6∈ DI′ω and thus by construction, 〈y, 1〉 is anonymous3. Let
ϕ : ∆I′ × N → ∆ be a bijection such that ϕ(aI′ω ) = aI for all a ∈ NI and
3Note that we can consider any i ∈ N in 〈y, 1〉 instead of 1.
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ϕ(〈y, 1〉) = x. Such a bijection exists, as |∆I′ × N| = |∆| and I ′ω satisfies the
unique name assumption. By Lemma 3, we get that ϕ(I ′ω) ∈ M(Σ). By the
choice of ϕ we get x 6∈ Dϕ(I′ω) as 〈y, 1〉 6∈ DI′ω has been renamed by x and since





which is a contradiction.
For the right to left direction, suppose there is an individual name a ∈ NI such that
aI,M(Σ) = x and ΣUNA |= D(a). This means that each model I of ΣUNA is such
that a ∈ DI . Now sinceM(Σ) is the set of all models This implies that for any





Hence by semantics, x ∈ KDI,M(Σ) as C = KD.
The above lemma shows that for a given concept C = KD with D a K-free con-
cept, we can replace the occurrence of KD in C with > if ΣUNA |= > v D and
otherwise with {a1, . . . , an} where ΣUNA |= D(ai) and ai ∈ NI for 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
A similar property can be proved for the roles as well. Again, we have to take care
of the exceptional case of the universal role.
Claim 1. Let Σ be a knowledge base. For the universal role U we have:
KUI,M(Σ) = UI,M(Σ)
Proof. The claim follows trivially as UJ = ∆ ×∆ for any J ∈ M(Σ). Specifi-





and thus UI,M(Σ) = KUI,M(Σ).
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This allows us to simply replace a role of the form KU in an epistemic concept
with U . Using construction from Definition 36 we can show a somewhat similar
result as in Lemma 4 for roles.
Lemma 5. Let Σ be a SRIQ\U knowledge base. For any epistemic role R =
KP with P a K-free role such that P 6= U , and for any x, y ∈ ∆ we have that
(x, y) ∈ RI,M(Σ) iff at least one of the following holds:
1. x = y and ΣUNA |= > v ∃P.Self.
2. there are individual names a, b ∈ NI with aI,M(Σ) = x and bI,M(Σ) = y
such that ΣUNA |= P (a, b).
Proof. For the “only-if” direction, we make the following case distinctions:
• Suppose that x = y and ΣUNA |= > v ∃P.Self. AsM(Σ) is the epistemic
model of Σ, therefore every interpretation in J ∈ M(Σ) satisfies the UNA
and by Fact 2 we get that J |= ΣUNA. This means for every x′ ∈ ∆ and





By semantics, therefore, (x′, x′) ∈ KP I,M(Σ) for any x′ ∈ ∆. In particular,
we have that (x, y) ∈ KP I,M(Σ) as x = y.
• Suppose there are a, b ∈ NI with x = aI,M(Σ), y = bI,M(Σ) and ΣUNA |=
P (a, b). By assumption we have that ΣUNA |= P (a, b). Therefore, we have






Hence by semantics, (x, y) ∈ KP I,M(Σ).
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This completes the proof of lemma in right to left direction.
Now for the “if” direction, we suppose that the first case of the lemma does not
hold. Therefore, we have to show that there are a, b with x = aI,M(Σ), y =
bI,M(Σ) and ΣUNA |= P (a, b). To the contrary suppose that there are no such
individual names a and b in NI . We distinguish two cases.
• There are a and b with x = aI,M(Σ) and y = bI,M(Σ) but ΣUNA 6|= P (a, b).
Now ΣUNA 6|= P (a, b) implies that there is a model I ′ of ΣUNA with
(aI′ , bI′) 6∈ P I′ . But as the interpretation of a and b does not change across
the interpretation in M(Σ) (rigid term assumption), we get that aI′ = aI
and bI






which is a contradiction to the assumption that (x, y) ∈ RJ ,M(Σ).
• Assume at least one of x, y is anonymous. W.l.o.g. let x be anonymous, the
other case follows by symmetry. Let I be a model of ΣUNA. Considering
Iω, we again have Iω |= ΣUNA by Lemma 2. By construction, 〈x, 1〉 is
anonymous and (〈x, 1〉, 〈y, 0〉) 6∈ P Iω . Let ϕ : ∆I × N→ ∆ be a bijection
such thatϕ(〈x, 1〉) = x andϕ(〈y, 0〉) = y. Such aϕ exists, since |∆I×N| =
|∆| and Iω satisfies the unique name assumption. By Lemma 3, we get that






which again is a contradiction.
Now we suppose that the first case does not hold. We have to show that x = y and
Σ |= > v ∃P.Self. Again we assume to its contrary and make the following case
distinctions:
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• x 6= y:
Now either both of x and y are named individuals but Σ 6|= P (a, b) or at
least one of them is anonymous. We can generate contradiction as above.
• x = y and but ΣUNA 6|= > v ∃P.Self:
We have to distinguish the following two cases.
– suppose that x is a named individual i.e., there is a ∈ NI with aI = x.
Now as ΣUNA 6|= P (a, a), this leads to contradiction as shown above.
– suppose that x is anonymous. Since every J ∈ M(Σ) satisfies UNA,
therefore, it follows from Fact 2 thatJ |= ΣUNA for everyJ ∈M(Σ).
This along with the fact that ΣUNA 6|= > v ∃P.Self implies that there
is some I ′ ∈M(Σ) such that (u, u) 6∈ P I′ for some u ∈ ∆. We define
a bijection ϕ : ∆ → ∆ such that ϕ(u) = x. By Lemma 3, we get that
ϕ(I ′) ∈M(Σ). Moreover (ϕ(u), ϕ(u)) 6∈ Pϕ(I′). Particularly,




and therefore, by semantics, (x, y) 6∈ KP I,M(Σ) which is a contradic-
tion.
Hence we have shown that the lemma must hold in left to right direction as
well.
Using the above lemma, we can define a translation procedure that maps (complex)
epistemic concept expressions to non-epistemic ones which are equivalent in all
models of Σ.
Definition 38. Let Σ be a SRIQ\U knowledge base. Further let P be a role
and R and S be non-epistemic roles with each different from the universal role U .
We define the function ΦΣ mapping SROIQK concept expressions to SROIQ
concept expressions as given in Figure 6.1 where we let {} = ∅ = ⊥4.
4W.l.o.g. we assume that in the definition of ΦΣ, n ≥ 1.
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ΦΣ :

C 7→ C if C is an atomic or one-of concept, > or ⊥;
KD 7→
{
> if ΣUNA |= ΦΣ(D) ≡ >
{a ∈ NI | ΣUNA |= ΦΣ(D)(a)} otherwise
∃KS.Self 7→
{
∃S.Self if ΣUNA |= > v ∃S.Self
{a ∈ NI | ΣUNA |= S(a, a)} otherwise
C1 u C2 7→ ΦΣ(C1) u ΦΣ(C2)





a∈NI{a} u ∃P.({b ∈ NI | ΣUNA |= P (a, b)} u ΦΣ(D))
t
{











ΞKU.D 7→ ΞU.ΦΣ(D) for Ξ ∈ {∀, ∃, >n, 6n}
Figure 6.1: Translation Function ΦΣ
In the following , we prove the correctness of this method. Note that our method
can be thought of as a reduction from epistemic queries to non-epistemic queries
through some computation, i.e., we perform several reasoning tasks (in this case
checking some entailments and instance retrieval) in order to answer the original
query. The important point is that our translation depends on the set of individ-
uals occurring in the knowledge base. For an epistemic concept C which is not
equivalent to >, one can deal with K by considering individuals occurring in the
knowledge base only (see Definition 38). We now prove that the extension of a
SROIQK concept and that of its K-free equivalent concept, obtained using the
translation function ΦΣ, agree underM(Σ).
Lemma 6. Let Σ be a SRIQ\U knowledge base, let x be an element of ∆, and
let C be a SROIQK concept. Then for any interpretation I ∈ M(Σ), we have
that CI,M(Σ) = (ΦΣ(C))I,M(Σ).
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Proof. It suffices to show that
x ∈ CI,M(Σ) iff x ∈ ΦΣ(C)I,M(Σ)
for any x ∈ ∆. For the proof, we use induction on the structure of the C. For the
base case where C is an atomic concept and the cases where C = > or C = ⊥, the
translation function ΦΣ has no effect i.e., the concept C is mapped to itself. Thus
the lemma follows immediately. Similar is the case of one-of concepts. For the
cases, where C = C1uC2, C = C1tC2 or C = ¬D, it follows from the standard
semantics and induction hypothesis. We now focus on the rest of the cases in the
following.
i. C = KD and ΣUNA 6|= D ≡ >:
By Lemma 4, x ∈ (KD)I,M(Σ) if and only if there is an a ∈ NI such that
x = aI,M(Σ) and ΣUNA |= D(a). This is equivalent to
x ∈ {a ∈ NI | ΣUNA |= D(a)}I,M(Σ)
and hence, by definition of ΦΣ, equivalent to x ∈ [ΦΣ(KD)]I,M(Σ).
ii. C = KD and ΣUNA |= D ≡ >:
Note that it trivially holds that if x ∈ CI,M(Σ) then x ∈ (ΦΣ(C))I,M(Σ) as
ΦΣ(C) = >. Hence we just prove that whenever x ∈ (ΦΣ(C))I,M(Σ) then
x ∈ CI,M(Σ) also. Now suppose that x ∈ (ΦΣ(C))I,M(Σ). To contrary,





which means that there is an interpretation I ′ ∈ M(Σ) such that x 6∈ DI′ .
Since M(Σ) is the epistemic model of Σ, hence I ′ ∈ M(Σ) respects the
unique name assumption and therefore, I ′ |= ΣUNA with DI
′ 6= ∆ as x 6∈
DI
′
. Hence ΣUNA 6|= D ≡ >, which is a contradiction.
iii. C = ∃KS.Self:
For the “if” condition we distinguish two cases. First, we suppose that
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ΣUNA |= > v ∃S.Self. Therefore, by definition ΦΣ(∃KS.Self) = ∃S.Self.
Now x ∈ [∃KS.Self]I,M(Σ) along with the semantics implies that for
each J ∈ M(Σ), we have that (x, x) ∈ SJ ,M(Σ). In particular,
(x, x) ∈ SI,M(Σ). Again by semantics therefore x ∈ [∃S.Self]I,M(Σ) and
hence x ∈ [ΦΣ(∃KS.Self)]I,M(Σ).
Second, suppose that ΣUNA 6|= > v ∃S.Self. We need to show that
x ∈ {c ∈ NI | ΣUNA |= S(c, c)}. As x ∈ [∃KS.Self] implies that
(x, x) ∈ KSI,M(Σ), by Lemma 5 there is a ∈ NI such that aI = x and
ΣUNA |= S(a, a) i.e., a ∈ {c ∈ NI | ΣUNA |= S(c, c)} which immediately
implies that x = aI ∈ [ΦΣ(∃KS.Self)]I,M(Σ) as per definition of ΦΣ.
Now for the “only-if” condition again we have to consider two cases as per
definition of ΦΣ. First suppose that ΦΣ(∃KS.Self) = ∃S.Self. Hence from
the definition of ΦΣ it must be the case that ΣUNA |= > v ∃S.Self. Now
as each model inM(Σ) satisfies UNA, by Fact 2, we have that J |= ΣUNA
and hence J |= > v ∃S.Self for each J ∈ M(Σ) i.e., for every u ∈ ∆, we
have that (u, u) ∈ SJ ,M(Σ). In other words, for every u ∈ ∆, we have that
(u, u) ∈ KSI,M(Σ). In particular, we have that x ∈ KP I,M(Σ) and therefore
by semantics, x ∈ [∃KS.Self]I,M(Σ).
Now for the second case assume that ΦΣ(∃KS.Self) = {c ∈ NI | ΣUNA |=
S(c, c)}. Since x ∈ [ΦΣ(∃KS.Self)]I,M(Σ), it implies there is a ∈ NI with
aI = x and ΣUNA |= S(a, a) which, by Lemma 5, implies that (x, x) ∈
KSI,M(Σ). Therefore, we get that x ∈ [∃KS.Self]I,M(Σ).
iv. C = ∃P.D and P is a simple role:
By semantics, x ∈ (∃P.D)I,M(Σ) if and only if there is y ∈ ∆ such
that (x, y) ∈ P I,M(Σ) and y ∈ DI,M(Σ), therefore by induction, y ∈
[ΦΣ(D)]I,M(Σ). Hence it is equivalent to x ∈ (ΦΣ(KD))I,M(Σ).
v. C = ∃KP.D:
First let x ∈ [∃KP.D]I,M(Σ). this implies that there is some y ∈ ∆ with
(x, y) ∈ KP I,M(Σ) such that y ∈ DI,M(Σ), therefore by induction, y ∈
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[ΦΣ(D)]I,M(Σ). By Lemma 5, (x, y) ∈ KP I,M(Σ) implies that at least one of
the following should hold.
• There are a, b ∈ NI with aI = x and bI = y such that ΣUNA |= P (a, b):
Consequently we have that y = bI ∈ [{c ∈ NI | ΣUNA |=
P (a, c)} u ΦΣ(D)]I,M(Σ). Now as M(Σ) is an epistemic model, ev-
ery interpretation in M(Σ) satisfies the UNA, and hence by Fact 2,
for every J ∈ M(Σ) we have that J |= ΣUNA. This along with
ΣUNA |= P (a, b) implies that (aI , bI) = (x, y) ∈ P I,M(Σ) and there-
fore, x ∈ [∃P.({c ∈ NI | ΣUNA |= P (a, c)} u ΦΣ(D))]I,M(Σ). Hence,
x = aI ∈ [{a} u {c ∈ NI | ΣUNA |= P (a, c)} u ΦΣ(D)]I,M(Σ), which
by definition of ΦΣ implies that x ∈ [ΦΣ(∃KP.D)]I,M(Σ).
• x = y and ΣUNA |= > v ∃P.Self: As y ∈ [ΦΣ(D)]I,M(Σ), therefore it
immediately follows from the definition that x ∈ [ΦΣ(∃KP.D)]I,M(Σ).
Now suppose that x ∈ [ΦΣ(∃KP.D)]I,M(Σ). This means that at least one of
the following should hold.
• there is an a ∈ NI such that aI = x and aI ∈ [∃P.({c ∈ NI |
ΣUNA |= P (a, c)} u ΦΣ(D))]I,M(Σ). Consequently there is some
b ∈ NI such that bI ∈ [[{c ∈ NI | ΣUNA |= P (a, c)} u ΦΣ(D)]]I,M(Σ)
i.e., ΣUNA |= P (a, b) and bI ∈ [ΦΣ(D)]I,M(Σ), therefore by induc-
tion, bI ∈ DI,M(Σ). By Lemma 5, ΣUNA |= P (a, b) implies that
(aI , bI) ∈ KP I,M(Σ). Therefore we get that x = aI ∈ [∃KP.D]I,M(Σ).
• x ∈ [ΦΣ(D)]I,M(Σ) and ΣUNA |= > v ∃P.Self:
Note that each J ∈ M(Σ) satisfies UNA, therefore, J |= ΣUNA. This
implies that J |= > v ∃P.Self. In other words, for every u ∈ ∆, we
have that (u, u) ∈ PJ for each J ∈M(Σ) and therefore, by semantics,
we get that (u, u) ∈ KP I,M(Σ). In particular, (x, x) ∈ KP I,M(Σ). Now
as x ∈ [ΦΣ(D)]I,M(Σ), we get that x ∈ [∃KP.D]I,M(Σ).
vi. C = >nKS.D:
We first prove the left to right direction. Suppose that n = 1. Then, x ∈
[>1KS.D]I,M(Σ) means that x ∈ [∃KS.D]I,M(Σ). Earlier we showed that
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this is the case iff x ∈ [ΦΣ(∃KS.D)]I,M(Σ) and therefore by definition, x ∈
[ΦΣ(>1KS.D)]I,M(Σ).
Now suppose that n > 1. From x ∈ [>nKS.D]I,M(Σ) we get that there are
y1, . . . , ym with m ≥ n such that (x, yi) ∈ KSI,M(Σ) and yi ∈ DI,M(Σ)
for each i ≤ m. By induction, yi ∈ [ΦΣ(D)]I,M(Σ) for each i ≤ m. By
Lemma 5, we have a, b1, . . . , bn ∈ NI such that aI = x, bIi = yi and ΣUNA |=
S(a, bi) for each i ≤ m. Now as m ≥ n and bIi ∈ [ΦΣ(D)]I,M(Σ) for i ≤ m,
it follows from the semantics that x = aI belongs to
[>nS.({c ∈ NI | ΣUNA |= S(a, c)} u ΦΣ(D))]I,M(Σ)
Hence, using definition of ΦΣ, we obtain that x ∈ [ΦΣ(>nKS.D)]I,M(Σ) as
x ∈ {a}I,M(Σ).




{c} u>nS.({c′ ∈ NI | ΣUNA |= S(c, c′)} u ΦΣ(D))
Now x ∈ [ΦΣ(>nKS.D)]I,M(Σ) implies that there are a, b1, . . . , bm ∈ NI ,
for m ≥ n, such aI = x, ΣUNA |= S(a, bi) and bIi ∈ [ΦΣ(D)]I,M(Σ) for
each i ≤ m. Since each J ∈ M(Σ) satisfies UNA, therefore, J |= ΣUNA
and hence we get that (aJ , bJi ) ∈ SJ for each J ∈M(Σ). Hence, It follows
from the semantics that (aI , bIi ) ∈ KSI,M(Σ) for each i ≤ m. Now as m ≥ n
and bIi ∈ DI,M(Σ)(by induction), we get that x ∈ [>nKS.D]I,M(Σ).
Now assume that n = 1. Hence, ΦΣ(>nKS.D) = ΦΣ(∃KS.D). Now for
x ∈ [∃KS.D]I,M(Σ) at least one of the following holds:
• there is a, b ∈ NI with aI = x such that ΣUNA |= S(a, b) and bI ∈
[ΦΣ(D)]I,M(Σ), therefore by induction, bI ∈ DI,M(Σ). By Lemma 5,
we get that (aI , bI) ∈ KSI,M(Σ) which along with bI ∈ DI,M(Σ) im-
plies that x = aI ∈ [>1KS.D]I,M(Σ).
• x ∈ [ΦΣ(D)]I,M(Σ) and ΣUNA |= > v ∃S.Self. By Lemma 5, we get
that (x, x) ∈ KSI,M(Σ). By induction we have that x ∈ DI,M(Σ) which
immediately implies that x ∈ [>1KS.D]I,M(Σ).
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vii. The rest of the cases can be proved in a similar fashion.
Thus we have shown that the extension of a SROIQK concept and that of its
translation using ΦΣ are equal. With this we have proved the correctness of our
translation procedure. Using this function, we can reduce the problem of entail-
ment of SROIQK axioms to that of SROIQ axioms in SRIQ\U knowledge
bases. Formally,
Theorem 1. For a SRIQ\U knowledge base Σ, SROIQK concepts C and D
and an individual a we have that
1. Σ ||= C(a) if and only f ΣUNA |= ΦΣ(C)(a).
2. Σ ||= C v D if and only if ΣUNA |= ΦΣ(C) v ΦΣ(D).
Proof. 1. For the first case, we see that Σ ||= C(a) is equivalent to aI,M(Σ) ∈
CI,M(Σ) which by Lemma 6 is the case if and only if
aI,M(Σ) ∈ ΦΣ(C)I,M(Σ)
for all I ∈ M(Σ). This is equivalent to aI ∈ ΦΣ(C)I as ΦΣ(C) does not
contain any Ks. Thus by semantics, this is equivalent to I |= ΦΣ(C)(a) for
all I ∈ M(Σ). Consequently, Fact 2 and Lemma 2 immediately imply that
this is the case if and only if ΣUNA |= ΦΣ(C)(a).
2. The second case can be proved analogously.
Theorem 1 shows that the epistemic entailment problem of epistemic axioms is
reducible into the standard entailment problem. Consequently, epistemic queries
answering can be translated in to the standard query answering.
Corollary 1. For a given SRIQ\U knowledge base Σ and an epistemic query
Q, let Q′ be the (non-epistemic) query obtained by translating axioms in Q into
K-free using ΦΣ . Then we have
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ans(Q) = ans(Q′)
i.e. answers of Q and Q′ coincide when posed to Σ.
It can be seen from the definition of ΦΣ that deciding epistemic entailment along
those lines may require deciding many classical entailment problems and hence
involves many calls to a standard DL reasoner. Nevertheless, Lemma 6 shows
that the translation preserves the semantics of the axiom being translated. Hence
we can use standard DL (OWL) reasoners in order to answer epistemic queries.
Note that the number of reasoner calls is bounded by the number of Ks occurring
in the query. The advantage in doing so is that the standard DL reasoners have
been developed over period of several years thus implement several optimization
techniques. Thus we do not need to implement reasoners capable of epistemic
reasoning from the scratch.
We have considered SRIQ\U knowledge bases and introduced a procedure for
answering epistemic query when put to such knowledge bases. The restriction is
due to the fact that Lemma 2 can only be proved upto SRIQ\U . In the next
chapter, we come back to this issue in detail.
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In the previous chapter we presented a method for translating an epistemic concept
into a K-free one via intermediate reasoner calls. This is achieved by translating
an epistemic axiom into a non-epistemic one using the translation function given
in Definition 38. Though SROIQK was our query language, we restricted the
knowledge base language to SRIQ\U . In the following, we explain the reason
behind this restriction formally as first identified in [MEHDI and RUDOLPH 2011b,
MEHDI et al. 2011].
7.1 Problems with the Classical Semantics
Following the intuition that led to the introduction of the K operator as an exten-
sion of K-free standard DL reasoning, a rather intuitive basic requirement to an
epistemic DL semantics is arguably the one provided in the following definition.
Definition 39. For a given DL L, an epistemic DL semantics represented by an
entailment relation |≈ is called L-backward-compatible if it coincides with the
(non-epistemic) standard semantics (represented by |=) on non-epistemic axioms,
i.e. for an L knowledge base Σ and an L axiom α both of which do not contain K,
we have
Σ |≈ α iff Σ |= α
Moreover, |≈ is called L-UNA-backward-compatible, Σ |≈ α if and only if Σ |= α
under the unique name assumption.
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In the classical semantics of epistemic extension of DLs, the common domain as-
sumption requires the following:
• all the interpretations considered in an epistemic interpretation share the
same fixed domain, and
• the domain is infinite.
However, there is no prima facie reason, why the domain that is described by a
knowledge base should not be finite, yet finite models are excluded from the con-
sideration entirely. We showed that this does not pose problems up to SRIQ\U
due to Lemma 2: every finite model of a knowledge base can be extended to an
infinite one such that the two models cannot be distinguished by means of the un-
derlying logic. This allows to directly establish the following result.
Corollary 2. ||= is SRIQ\U -UNA-backward-compatible.
As a consequence, the restriction to infinite models imposed by the common do-
main assumption turns out to be insignificant in case of SRIQ\U . However, this
situation changes drastically once nominals or the universal role are involved.
Fact 3. There are SROIQ knowledge bases with only finite models.
It is easy to see that a knowledge base Σ containing the axiom> v {a, b, c} or> v
63U.> has only models with at most three elements. Consequently, in both cases
we have that Σ is unsatisfiable w.r.t. the classical epistemic semantics. Thus by ex
falso quodlibet we, e.g., obtain Σ ||= > v ⊥whereas we clearly have Σ 6|= > v ⊥
even under the UNA. So we conclude that ||= is not UNA-backward-compatible
for any description logic that features nominals or both number restrictions and the
universal role; in particular, it is not SROIQ-UNA-backward-compatible.
Corollary 3. ||= is not SROIQ-UNA-backward-compatible.
Note that the imposition of UNA in the classical semantics may be a deliberate
decision. Nevertheless, we believe the non-UNA-backward-compatibility is
mainly due to the side effect of the classical semantics crafted for and probed
against less expressive description logics. This contradicts the intuition behind the
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K operator. Meanwhile, the rigidity of terms across the world (interpretations)
required by the classical semantics makes no sense once the common domain
assumption is not taken. This motivates us for the quest for a more appropriate,
“domain-flexible” epistemic semantics.
In the following we introduce a new semantics which overcomes the problems of
classical semantics when employed for an expressive DL like SROIQ.
7.2 Extended Epistemic Semantics
For a flexible semantics, we need to relinquish the common domain assumption and
the rigid term assumption. In other words, the domains we consider in the possible
worlds should be allowed to have arbitrary (yet non-empty) size and be composed
of arbitrary elements. Besides, the semantics should allow for the individual names
to refer to different elements in different possible worlds. In other words, elements
referred to by different individual names may coincide in some worlds but not in
others. Now the very question is how to interpret the epistemic operator across
different interpretations. We have to find a substitute for the common domain and
rigid term assumptions as otherwise every epistemic role or concept would have
the empty set as extension. We solve the problem by introducing one abstraction
layer that assigns abstract individual names to domain elements. These abstract
individual names are elements from NI ∪ N and hence common to all interpre-
tations, thus they can serve as the “common ground” for different interpretations
with different domains. We require that every domain element is associated with at
least one abstract name, however, we also allow for several abstract names to refer
to the same domain element (thus allowing for the possibility of finite domains).
This intuition leads to the definition of extended interpretations.
Definition 40. An extended SROIQ interpretation Ĩ is a triple (∆Ĩ , ·Ĩ , ϕĨ) such
that
• (∆Ĩ , ·Ĩ) is a standard DL interpretation,
• ϕĨ : NI ∪N ∆Ĩ is a surjective function from NI ∪N onto ∆Ĩ , such that
for all a ∈ NI we have that ϕĨ(a) = aĨ .
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The definition of ϕĨ can be extended to subsets of NI ∪ N. For a set S,
ϕĨ(S) := {ϕĨ(t) | t ∈ S}
Similarly we extend ϕĨ to ordered pairs and set of ordered pairs on NI ∪ N as
follows:
• ϕĨ((s, t)) := (ϕĨ(s), ϕĨ(t)) for ordered pairs (s, t) ∈ (NI ∪ N)2.
• ϕĨ(T ) := {ϕĨ((s, t)) | (s, t) ∈ T} for sets T ⊆ (NI ∪ N)2.
We also define the inverse ϕĨ
−1 of the mapping ϕĨ for an extended interpretation Ĩ
as follows:




−1(x) for E ⊆ ∆Ĩ .





−1((x, y)) for any H ⊆ ∆Ĩ ×∆Ĩ .
Note that for any extended interpretation Ĩ, we have that ϕĨ(a) = aĨ for any
a ∈ NI . This means that ϕĨ guarantees that each individual name a is the
designator (abstract name) of the interpretation of a under Ĩ. For the rest of the
elements of ∆Ĩ , we use elements of N as their designators.
Based on the notion of extended interpretation we define a new semantics for
SROIQK.
Definition 41. An extended epistemic interpretation for SROIQK is a pair
(Ĩ, W̃), where Ĩ is an extended SROIQ interpretation and W̃ is a set of extended
SROIQ interpretations. Similar to epistemic interpretations, for SROIQK con-
cepts C and D, role R and simple role S, we define an extended interpretation
function ·Ĩ,W̃ as follows:
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aĨ,W̃ = aĨ for a ∈ NI
X Ĩ,W̃ = X Ĩ for X ∈ NC ∪NR ∪ {>,⊥}
{a1,..., an}Ĩ,W̃ = {aĨ1 ,..., aĨn}
(C uD)Ĩ,W̃ = C Ĩ,W̃ ∩DĨ,W̃
(C tD)Ĩ,W̃ = C Ĩ,W̃ ∪DĨ,W̃
(¬C)Ĩ,W̃ = ∆Ĩ,W̃ \ C Ĩ,W̃
(∃S.Self)Ĩ,W̃ = {x | (x, x) ∈ RĨ,W̃}
(∀R.C)Ĩ,W̃ = {x | ∀y.(x, y) ∈ RĨ,W̃ → y ∈ C Ĩ,W̃}
(∃R.C)Ĩ,W̃ = {x | ∃y.(x, y) ∈ RĨ,W̃ ∧ y ∈ C Ĩ,W̃}
(6nS.C)Ĩ,W̃ = {x | #{y∈C Ĩ,W̃ |(x, y)∈RĨ,W̃} ≤ n}















Again, we set [(KR)−]Ĩ,W̃ := (KR−)Ĩ,W̃ for an epistemic role (KR)−. We now
elaborate our semantics by interpreting (step by step) a conceptKC in Ĩ, W̃ where
C is K-free concept:
1. for every interpretation J̃ ∈ W̃ , take the extension of C under J̃ which is
just a subset of ∆J̃ . (see Figure 7.1)









Figure 7.1: Step 1 of interpreting C in (Ĩ, W̃)
2. intersect all the subsets of NI ∪ N which are mapped to CJ̃ by ϕJ̃ for each
J̃ ∈ W̃ (see Figure 7.2).
3. KC Ĩ,W̃ is then the subset of ∆Ĩ which is the image of this intersect under
ϕĨ (see Figure 7.3) i.e.,
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Figure 7.2: Step 2 of interpreting C in (Ĩ, W̃)





Then ϕ of the current world (interpretation) is applied to get the extension of the
concept (role) in the current world.
The semantics of TBox, RBox, and ABox axioms follows exactly that for the clas-
sical semantics. Formally, we say an extended epistemic interpretation (Ĩ, W̃)
satisfies a GCI C v D for some SROIQK concepts C and D, if and only if
C Ĩ,W̃ ⊆ DĨ,W̃ . We write (Ĩ, W̃) |= C v D. Similarly we say (Ĩ, W̃) satisfies a
TBox T , written (Ĩ, W̃) |= T iff it satisfies all its axioms. The satisfaction of other
axioms, RBox, ABox and knowledge base in (Ĩ, W̃) can be defined analogously.
For the notion of models, like in classical semantics, we prefer certain extended
epistemic interpretations over the others i.e., our semantics is preferential.
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Figure 7.3: Step 3 of interpreting C in (Ĩ, W̃)
Definition 42. A set M̃ of extended interpretations is called extended epistemic
model of a given SROIQK knowledge base Σ = (T ,R,A) iff
• (Ĩ,M̃) satisfies Σ i.e, it satisfies T ,R and A for each Ĩ ∈ M̃, and
• M̃ is maximal in the sense that for every set of extended interpretations M̃′
such that M̃ ⊂ M̃′, there is some J̃ ∈ M̃′ such that J̃ ,M̃ does not satisfy
Σ.
We say a SROIQK knowledge base Σ is satisfiable (under the extended seman-
tics) if it has an extended epistemic model.
Based on the above definition, we now define the notion of entailment in this new
semantics.
Definition 43. For a given SROIQK knowledge base Σ and a SROIQK axiom
α, we say Σ entails α under the extended semantics, written Σ ||=e α, if for every
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extended epistemic model M̃ of Σ, we have that for every Ĩ ∈ M̃, the extended
epistemic interpretation (Ĩ,M̃) satisfies α.
Note that we now use the symbol ||=e to represent the entailment relation in
extended epistemic semantics. Further, as the semantics is preferential, ||=e has a
non-monotonic behavior.
Next we show that when considering non-epistemic axioms, the notions of satis-
faction under the extended semantics and under the standard semantics coincide.
More precisely, given a standard interpretation I, by E(I) we mean the set of all
extended interpretation Ĩ such that ∆Ĩ = ∆I and the mappings ·I and ·Ĩ are iden-
tical. In other words, E(I) represents all the extended interpretations obtained by
adding some mapping ϕĨ : NI ∪N→ ∆I satisfying ϕĨ(a) = aĨ for each a ∈ NI .
Now as in case of standard epistemic semantics, a K-free knowledge base Σ has
a unique extended epistemic model. We denote it with M̃(Σ) which is the set of
all extended epistemic models obtained by extending extended interpretations in
M(Σ). Note thatM(Σ) is the set of all standard models of Σ. Formally,
Fact 4. For any SROIQ knowledge base Σ, we have that
M̃(Σ) = {Ĩ | Ĩ ∈ E(I) for each I with I |=M(Σ)}
We abbreviate this by writing M̃(Σ) = E(M(Σ)).
Further the following relation holds between an interpretation I and E(I).
Lemma 7. Let C be a non-epistemic concept, R a non-epistemic role and I a
standard interpretation. Then
• for any x ∈ ∆I and for each Ĩ ∈ E(I), we have that
x ∈ CI iff x ∈ C Ĩ
• for any (x, y) ∈ ∆I ×∆I and for each Ĩ ∈ E(I), we have that
(x, y) ∈ RI iff (x, y) ∈ RĨ
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Proof. Note that as C contains no occurrence of K, the mapping ϕĨ play no role
in interpreting C under Ĩ. Hence, by simple induction, the proof follows simply
from the definition of the extended interpretation. Similar is the case of roles.
Since the interpretation of any axiom depends on the interpretation of concept
names and role names occurring in it and since the interpretation of a knowledge
base, depends on the interpretation of its axioms, as a consequence of the above
lemma, we get
Corollary 4. For any non-epistemic axiom α and a standard interpretation I, we
have that
I |= α iff Ĩ |= α for each Ĩ ∈ E(I).
Consequently we get
Corollary 5. For a standard (non-epistemic) knowledge base Σ and a standard
interpretation I, we have that
I |= Σ iff Ĩ |= Σ for each Ĩ ∈ E(I).
Now it is easy to see that the (non-epistemic) consequences of a standard knowl-
edge under the extended epistemic semantics and under the standard semantics
coincide.
Corollary 6. For a given non-epistemic knowledge base Σ and a non-epistemic
axiom α, we have
Σ |= α if and only if Σ ||=e α
Note that unlike the classical semantics, our proposed semantics does not enforce
the unique name assumption either. Hence, this new semantics is more compatible
with standard inference engines. Moreover, with this new semantics, the problem
that arises when allowing for nominals and universal roles in the knowledge base
language, is avoided, thus making it a more suitable and appropriate choice for
K-extensions of expressive description logics, like SROIQ.
It is now easy to see that the newly established semantics has the desired compati-
bility property as a direct consequence of Corollary 6.
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Theorem 2. ||=e is SROIQ-backward-compatible.
Consequently, this new semantics is more adequate for very expressive DLs such
as SROIQ. Yet, as will be shown later, it is also generic in the sense that for
SRIQ\U knowledge bases it behaves similar to the (classical) epistemic interpre-
tation introduced earlier. With this new semantics, we avoid the aforementioned
problems arising from nominals and the universal role in the language of a knowl-
edge base. In the following section, we extend the translation procedure, presented
in Definition 38, such that it allows for SROIQ as the knowledge base language.
7.3 Reasoning in Extended Semantics
In Chapter 6.2, we presented a procedure for translating epistemic axioms into
equivalent non-epistemic ones. We now extend the definition of ΦΣ (see Defini-
tion 38) such that it also handles a richer knowledge base language like, SROIQ.
7.3.1 Deciding Entailment of Extended Epistemic Axioms
To devise a translation procedure similar to Definition 38 for expressive DLs, the
idea is similar i.e., we replace certain epistemic concepts with K-free ones obtained
via several intermediate reasoning steps. Nevertheless, there are some changes for
handling the additional modeling constructs (e.g., the universal role and nominals)
in SROIQ. But first we notice that a similar argument can be made as in Lemma 4
in case of extended epistemic semantics i.e., the extension of an epistemic concept
KD may contain only named individuals. Formally,
Lemma 8. Let Σ be a SROIQ-knowledge base and C = KD an epistemic con-
cept with Σ 6|= D ≡ >. For an extended interpretation Ĩ ∈ M̃(Σ) and x ∈ ∆Ĩ ,
we have that x ∈ C Ĩ,M̃(Σ) iff x is named such that there is an individual name
a ∈ NI with x = aĨ,M̃(Σ) and Σ |= D(a).
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but suppose that there is no a ∈ NI such that aĨ,M̃(Σ) = x and Σ 6|= D(a).
Since Σ 6|= D ≡ >, there is a model I ′ of Σ such that ∆I′ 6= DI′ . In other words,
there is a y ∈ ∆I′ with y 6∈ DI′ . By Lemma 7, y 6∈ DĨ′ for each Ĩ ′ ∈ E(I ′).
As by definition, E(I ′) contains all the extended interpretation obtained from I ′
by augmenting any mapping from NI ∪ N to ∆I
′
, therefore, there is an extended
interpretation J̃ ′ ∈ E(I ′) such that ϕJ̃ ′−1(y) = ϕĨ−1(x) as ϕĨ and ϕJ̃ ′ share the
same domain, namely NI ∪ N. Since I ′ |= Σ (as I ′ ∈ M(Σ)), by corollary 4 we
get that J̃ ′ ||=e Σ and therefore J̃ ′ ∈ M̃(Σ). Now y 6∈ DJ̃
′
⇒ ϕJ̃ ′










−1(DJ̃ ) as ϕĨ−1(x) = ϕJ̃ ′−1(y)





which is a contradiction.
Now for the right to left direction, suppose there is a ∈ NI such that aĨ,M̃(Σ) = x
and Σ |= D(a). Corollary 4 along with the fact that both Σ and D are non-
epistemic implies that Σ ||=e D(a). This implies that for each J̃ ∈ M̃(Σ) we have
that aJ̃ ∈ DJ̃ , which by definition of ϕJ̃ implies that ϕJ̃−1(aJ̃ ) ⊆ ϕJ̃−1(DJ̃ ).
Now as aJ̃ = ϕJ̃ (a) for any J̃ ∈ M̃(Σ), we get that ϕJ̃−1(ϕJ̃ (a)) ⊆ ϕJ̃−1(DJ̃ ).


























as aĨ = aĨ,M̃(Σ) = x. By semantics of K, we get that x ∈ C Ĩ,M̃(Σ).
A similar property can be proved for the roles as well. But again, here we have to
be careful about the exceptional case of the roles equivalent to the universal role.
The idea is that the extension of a role KR, with R equivalent to the universal role
U , and that of the role R, under the extended semantics, coincides. To see this we
prove the following:
Claim 2. Let Σ be a non-epistemic knowledge base. For any non-epistemic role
R with Σ |= R ≡ U and for each extended interpretation Ĩ ∈ M̃(Σ), we have
KRĨ,M̃(Σ) = RĨ,M̃(Σ).








Since Σ |= R ≡ U , RI = ∆I × ∆I for each I ∈ M(Σ). Now as both R and
Σ are K-free, by Fact 4 we get M̃(Σ) = E(M(Σ)) and therefore, it follows from
Lemma 7 that RJ̃ = ∆J̃ × ∆Ĩ for each J̃ ∈ M̃(Σ). This together with (∗)
implies that
KRĨ,M̃(Σ) = ϕĨ((NI ∪ N)× (NI ∪ N))
as NI ∪N is the domain of ϕJ̃ for each J̃ ∈ M̃(Σ). Now since ϕĨ is a surjective
mapping from NI ∪ N to ∆Ĩ , we get that KRĨ,M̃(Σ) = ∆Ĩ × ∆Ĩ and hence
KRĨ,M̃(Σ) = RĨ,M̃(Σ) as RĨ,M̃(Σ) = ∆Ĩ ×∆Ĩ .
Results similar to Lemma 5 can be proved for roles of the form KR. Like in
classical semantics here we have that
• two elements are “known‘” to be related via R in Σ if so is stated in Σ via
some role assertion in which case both elements are named,
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• every elements is “known” to be related to itself via R whenever Σ enforce
so via some axiom.
Additionally in our semantics, via axiomatization in Σ we can have:
• an element x is “known” to be related to some other element viaR, whenever
Σ enforces x to be related to all the elements of the domain,
• whenever Σ enforces every element to be related to an element x via R, then
the relationship is “’known’.
Note that the additional cases we have here are due to the additional constructs we
have in SROIQ. Further, in the last two cases, the element x need to be named in
order to automatize the restrictions. In the following we formally prove the above
characteristic of K in SROIQ.
Lemma 9. Let Σ be a SROIQ knowledge base. Let R = KP be an epistemic
role such that Σ 6|= P ≡ U . For any extended interpretation Ĩ ∈ M̃(Σ) and
any x, y ∈ ∆Ĩ , we have that (x, y) ∈ RĨ,M̃(Σ) if and only if at least one of the
following holds:
(a) there are individual names a, b ∈ NI such that aĨ,M̃(Σ) = x, bĨ,M̃(Σ) = y
and Σ |= P (a, b).
(b) there is an individual name a ∈ NI with aĨ = x and Σ |= > v ∃P−.{a}.
(c) there is an individual name b ∈ NI with bĨ = y and Σ |= > v ∃P.{b}.
(d) x = y and Σ |= ∃> v P.Self.
Proof. For the left to right direction, suppose that (x, y) ∈ RĨ,M̃(Σ) but neither of
(a), (b), (c) or (d) holds. We distinguish the following cases:
(1) There are a, b ∈ NI with aĨ,M̃(Σ) = x and bĨ,M̃(Σ) = y. Regardless of
whether x 6= y or Σ 6|= > v ∃P.Self, since (a) does not hold, we have that
Σ 6|= P (a, b). It means that there is an interpretation I such that I |= Σ
but I 6|= P (a, b) i.e., (aI , bI) 6∈ P I . Define an extended interpretation K̃ as
follows:
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• ∆K̃ = ∆I ,
• ·K̃ = ·I ,
• ϕK̃(c) = cK̃ for each c ∈ NI .
By definition, K̃ ∈ E(I). As I |= Σ, by Corollary 4, we get that Ĩ ||=e Σ and
by Lemma 7, we get that (aK̃, bK̃) 6∈ P K̃. Now by definition of ϕK̃ we have

















follows from the definition of ϕĨ . But we have ϕĨ(a) = aĨ = x and ϕĨ(b) =
bĨ = y, therefore





and therefore by semantics of K, we get that (x, y) 6∈ KP Ĩ,M̃(Σ) as KP = R,
which is a contradiction.
(2) y is anonymous and there is a ∈ NI such that aĨ,M̃(Σ) = x. As (d) does
not hold, therefore, either x 6= y or Σ 6|= > v ∃P.Self. In any of the cases,
by the assumption it follows from (b) in particular that Σ 6|= > v ∃P−.{a}.
Therefore, there is an interpretation I with I |= Σ but I 6|= > v ∃P−.{a} i.e.,
there is a u ∈ ∆I such that u 6∈ [∃P−.{a}]I which implies that (aI , u) 6∈ P I .
By the definition of E(I), there is an extended interpretation Ĩ ′ ∈ E(I) such
that ϕĨ′
−1(u) = ϕĨ−1(y). Again this is the case as both ϕĨ and ϕĨ′ share the
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common domain NI ∪ N. Since (aI , u) 6∈ P I and Ĩ ′ ∈ E(I), by Lemma 7,
therefore, (aĨ′ , u) 6∈ P Ĩ′ which implies
ϕĨ′
−1(aĨ′)× ϕĨ′−1(u) 6⊆ ϕĨ′−1(P Ĩ
′)
⇒ ϕĨ′
−1(ϕĨ′(a))× ϕĨ′−1(u) 6⊆ ϕĨ′−1(P Ĩ
′) as aĨ′ = ϕĨ′(a)
⇒ {a} × ϕĨ′
−1(u) 6⊆ ϕĨ′−1(P Ĩ
′) as aĨ′ = ϕĨ′(a)




−1(P J̃ ) as Ĩ ′ ∈ M̃(Σ)
⇒ {a} × ϕĨ−1(y) 6⊆
⋂
J̃ ∈M̃(Σ) ϕJ̃









by Def. of ϕĨ










as ϕĨ(a) = aĨ = x
⇒ (x, y) 6∈ KP I,M(Σ) = RĨ,M̃(Σ) by semantics
which is a contradiction.
(3) x is anonymous and there is b ∈ NI with bĨ,M̃(Σ) = y. Again as (d) does not
hold, either x 6= y or Σ 6|= > v ∃P.Self. In either of the cases, it follows
from (c) particularly that Σ 6|= > v ∃P.{b}. In other words, there is an
interpretation I such that I |= Σ but I 6|= > v ∃P.{b} i.e., there is a u ∈ ∆I
such that u 6∈ [∃P.{b}]I . Consequently, (u, bI) 6∈ P I . Again by the definition
of E(I), there is an extended interpretation Ĩ ′ such that ϕĨ′−1(u) = ϕĨ−1(x).
Now by Lemma 7, (u, bI) 6∈ P I implies
(u, bĨ′) 6∈ P Ĩ′
⇒ ϕĨ′






−1(P J̃ ) as Ĩ ′ ∈ M̃(Σ)
⇒ ϕĨ−1(x)× {b} 6∈
⋂
J̃ ⊆M̃(Σ) ϕJ̃
−1(P J̃ ) as ϕĨ′−1(u) = ϕĨ−1(x)










as ϕĨ(b) = bĨ = y
⇒ (x, y) 6∈ KP Ĩ,M̃(Σ) = RĨ,M̃(Σ) by semantics
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which is a contradiction.
We have shown that at least one of (a), (b), (c) or (d) should hold given that (x, y) ∈
RĨ,M̃. For right to left direction, suppose either (a), (b), (c) or (d) holds. We have
to show then (x, y) ∈ RĨ,M̃(Σ). Thus we make the following case distinction:
(1) There are a, b ∈ NI such that aĨ,M̃(Σ) = x and bĨ,M̃(Σ) = y and Σ |= P (a, b):
Since both P and Σ contain no occurrence of K, by Corollary 6 we get that
Σ ||=e P (a, b) i.e., for each J̃ ∈ M̃(Σ), (aJ̃ , bJ̃ ) ∈ P J̃ which implies that
ϕJ̃
−1(aJ̃ )× ϕJ̃
−1(bJ̃ ) ⊆ ϕJ̃
−1(P J̃ )
for any J̃ ∈ M̃(Σ). As cJ̃ = ϕJ̃ (c) for c ∈ NI and J̃ ∈ M̃(Σ), therefore,
ϕJ̃
−1(ϕJ̃ (a))× ϕJ̃
−1(ϕJ̃ (b))) ⊆ ϕJ̃
−1(P J̃ )












by using the definition of ϕĨ . Thus




−1(P J̃ ))) = KP Ĩ,M̃(Σ)
as ϕĨ(a) = aĨ = x and ϕĨ(b) = bĨ = y. Hence, (x, y) ∈ RĨ,M̃(Σ) as
R = KP .
(2) There is an individual a ∈ NI with aĨ,M̃(Σ) = x and Σ |= > v ∃P−.{a}:
By Corollary 6 and the fact that Σ |= > v ∃P−.{a}, we get Σ ||=e > v
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∃P−.{a} as neither Σ nor > v ∃P−.{a} contains any occurrence of K.
Hence, for each extended interpretation J̃ ∈ M̃(Σ), we get that J̃ |= > v
∃P−.{a}, i.e., every u ∈ ∆J̃ is such that u ∈ [∃P−.{a}]J̃ . This means that
for every J̃ ∈ M̃(Σ) and u ∈ ∆J̃ , we have that (aJ̃ , u) ∈ P J̃ . Now, using
the definition of ϕJ̃







for any u ∈ ∆Ĩ and J̃ ∈ M̃(Σ). Note that a ∈ ϕJ̃−1(ϕJ̃ (a)). Further since
ϕJ̃ has domain NI ∪N and u ∈ ∆J̃ is arbitrary, for each J̃ ∈ M̃(Σ), we get














and since ϕĨ(a) = aĨ = x and ϕĨ is a surjective mapping with range ∆Ĩ ,
therefore we get that






for every v ∈ ∆Ĩ . In particular,






which, by semantics implies that (x, y) ∈ KP Ĩ,M̃(Σ) = RĨ,M̃(Σ) as R = KP .
(3) There is b ∈ NI with bĨ,M̃(Σ) = y and Σ |= > v ∃P.{b}:
By Corollary 6, we get that Σ ||=e > v ∃P.{b} as both Σ and > v ∃P.{b}
are K-free. In other words, for every J̃ ∈ M̃(Σ), we have that (u, bJ̃ ) ∈
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−1(ϕJ̃ (b)) ⊆ ϕJ̃
−1(P J̃ )
for any J̃ ∈ M̃(Σ) and u ∈ ∆J̃ . Again as b ∈ ϕJ̃−1(ϕJ̃ (b)) and ϕJ̃ has
domain NI ∪N for each J̃ ∈ M̃(Σ), we get (t, b) ∈ ϕJ̃−1(P J̃ ) and therefore,




for each t ∈ (NI ∪ N). Using definition of ϕĨ we get






for any t ∈ (NI ∪ N). Since ϕĨ(b) = bJ̃ = y and ϕĨ is a surjective mapping
with range ∆Ĩ , we get that






for any v ∈ ∆Ĩ . In particular,






which by semantics implies that (x, y) ∈ RĨ,M̃(Σ) as R = KP .
(4) x = y and Σ |= > v ∃P.Self:
As both Σ and the axiom > v ∃P.Self are K-free, Corollary 6 implies that
Σ ||=e > v ∃P.Self i.e., for each J̃ ∈ M̃(Σ) and u ∈ ∆J̃ , we have
that (u, u) ∈ P J̃ and by definition of ϕJ̃−1, therefore, ϕJ̃−1(u) × ϕJ̃−1(u) ⊆
ϕJ̃
−1(P J̃ ). But as ϕJ̃ , for each J̃ ∈ M̃(Σ), is a mapping with domainNI∪N,
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for each t ∈ (NI ∪ N). Now using the definition of ϕĨ , we get that






for each t ∈ (NI∪N). As ϕĨ is a surjective mapping fromNI∪N to ∆Ĩ , there-
fore, (v, v) ∈ KP Ĩ,M̃(Σ) for every v ∈ ∆Ĩ . In particular, (x, x) ∈ KP Ĩ,M̃(Σ)
and therefore (x, x) ∈ RĨ,M̃(Σ) as R = KP .
Having proved Lemma 8 and Lemma 9 we now extend the translation procedure
ΦΣ of Definition 38 in a way that it maps (complex) epistemic concept expressions
to non-epistemic ones which are equivalent in all models of the given SROIQ
knowledge base Σ. We represent this extension by Φ̃Σ.
Definition 44. Let Σ be a SROIQ knowledge base Σ. Further let P be a role,
and R and S be non-epistemic roles all different from U . We define a function Φ̃Σ
mapping SROIQK concept expressions to SROIQ concept expressions as in
Figure 7.4 where we let {} = ∅ = ⊥.
We now prove that the method based on the translation function Φ̃Σ as in Defini-
tion 44 is indeed correct. For the formal proof of the correctness of this procedure,
there are several points worth mentioning. Firstly, note that under the new seman-
tics, we do not enforce the UNA, hence, no need to axiomatize it in the knowledge
base explicitly. Secondly, we allow for both finite and infinite models of the knowl-
edge base. In fact, a property similar to Lemma 2 can not be proved for SROIQ
knowledge bases, i.e., it is not guaranteed that for all finite models of a SROIQ
knowledge base there exist infinite ones with the same behavior. Hence a com-
pletely different approach is taken in proving the correctness of the extended ΦΣ.
More notably, in the current epistemic semantics, Lemma 3 allows us to exchange
the role of any two anonymous individuals in a model without compromising mod-
elhood. This holds in the extended semantics case as well, but does not suffice for
showing formal correctness of ΦΣ. Instead, we use the definition of ϕĨ for an ex-
tended interpretation Ĩ. We now show that the extension of a SROIQK concept
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Φ̃Σ :

C 7→ C if C is an atomic or one-of concept, > or ⊥;
KD 7→
{
> if Σ |= Φ̃Σ(D) ≡ >
{a ∈ NI | Σ |= Φ̃Σ(D)(a)} otherwise
∃KS.Self 7→
{
∃S.Self if Σ |= > v ∃S.Self
{a ∈ NI | Σ |= S(a, a)} otherwise
C1 u C2 7→ Φ̃Σ(C1) u Φ̃Σ(C2)






a∈NI{a} u ∃P.({b ∈ NI | Σ |= P (a, b) u Φ̃Σ(D)})
t∃P.
(
{b ∈ NI | Σ |= > v ∃P.{b}} u Φ̃Σ(D)
)
t{a ∈ NI | Σ |= > v ∃P−{a}} u ∃P.Φ̃Σ(D)
t
{








a∈NI{a} u>nS.({b ∈ NI | Σ |= S(a, b) u Φ̃Σ(D)})
t{a ∈ NI | Σ |= > v ∃S−.{a}} u>nS.Φ̃Σ(D)





{b ∈ NI | Σ |= > v ∃S.{b}} u Φ̃Σ(D)
)
u




ΞKR.D 7→ ΞR.Φ̃Σ(D) for Ξ ∈ {∀, ∃, >n, 6n} and Σ |= R ≡ U
Figure 7.4: Translation function Φ̃Σ
and the extension of SROIQ concept obtained using the translation function Φ̃Σ,
agree under each extended interpretation in M̃(Σ).
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Lemma 10. Let Σ be a SROIQ-knowledge base and C be a SROIQK con-
cept. Then for any extended interpretation Ĩ ∈ M̃(Σ), we have that C Ĩ,M̃(Σ) =
[Φ̃Σ(C)]Ĩ,M̃(Σ).
Proof. For the proof we use induction on the structure of C and show that for each
x ∈ ∆Ĩ , we have that x ∈ C Ĩ,M̃(Σ) if and only if x ∈ (Φ̃Σ(C))Ĩ,M̃(Σ). For the
base case; C is atomic or one-of concept, and the cases where C = > and C = ⊥,
the lemma follows immediately from the definition of Φ̃Σ. For the cases, where
C = C1 uC2, C = C1 tC2 or C = ¬D, it follows from the induction hypothesis.
The non-trivial cases are considered in the following.
(i) C = KD and Σ 6|= D ≡ >:
By Lemma 9, x ∈ KDĨ,M̃(Σ) iff there is an a ∈ NI with aĨ = x and
Σ |= D(a). This is equivalent to x ∈ {a ∈ NI | Σ |= D(a)}Ĩ,M̃(Σ) and
hence, by definition of Φ̃Σ, to x ∈ [Φ̃Σ(KD)]Ĩ,M̃(Σ).
(ii) C = KD and Σ |= D ≡ >:
By Corollary 6 we get hat Σ ||=e D ≡ > i.e., for each J̃ ∈ M̃(Σ) we have





−1(DJ̃ ,M̃(Σ))) = ϕĨ(NI ∪ N)
as ϕĨ
−1 is a surjective mapping from NI ∪ N to ∆J̃ for each J̃ ∈ M̃(Σ).
Now ϕĨ(NI ∪ N) yields ∆Ĩ as it is a surjective mapping to ∆Ĩ . Hence
we get that KDĨ,M̃(Σ) = ∆Ĩ = >Ĩ , which by definition of Φ̃Σ yields
that KDĨ,M̃(Σ) = [Φ̃Σ(KD)]Ĩ,M̃(Σ). Consequently, x ∈ KDĨ,M̃(Σ) iff
x ∈ Φ̃Σ(KD)Ĩ,M̃(Σ).
(iii) C = ∃KS.Self:
First to prove the “if” part, suppose that Σ |= > v ∃S.Self. By seman-
tics, x ∈ [∃KS.Self]Ĩ,M̃(Σ) implies that for each J̃ |= M̃(Σ) we have that
(x, x) ∈ SJ̃ ,M̃(Σ). In particular, (x, x) ∈ SĨ,M̃(Σ) i.e., x ∈ [∃S.Self]Ĩ,M̃(Σ).
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Therefore, x ∈ [Φ̃Σ(∃KS.Self)]Ĩ,M̃(Σ) as by definition Φ̃Σ(∃KS.Self) =
∃S.Self.
Suppose that it is not the case that Σ |= > v ∃S.Self. By semantics,
x ∈ [∃KS.Self]Ĩ,M̃(Σ) implies (x, x) ∈ KSĨ,M̃(Σ). By Lemma 9, there
is aĨ = x such that Σ |= S(a, a). Hence, a ∈ {c ∈ NI | Σ |= S(c, c)},
which implies that x ∈ [Φ̃Σ(∃KS.Self)]Ĩ,M̃(Σ) as by definition
Φ̃Σ(∃KS.Self) = {c ∈ NI | Σ |= S(c, c)}.
Now we prove the “only-if” part. Suppose that x ∈ [Φ̃Σ(∃KS.Self)]Ĩ,M̃(Σ).
Based on the definition of Φ̃Σ we distinguish the following cases.
• Φ̃Σ(∃KS.Self) = ∃S.Self:
Like in (4) of Lemma 9, we can show that x ∈ [∃KS.Self]Ĩ,M̃(Σ).
• Φ̃Σ(∃KS.Self) = {c ∈ NI | Σ |= S(c, c)}:
x ∈ [Φ̃Σ(∃KS.Self)]Ĩ,M̃(Σ) implies that there some a ∈ NI with
aĨ = x such that Σ |= S(a, a). By Lemma 9, it means that
(aĨ , aĨ) = (x, x) ∈ KSĨ,M̃(Σ) and hence x ∈ [∃KS.Self]Ĩ,M̃(Σ).
(iv) C = ∃P.D and P is a non-epistemic role:
By the semantics, x ∈ [∃P.D]Ĩ,M̃(Σ) iff there is a y ∈ ∆Ĩ with
(x, y) ∈ P Ĩ,M̃(Σ) and y ∈ DĨ,M̃(Σ), therefore by induction,
y ∈ [Φ̃Σ(D)]Ĩ,M̃(Σ). Hence, it is equivalent to x ∈ [∃P.Φ̃Σ(D)]Ĩ,M̃(Σ)
which, by definition, is the case if and only if x ∈ [Φ̃Σ(∃P.D]Ĩ,M̃(Σ).
(v) C = ∃KP.D:
x ∈ (∃KP.D)Ĩ,M̃(Σ) implies x ∈ [Φ̃Σ(∃KP.D)]Ĩ,M̃(Σ):
By semantics, x ∈ (∃KP.D)Ĩ,M̃(Σ) means that there is a y ∈ ∆Ĩ
with (x, y) ∈ (KP )Ĩ,M̃(Σ) and y ∈ DĨ,M̃(Σ) hence, by induction y ∈
Φ̃Σ(D)Ĩ,M̃(Σ). By Lemma 9, (x, y) ∈ KP Ĩ,M̃ implies that at least one
of the following should hold:
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• There are a, b ∈ NI with aĨ = x, bĨ = x and Σ |= P (a, b). This means
that b ∈ {c ∈ NI | Σ |= P (a, c)}, therefore,
bĨ ∈ [{c ∈ NI | Σ |= P (a, c)}]Ĩ,M̃(Σ)
Now as y ∈ [Φ̃Σ(D)]Ĩ,M̃(Σ), therefore,
x ∈ [{a} u ∃P.({c ∈ NI | Σ |= P (a, c)} u Φ̃Σ(D))]Ĩ,M̃(Σ)
which by definition of Φ̃Σ implies that x ∈ [Φ̃Σ(∃KP.D)]Ĩ,M̃(Σ)
• There is an a ∈ NI with aĨ = x and Σ |= > < ∃P−.{a}. This means
that a ∈ {c ∈ NI | Σ |= > v ∃P−{c}}, therefore,
aĨ ∈ [{c ∈ NI | Σ |= > v ∃P−{c}}]Ĩ,M̃(Σ)
Now as Σ is K-free, by Corollary 6 Σ |= > v ∃P−.{a} implies that
Σ ||=e > v ∃P−.{a} i.e., (aJ̃ , u) ∈ P J̃ ,M̃(Σ) for each J̃ ∈ M̃(Σ) and
u ∈ ∆J̃ . In particular, (aĨ , y) = (x, y) ∈ P Ĩ,M̃(Σ). Consequently,
we get that x ∈ [∃P.Φ̃Σ(D)]Ĩ,M̃(Σ) as y ∈ [Φ̃Σ(D)]Ĩ,M̃(Σ). This along
with (∗) implies that x = aĨ ∈ [Φ̃Σ(∃KP.D)]Ĩ,M̃(Σ) as per definition
of Φ̃Σ.
• There is a b ∈ NI with bĨ = y and Σ |= > v ∃P.{b} i.e., b ∈ {c ∈
NI | Σ |= > v ∃P.{c}} which implies that
bĨ ∈ [{c ∈ NI | Σ |= > v ∃P.{c}}]Ĩ,M̃(Σ) (∗)
Since Σ is K-free we get from Corollary 6 that Σ ||=e > v ∃P.{b} i.e.,
for each J̃ ∈ M̃(Σ) and u ∈ ∆Ĩ we have that (u, bJ̃ ) ∈ P J̃ ,M̃(Σ).
In particular, (x, bĨ) = (x, y) ∈ P Ĩ,M̃(Σ), which along with (∗)
and the fact that y ∈ [Φ̃Σ(D)]Ĩ,M̃(Σ) immediately implies that x ∈
[∃KP.D]Ĩ,M̃(Σ) as per definition of Φ̃Σ.
• x = y and Σ |= > v ∃P.Self. As Φ̃Σ(∃KP.D) = Φ̃Σ(D), therefore,
we get that x ∈ [Φ̃Σ(∃KP.D)]Ĩ,M̃(Σ) as x = y ∈ [Φ̃Σ(D)]I,M(Σ).
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x ∈ [Φ̃Σ(∃KS.D)]Ĩ,M̃(Σ) implies x ∈ [∃KS.D]Ĩ,M̃(Σ) :
According to the definition of Φ̃Σ, we make the following case distinction.
• There is an a ∈ NI such that aĨ = x and x ∈ [∃P.({c ∈ NI | Σ |=
P (a, c)} u Φ̃Σ(D))]Ĩ,M̃(Σ) i.e., there is some b ∈ NI such that bĨ ∈
[Φ̃Σ(D)]Ĩ,M̃(Σ) and Σ |= P (a, b). This, by Lemma 9, implies that
(aĨ , bĨ) ∈ KP Ĩ,M̃(Σ). Hence, we get that x = aĨ ∈ [∃KP.D]Ĩ,M̃(Σ)
as bĨ ∈ DĨ,M̃(Σ) by induction.
• x ∈ [∃P.({c ∈ NI | Σ |= > v ∃P.{c}} u Φ̃Σ(D))]Ĩ,M̃(Σ) which
implies that there is some b ∈ NI such that Σ |= > v ∃P.{b} and bĨ ∈
[Φ̃Σ(D)]Ĩ,M̃(Σ). It follows from Lemma 9, that (x, bĨ) ∈ KP Ĩ,M̃(Σ)
which immediately implies that x ∈ [KP.D]Ĩ,M̃(Σ) as bĨ ∈ DĨ,M̃(Σ)
by induction.
• There is an a ∈ NI with aĨ = x such that Σ |= > v ∃P−.{a} and
x ∈ [∃P.Φ̃Σ(D)]Ĩ,M̃(Σ). It means that there is a y ∈ ∆Ĩ such that
y ∈ [Φ̃Σ(D)]Ĩ,M̃(Σ). By Lemma 9, we get that (x, y) ∈ KP Ĩ,M̃(Σ)
and hence, by semantics, x ∈ [∃KP.D]Ĩ,M̃(Σ) as y ∈ DĨ,M̃(Σ) by
induction.
• x ∈ [Φ̃Σ(D)]Ĩ,M̃(Σ), therefore by induction x ∈ DĨ,M̃(Σ). Since it is
the case that Σ |= ∃P.Self, Lemma 9 implies that (x, x) ∈ KP Ĩ,M̃(Σ)
and therefore, x ∈ [∃KP.D]Ĩ,M̃(Σ).
(vi) C = >nKS.D
x ∈ [>nKS.D]Ĩ,M̃(Σ) implies x ∈ [Φ̃Σ(>nKS.D)]Ĩ,M̃(Σ)
By semantics, x ∈ [>nKS.D]Ĩ,M̃(Σ) implies that there are pair-wise dis-
tinct y1, . . . , ym ∈ ∆Ĩ with m ≥ n such that (x, yi) ∈ KSĨ,M̃(Σ) and
yi ∈ DĨ,M̃(Σ), therefore by induction, yi ∈ Φ̃Σ(D)Ĩ,M̃(Σ) for i ≤ m. By
Lemma 9, this implies that at least one of the following should hold:
• There are a, b1, . . . , bm with aĨ = x and bĨi = yi such that Σ |= S(a, bi)
for i ≤ m i.e., bi ∈ {c ∈ NI | Σ |= (a, c)}. Since Σ is K-free, it
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follows from Corollary 6 that Σ ||=e S(a, bi) for i ≤ m. This implies
that (aĨ , bĨi ) = (x, yi) ∈ SĨ,M̃(Σ) for each i ≤ m. As m ≥ n and bi ∈
{c ∈ NI | Σ |= S(a, c)} with yi = bĨi ∈ [Φ̃Σ(D)]Ĩ,M̃(Σ), therefore,
we get that aĨ ∈ [>nS.({c ∈ NI | Σ |= S(a, c)} u Φ̃Σ(D))]Ĩ,M̃(Σ)
which immediately implies that x ∈ [Φ̃Σ(>nKS.D)]Ĩ,M̃(Σ) as x ∈
{a}Ĩ,M̃(Σ).
• There is an a ∈ NI with aĨ = x such that Σ |= > v ∃S−.{a}. This
implies that
a ∈ {c ∈ NI | Σ |= > v ∃S−.{c}} (∗)
Now by Corollary 6, Σ |= > v ∃S−.{a} implies that Σ ||=e > v
∃S−.{a}. It means that for any J̃ ∈ M̃(Σ), we have that (aJ̃ , v) ∈ SJ̃
for arbitrary v ∈ ∆J̃ . In particular, (x, yi) ∈ SĨ,M̃(Σ) as aĨ = x
and yi ∈ ∆Ĩ for i ≤ m. Now since yi ∈ Φ̃Σ(D)Ĩ,M̃(Σ) and m ≥
n, it follows from the semantics that x ∈ [>nS.ΦΣ(D)]Ĩ,M̃(Σ). This
along with (∗) implies that x ∈ [{c ∈ NI | Σ |= > v ∃S−.{c} u
>nS.Φ̃Σ(D)]Ĩ,M̃(Σ) and therefore, by definition of Φ̃Σ, we get that x ∈
[Φ̃Σ(>nKS.D)].
• There are b1, . . . , bm ∈ NI with bĨi = yi and Σ |= > v ∃S.{bi} for
i ≤ m. This means that
{b1, . . . , bm} ⊆ {c ∈ NI | Σ |= > v ∃P.{c}} (∗)
Now by Corollary 6, Σ |= > v ∃S.{bi} implies that Σ ||=e > v ∃S.{bi}
for i ≤ m. Therefore, we get that for each J̃ ∈ M̃(Σ), (u, bJ̃i ) ∈
SJ̃ ,M̃(Σ) for arbitrary u ∈ ∆Ĩ and i ≤ m. In particular, we have that
for each i ≤ m, (x, bĨi ) ∈ SĨ,M̃(Σ). Now as bĨi = yi ∈ Φ̃Σ(D)Ĩ,M̃(Σ)
for i ≤ m, consequently, it follows from (∗) , that
x ∈ [>nS.({c ∈ NI | Σ |= > v ∃S.{c}} u ΦΣ(D))]Ĩ,M̃(Σ)
as m ≥ n and therefore, x ∈ [ΦΣ(>nKS.D)]Ĩ,M̃(Σ) as per definition
of Φ̃Σ.
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• There is a y ∈ {y1, . . . , ym} such that x = y and Σ |= > v ∃S.Self.
Hence we have that
x ∈ [Φ̃Σ(D)]Ĩ,M̃(Σ) (∗)
Note that if x is named, we can proceed as the first two cases of the
proof. Here hence, we assume that x is unnamed i.e.,
x ∈ [¬{a | a ∈ NI}]Ĩ,M̃(Σ) (∗∗)
Suppose that x 6∈ [>(n − 1)S.({b ∈ NI | Σ |= > v ∃S.{b}} u
Φ̃Σ(D))]Ĩ,M̃(Σ). This means that there are b1, . . . , bk ∈ NI with k <
(n−1)such that bi ∈ [{b ∈ NI | Σ |= > v ∃S.{b}}u Φ̃Σ(D))]Ĩ,M̃(Σ).
Note that Σ |= > v ∃S.Self, by Corollary 6 implies that Σ ||=e > v
∃S.Self. Hence, we get that (x, x) ∈ KSĨ,M̃(Σ) which along with the
fact that x = y ∈ DĨ,M̃(Σ) implies that x[>1S.D]Ĩ,M̃(Σ). By the
assumption here we get that there are distinct z1, . . . , zm′ ∈ ∆Ĩ with
(x, zi) ∈ KSĨ,M̃(Σ) and zi ∈ DĨ,M̃(Σ) for i ≤ m′ and m′ is at most
(n− 1). Which is a contradiction as x ∈ [>nKS.D]Ĩ,M̃(Σ). Therefore,
it must be the case that x ∈ [>(n − 1)S.({b ∈ NI | Σ |= > v
∃S.{b}} u Φ̃Σ(D))]Ĩ,M̃(Σ) which along with (∗) and (∗∗) implies that
x ∈ [Φ̃Σ(>nKS.D)]Ĩ,M̃(Σ) as per definition of Φ̃Σ.
x ∈ [Φ̃Σ(>nKS.D)]Ĩ,M̃(Σ) implies x ∈ [>nKS.D]Ĩ,M̃(Σ)
According to the definition of ΦΣ, at least one of the following is the case:
• There are a, b1, . . . , bm ∈ NI with aĨ = x such that Σ |= S(a, bi) and
bĨi ∈ [Φ̃Σ(D)]Ĩ,M̃(Σ) for i ≤ m. By Lemma 9, therefore, (x, bĨi ) =
(aĨ , bĨi ) ∈ KSĨ,M̃(Σ) and by induction bĨi ∈ DĨ,M̃(Σ) for i ≤ m. This
immediately implies that x = aĨ ∈ [>nKS.D]Ĩ,M̃(Σ) as m ≥ n.
• Φ̃Σ(>nKS.D) = {c ∈ NI | Σ |= > v ∃S−.{c}} u>nS.Φ̃Σ(D):
x ∈ [{c ∈ NI | Σ |= > v ∃S−.{c}} u >nS.Φ̃Σ(D)]Ĩ,M̃(Σ) implies
that there is an a ∈ NI with aĨ = x and aĨ ∈ [>nS.Φ̃Σ(D)]Ĩ,M̃(Σ)
i.e., there are pair-wise disjoint y1, . . . , ym ∈ ∆Ĩ with m ≥ n such that
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yi ∈ [Φ̃Σ(D)]Ĩ,M̃(Σ) for i ≤ m. By induction, therefore, for i ≤ m
we have that yi ∈ DĨ,M̃(Σ). Now Σ |= > v ∃S−.{a} implies that
(x, y) ∈ SĨ as aĨ = x and therefore, by Lemma 9, (x, y) ∈ KSĨ,M̃(Σ)
for each y ∈ ∆Ĩ . In particular, (x, yi) ∈ KSĨ,M̃(Σ) for i ≤ m. As
yi ∈ DĨ,M̃(Σ) for i ≤ m and m ≥ n, consequently we get that x ∈
[>nKS.D]Ĩ,M̃(Σ).
• Φ̃Σ(>nKS.D) = >nS.({c ∈ NI | Σ |= > v ∃S.{c}} u Φ̃Σ(D)):
x ∈ [>nS.({c ∈ NI | Σ |= > v ∃S.{c}} u ΦΣ(D))]Ĩ,M̃(Σ) implies
that there are distinct b1, . . . , bm ∈ NI with m ≥ n, such that Σ |=
> v ∃S.{bi} and bĨi ∈ [Φ̃Σ(D)]Ĩ,M̃(Σ), therefore by induction bĨi ∈
DĨ,M̃(Σ) for i ≤ m. By Lemma 9, Σ |= > v ∃S.{bi} implies that
(x, bĨi ) ∈ KSĨ,M̃(Σ) for i ≤ m which immediately yields that x ∈
[>nKS.D]Ĩ,M̃(Σ).
• x is anonymous with x ∈ [Φ̃Σ(D)]Ĩ,M̃(Σ) and x ∈ [>(n − 1)S.({c ∈
NI | Σ |= > v ∃S.{c}} u Φ̃Σ(D))]Ĩ,M̃(Σ), which, as already proved
in the previous case, implies
x ∈ [>(n− 1)KS.D]Ĩ,M̃(Σ) (∗)
Now by Lemma 9, we have that (x, x) ∈ KSĨ,M̃(Σ). This along with
(∗) implies that x ∈ [>nKS.D]Ĩ,M̃(Σ) as x ∈ DĨ,M̃(Σ) by induction.
(vii) C = ΞKR.D for Ξ ∈ {∀, ∃, >n, 6n} and Σ |= R ≡ U :
By Claim 2, we have that KRĨ,M̃(Σ) = RĨ,M̃(Σ). Hence, by induc-
tion, it follows immediately that x ∈ [ΞKR.D]Ĩ,M̃(Σ) if and only if x ∈
[ΞR.Φ̃Σ(D)]Ĩ,M̃(Σ) = [Φ̃Σ(ΞKR.D)]Ĩ,M̃(Σ).
(viii) the rest of the cases can be proved analogously.
The translation function Φ̃Σ in Definition 44 enables us to reduce the problem of
entailment in SROIQK axioms by SROIQ knowledge bases to the problem of
entailment of SROIQ axioms. Formally,
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Theorem 3. For a SROIQ knowledge base Σ, SROIQK concepts C, D, and
an individual a, the following hold:
1 Σ ||=e C(a) if and only if Σ |= Φ̃Σ(C)(a).
2 Σ ||=e C v D if and only if Σ |= Φ̃Σ(C) v Φ̃Σ(D).
Proof. For the first case, note that Σ ||=e C(a) is equivalent to aĨ,M̃(Σ) ∈ C Ĩ,M̃(Σ)
which by Lemma 10 implies that aĨ,M̃(Σ) ∈ Φ̃Σ(C)Ĩ,M̃(Σ) for all Ĩ ∈ M̃(Σ).
Since Σ and Φ̃Σ(C) are K-free, by Fact 4 we get M̃ = E({I | I |= Σ}) and
therefore by Lemma 7 we get the equivalent statement that aI ∈ Φ̃Σ(C)I for each
model I of Σ and therefore, Σ |= C(a). We can prove the second case with similar
arguments.
Now as the answer of an epistemic query to a SROIQ knowledge base can be de-
termined by checking the entailment of the axioms in the query from the knowledge
base. Consequently, epistemic queries answering can be translated in to standard
query answering.
Corollary 7. For a given SROIQ knowledge base Σ and an epistemic query Q,
letQ′ be the (non-epistemic) query obtained by translating axioms inQ into K-free
using ΦΣ . Then we have
ans(Q) = ans(Q′)
i.e. answers of Q and Q′ coincide when posed to Σ.
Thus any tool implementing Definition 44 can be used to answer epistemic queries
to SROIQ knowledge bases. Note that the definition of ΦΣ and Φ̃Σ coincide for
a SRIQ\U knowledge base Σ i.e.,
Lemma 11. Let Σ be a SRIQ\Uknowledge base. Then for any epistemic concept
C formulated in SROIQK we have ΦΣ(C) = Φ̃Σ(C).
Proof. We prove the lemma by induction on the structure of C. For the base case
with C an atomic concept, C = > or C = ⊥, by Definition 38 and Definition 44
we have that ΦΣ(C) = Φ̃Σ(C) = C. The remaining cases are as following
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• C = ¬D for some epistemic concept D:
By definition of ΦΣ we have ΦΣ(C) = ¬ΦΣ(D) and thus by induction
ΦΣ(C) = ¬Φ̃Σ(C) and thus by definition of Φ̃Σ(C) we get that ΦΣ(C) =
Φ̃Σ(C).
• C = C1 t C2 for epistemic concepts C1 and C2:
Again from definition of ΦΣ and induction it follows that ΦΣ(C) =
ΦΣ(C1) t ΦΣ(C2) = Φ̃Σ(C1) t Φ̃Σ(C2) and thus by definition of Φ̃Σ we
get that ΦΣ(C) = Φ̃Σ(C).
• C = ∃R.D for a non epistemic role R and an epistemic concept D:
Since R is K-free, by definition of ΦΣ and induction we get that ΦΣ(C) =
∃R.ΦΣ(D) and thus by induction, ΦΣ(C) = ∃R.Φ̃Σ(D) and therefore by
definition of Φ̃Σ, ΦΣ(C) = Φ̃Σ(C).
• C = ∃KR.D for a non epistemic role R and an epistemic concept D:
Note that the equality of ΦΣ(C) to⊔
a∈NI
a u ∃R.({b1 . . . bn}) u ΦΣ(D) (1)
follows from the definition of ΦΣ where {b1 . . . bn} = {b ∈ NI | ΣUNA |=
R(a, b)}. Now consider the case of Φ̃Σ(∃KR.D) in Definition 44. Since we
consider SRIQ\U only, Φ̃Σ(∃KR.D) is translated into
⊔
a∈NI
a u ∃R.({b1 . . . bn}) u Φ̃Σ(D) (2)
where {b1 . . . bn} = {b ∈ NI |Σ |= P (a, b)}. The remaining disjuncts are
not considered as they correspond to one-of or SELF constructs which we
do not allow in SRIQ\U . Hence, we established the equality of (1) and (2)
as by induction ΦΣ(D) = Φ̃Σ(D) and thus ΦΣ(C) = Φ̃Σ(C).
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• C =≥ nS.D for a simple non-epistemic role S and an epistemic concept D:
By definition of ΦΣ and induction we get that ΦΣ(C) =≥ nS.ΦΣ(D) =≥
nS.Φ̃Σ(D) and thus ΦΣ(C) = Φ̃Σ(C) follows from the definition of Φ̃Σ.
• C =≥ nS.D for a simple non-epistemic role S and an epistemic concept D:
Suppose that n > 1. Thus from the definition of ΦΣ we get the equality of
ΦΣ(C) to ⊔
a∈NI
{a}u ≥ nS.({B1, . . . , bn}) u ΦΣ(D) (3)
where {b1, . . . , bn} = {b∈NI |ΣUNA |= ΦΣ(D)}. Similarly from the defini-
tion of Φ̃Σ we get the equality of Φ̃Σ(C) to
⊔
a∈NI
{a}u ≥ nS.({B1, . . . , bn}) u Φ̃Σ(D) (4)
where {b1, . . . , bn} = {b∈NI |ΣUNA |= Φ̃Σ(D)}. Again the remaining
disjuncts are equivalent to ⊥ as we do not allow for one-of and SELF con-
structs. By induction we immediately get the equality of (3) and (4) and
thus ΦΣ(C) = Φ̃Σ(C).
• C = ΞKU.D for an epistemic concept D:
The equality ΦΣ(C) = Φ̃Σ(C) follows immediately from induction hypoth-
esis and definitions of ΦΣ and Φ̃Σ.
The rest of the cases can be proved analogously.
The lemma above, Theorem 1 and Theorem 3 immediately yields the following
results.
Corollary 8. For a given SRIQ\U knowledge base Σ, SROIQK concepts C,
D and an individual name a, we have that
1. Σ ||=e C(a) under the unique name assumption if and only if Σ ||= C(a),
similarly
2. Σ ||=e C v D under the unique name assumption if and only if Σ ||= C v D
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With this we conclude the chapter. In the next chapter we discuss issues related to
the implementation of the function Φ̃Σ.
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In this chapter we present EQuIKa1, a system realizing the translation procedure
presented in Section 7.3.1. Note that a naı̈ve implementation of the translation
function presented in Definition 44 is not necessarily feasible in practice, in par-
ticular when dealing with knowledge bases containing relatively large number of
individuals. We thus present several optimization rules. These rules, in general,
speed up the computation time of EQuIKa in retrieving instances of an epistemic
concept.
8.1 Optimization
The basic idea is to check the structure of a given epistemic concept and reduce
either the number of K’s occurring in the concept or the number of calls to the
core reasoner during the translation of the concept such that the correctness of the
answers is preserved. These intuition is realized by the optimization rules. In the
following we discuss these rules and their correctness. Later in Section 8.3, we
see that implementing these rules in EQuIKa indeed improves its performance in
terms of computation time.
The rules are as follows:
• Rule 1 (Nominals): For individual names a1, . . . , an we have
Φ̂Σ(K{a1, . . . , an}) 7→ {a1, . . . , an}
1EQuIKa is a acronym for Epistemic Querying Interface Karlsruhe)
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This rule allows us to avoid instance retrieval for the concept {a1, . . . , an}
thus reduces the number of intermediate reasoner calls by 1. The correctness
of Rule 1 is given as follows:






−1({a1, . . . , an}J )
)
i.e., x ∈ ϕĨ(ϕJ̃−1({a1, . . . , an}J )) for each J ∈ M(Σ). In particular,
x ∈ ϕĨ(ϕĨ−1({a1, . . . , an}I)). Since ϕĨ is a surjective mapping, we get that
x ∈ {a1, . . . , an}I = {a1, . . . , an}I,M(Σ).
For the right to left direction, let x ∈ {a1, . . . , an}I,M(Σ) and suppose that
x 6∈ K{a1, . . . , an}I,M(Σ). Note that by definition of ϕJ , we have that
ai ∈ ϕJ −1(aJi ) for each J ∈ M(Σ) and 1 ≤ i ≤ n. It means that
{a1, . . . , an} ⊆ ϕJ −1({a1, . . . , an}J ) for each J ∈M(Σ) i.e.,




−1({a1, . . . , an}J )
and thus by applying ϕI we get




−1({a1, . . . , an}J )
)
which in other words means that ϕI({a1, . . . , an}) ⊆
K{a1, . . . , an}I,M(Σ). By assumption, since x 6∈ K{a1, . . . , an}I,M(Σ),
consequently we get that x 6∈ ϕI({a1, . . . , an}) = {ϕĨ(a1), . . . , ϕĨ(an)}.
By definition of ϕĨ we have that ϕI(a) = aI for each a ∈ NI . Therefore
we get that x 6∈ {a1I , . . . , anI} = {a1, . . . , an}I,M(Σ), which is a
contradiction. Hence, x ∈ K{a1, . . . , an}I,M(Σ) must hold.
• Rule 2 (Conjunction): Let C1, . . . , Cn be concepts where each Ci is either
an epistemic concept of the form KD for some conceptD or a one-of concept
124
8.1. OPTIMIZATION
for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. By C ′i we denote the concept obtained from Di by dropping
K or C ′i = Ci when Di is a one-of concept. Then,
Φ̂Σ(C1u, . . . ,uCn) 7→ K(C ′1u, . . . ,uC ′n)
This rule reduces the number of intermediate reasoner call by n. Thus it
boost ups EQuIKa’s performance to a great magnitude. We now present the
proof of its correctness:
Proof. For a one-of concept {a1, . . . , ak}, it follows from the proof of Rule 1
that {a1, . . . , ak} is equivalent to K{a1, . . . , ak}. Hence, we assume that
each concept in C1 u · · · uCn is of the form KD for some concept D. Now
we have that
x ∈ [KD1 u . . .KDn]I,M(Σ)
if and only if by semantics of conjunction
x ∈ (KDI,M(Σ)1 ∩ · · · ∩ KDI,M(Σ)n )
























−1((D1 u · · · uDn)J ))
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which by semantics of K is the case if and only if x ∈ [K(D1 u · · · u
Dn)]I,M(Σ).
Note that a similar rule for disjunction does not work. For example, an
element x in the extension of the concept
KC1 t · · · t KCn
implies the membership of x in the extension of
K(C1 t · · · t Cn)
whereas this does not hold in the other direction.
• Rule 3 (Existential Quantification):




a∈NI{a} u ∃P.({b ∈ NI | Σ |= P (a, b) u Φ̃Σ(D)})
t∃P.
(
{b ∈ NI | Σ |= > v ∃P.{b}} u Φ̃Σ(D)
)
t{a ∈ NI | Σ |= > v ∃P−{a}} u ∃P.Φ̃Σ(D)
t
{
Φ̃Σ(D) if Σ |= > v ∃P.Self
⊥ otherwise
Suppose Inst(D) returns the set of instances of a conceptD and let OUTP =
Inst(∃P.Φ̃(D)) and INP = Inst(∃P−.>). Using these abbreviation, Rule 3




a∈OUTP {a} u ∃P.({b ∈ INP | Σ |= P (a, b) u Φ̃Σ(D)})
t∃P.
(
{b ∈ INP | Σ |= > v ∃P.{b}} u Φ̃Σ(D)
)
t{a ∈ OUTP | Σ |= > v ∃P−{a}} u ∃P.Φ̃Σ(D)
t
{
Φ̃Σ(D) if Σ |= > v ∃P.Self
⊥ otherwise
The basic idea is that in the first disjunct of the case ∃KR.D in Definition 44,
instead of checking the two conditions i.e., checking for each b ∈ NI if
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Σ |= P (a, b) and if b ∈ Φ̃Σ(D), we simply compute all the instances of
the concept ∃P−.> which are individual names for which we are sure that
some element is related to them via the property P . Consequently we have to
consider lesser number of individuals in the first disjunct of the optimization
rule. Further, we reuse these instances in second disjunct as well instead of
checking if for each b ∈ NI we have that Σ |= ∃P.{b}. A somewhat similar
argument can me made for the third disjunct.
Note that without the optimization, the number of calls to the core rea-
soner required for translating a concept of the form ∃KP.D is at least
(|NI | × |NI | + 2|NI | + 1) plus the number of calls needed to translate D.
With the optimization Rule 3, such a translation reduces the number of calls
when |Inst(∃P.Φ̃(D))| < |NI | or |Inst(∃P−.>)| < NI . Now to prove the
correctness,
Proof. We introduce the following abbreviations,
– C1 =
⊔
a∈NI{a} u ∃P.({b ∈ NI | Σ |= P (a, b) u Φ̃Σ(D)})
– C ′1 =
⊔
a∈OUTP {a} u ∃P.({b ∈ INP | Σ |= P (a, b) u Φ̃Σ(D)})
– C2 = ∃P.
(
{b ∈ NI | Σ |= > v ∃P.{b}} u Φ̃Σ(D)
)
– C ′2 = ∃P.
(
{b ∈ INP | Σ |= > v ∃P.{b}} u Φ̃Σ(D)
)
– C3 = {a ∈ NI | Σ |= > v ∃P−{a}} u ∃P.Φ̃Σ(D)
– C ′3 = {a ∈ OUTP | Σ |= > v ∃P−{a}} u ∃P.Φ̃Σ(D)
We first show that for an extended interpretation I ∈ M(Σ) and x ∈ ∆I ,
x ∈ CI,M(Σ)1 iff x ∈ C
′I,M(Σ)
1 . For this note that if b
′ ∈ Inst({b ∈ NI |Σ |=
P (a′, b)}) for individuals a′ and b′ then it immediately follows that b′ ∈
Inst({b ∈ INP |Σ |= (a′, b)}) and vice versa. Now for x ∈ ∆I , x ∈ CI,M(Σ)1
if and only if there is an individual a′ ∈ NI such that x = a′I,M(Σ) and
x ∈ ∃P.({b ∈ NI | Σ |= P (a′, b) u Φ̃Σ(D)})I,M(Σ). This is the case if
and only if x ∈ ∃P.({b ∈ INP | Σ |= P (a′, b) u Φ̃Σ(D)})I,M(Σ) which is
equivalent to x ∈ C ′I,M(Σ)1 .
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In the same way, we can prove that x ∈ CI,M(Σ)2 if and only if x ∈
C
′I,M(Σ)
2 . Similarly, x ∈ C
I,M(Σ)
3 if and only if x ∈ C
′I,M̃(Σ)
3 . Conse-
quently, this establishes the proof of the correctness of Rule 3.
• Rule 4 (Number Restriction):
Similarly, Rule 4 handles the case of Definition 44 where the considered
concept is of the form ≥ nKS.D. The rule is given as follows:
⊔
a∈OUTP,n{a} u>nS.({b ∈ INP,n | Σ |= S(a, b) u Φ̃Σ(D)})
t{a ∈ OUTP,n | Σ |= > v ∃S−.{a}} u>nS.Φ̃Σ(D)





{b ∈ INP,n−1 | Σ |= > v ∃S.{b}} u Φ̃Σ(D)
)
u
Φ̃Σ(D) u ¬{a | a ∈ NI} if Σ |= > v ∃S.Self
⊥ otherwise
where OUTP,n =≥ nP.Φ̃(D) and INP,n =≥ n.P−.>.
The proof of correctness is similar to that of Rule 3.
These rules suffice in the sense that for most of the remaining constructs, we use
their dual which corresponds to one of the rules discussed above. Later we will
compare the performance of two implementations of EQuIKa: one implementing
Φ̃Σ without while the other implementing with the optimization rules.
8.2 Implementation
The EQuIKa system is implemented on top of the OWL-API.2 It can be used as an
API as well as within Protégé using an epistemic query tab. In the following we
address several issues involved in implementing EQuIKa.
• The standard OWL-API does not suppose the epistemic constructs. Now in
order to embed K in the syntax of queries, we extended several classes of the











Figure 8.1: RDF represention of the epistemic operator for concepts
complement construct (¬) for concepts and like the inverse role construct
for roles. We therefore followed the same implementation patterns. For
example, as a possible representation of the assertion
KWine(bancroftChardonnay)
we can use the equivalent RDF3 representation as given in figure 8.1.
Similarly, the RDF representation of the concept assertion
∀KproducesWine.KWhiteTableWine(bancroft)
is given in Figure 8.2.
• For parsing we created an EpistemicSyntaxParser based on the
ManchesterOWLSyntaxOntologyParser
The K operator is expressed by the token knownClass for concepts and by
the token knownProperty for the roles. We have already desmonstrated
















Figure 8.2: RDF represention of the epistemic operator for roles
• We implemented the translation function in a recursive fashion. For this, we
implemented a visitor pattern by extending the
OWLClassExpressionVisitor
class in order to handle the epistemic operator.
• In order to support epistemic querying within the Protégé editor, we imple-
mented an additional tab based on the DL Query tab. Figure 8.3 shows a
snapshot of epistemic querying in Protégé.
An overview of the overall implementation of EQuIKa is given by the class di-
agram in Figure 8.4. Note that the new types OWLObjectEpistemicConcept
and OWLObjectEpistemicRole are derived from the respective standard types
OWLBooleanClassExpression and OWLObjectPropertyExpression to fit the
design of the OWL-API. As our translation method depends on intermediate calls
to a standard reasoner, the class EQuIKaReasoner implements the OWLRea-
soner interface. Now EQuIKa translates an epistemic concept into a K-free one in
a recursive fashion using the class Translator that implements the OWLClassEx-
pressionVisitor. Further, since Protégé can utilize any reasoner that implements
the OWLReasoner interface, this enables Protégé to use the EQuIkaReasoner to
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Figure 8.3: Epistemic Querying in Protégé
answer epistemic queries. Last but not least, EQuIKa has been shared on google-
code for testing purposes.4 The Protégé plugin is provided as jar file that can be
installed via the Protégé 4.1 plugin folder.
In the next section we present results of some experiments we performed in order
to assess the overall performance of EQuIKa in practice.
8.3 Evaluation
For the purpose of evaluation, we performed several experiments with the follow-
ing setup:
• We used an IBM Thinkpad T60 dual core, 2 GHz each core and running with





Figure 8.4: The EQuIKa-system extending the OWL-API
• For benchmark tests, we used a populated version of the Wine ontology5, that
contains 483 individuals. Further, to test different constructs, this version of
the Wine ontology uses most of the SROIQ/OWL 2 DL constructs. This
ontology can be downloaded along with EQuIKa.
• To evaluate the performance of EQuIKa, we constructed several epistemic
concepts and translated them into K-free ones.
These concepts are given in Table 8.1 where r1, . . . , r108 are individuals rep-
resenting wine regions in the ontologies. Note that for the testing purpose
we were not interested in the actual meaning of these concepts. In fact, these
concepts are arbitrarily constructed using different constructs. This allows
us to study the effect of different constructs in concept on the performance
of EQuIKa.





EC2 ∃KhasWineDescriptor.KWineDescriptor u ∃KmadeFromFruit.KWineGrape
EC3 KRoseWine
EC4 KRoseWine u KWhiteWine
EC5 KRoseWine u KWhiteWine u {r1, . . . , r108}
EC6 KWine u ¬∃KhasSugar.{Dry} u ¬∃KhasSugar.{OffDry} u ¬∃KhasSugar.{Sweet}
Table 8.1: Concepts used for instance retrieval experiments.
A better way of evaluating EQuIKa is to compare it with its alike tools. But to
the best of our knowledge, EQuIKa is the only reasoner of its nature for epistemic
query answering. Unfortunately, there is no other existing reasoner with these
capabilities against which we could compare EQuIKa’s performance. To give an
impression about the runtime behavior, we performed two kind of experiments.
As a measure, we considered the time required to translate the epistemic concepts
(given in Table 8.1) to K-free equivalent ones and the instance retrieval time of
the translated concept. Note that we arbitrary constructed these concepts using
constructs that are potentially complex cases of the translation function presented
in Defintion 44. However we did not use all the constructs in SROIQ simply
because the wine ontology itself does not use all the constructs in SROIQ.
Concept EQuIKa-N EQuIKa-O
Ttrans Tinst #inst Ttrans Tinst #inst
EC1 4 192.7 132 21 97.8 132
EC2 9 198.9 3 3 37.5 3
EC3 110 110.1 3 26 26.5 3
EC4 203 211.7 0 122 122.1 0
EC5 206 400.6 0 121 121.9 0
EC6 13 − − 0.5 487.3 119
Table 8.2: Time (in seconds) required for instance retrieval.
Experiment 1
In the first series of experiments, we evaluated the benefit of the optimization rules
introduced in the previous section. We implemented two versions of EQuIKa; a
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naive one called EQuIKa-N implementing the translation function of Definition 44
as is and an optimized one called EQuIKa-O where the optimization rules were
used. The corresponding results are shown in Table 8.2 where Ttrans, Tinst and
#inst represent the translation time (in seconds), instance retrieval time (in sec-
onds) and the number of instances respectively where the times are measured in
seconds. Note that the optimized EQuIKa-O outperformed the naive EQuIKa-N.
A time comparison in seconds between both versions of EQuIKa is presented in
Figure 8.5. For each concept, the first (brown) bar represents the total time taken by
EQuIKa-N and the second (blue) bar represents the total time taken by EQuIKa-O.
In both bars, the dark colored part represented the time taken for the translation
and the light colored part represents the instance retrieval time by the correspond-
ing versions of EQuIKa. It can be seen from the chart that the optimized EQuIKa is
one or several orders of magnitude faster than the non-optimized one. In particular
for concept EC6, EQuIKa-N didn’t responded for almost an hour and we stopped
it, whereas EQuIKa-O translated EC6 and retrieved its instances in few seconds.
Hence, beside being correct, the optimized rules introduced are of high importance
toward the practical feasibility of EQuIKa.
Experiment II
In the second series of experiments, we evaluated the computation time of
EQuIKa-O in general to provide an impression of how the cost of epistemic
querying relates to standard reasoning tasks. For this purpose, we consider
non-epistemic concepts C1, . . . , C6 where each Ci is obtained by removing all the
occurrences of the operator K from ECi for 1 ≤ i ≤ 6. Table 8.3 shows the results
of our experiments. Note that the number of instances retrieved for the concepts
Ci and ECi needs not to coincide as the concepts are semantically non-equivalent
in general. Further, the instance retrieval time for ECi’s in general is great
that the instance retrieval time for Ci’s. The reason is that EQuIKa-O replaces
sub-concepts of ECi’s by one-concepts thus resulting into more complex
concepts. However, it can be seen that even when comparing to the K-free counter
part of the epistemic concepts, the computation time of EQuIKa-O is roughly in
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Figure 8.5: Computation time (in seconds) comparision of EQuIKa-N and
EQuIKa-O.
Concept Tinst #inst Concept Ttrans Tinst #inst
C1 2.18 159 EC1 20 95.7 132
C2 41.9 159 EC2 3 36.5 3
C3 10.7 3 EC3 10 10.8 3
C4 2.68 0 EC4 2 2.9 0
C5 0.2 0 EC5 2 2.9 0
C6 61.1 80 EC6 0.5 487.3 119
Table 8.3: Time (in seconds) comparison between epistemic vs. standard instance
retrieval.
the same order of magnitude.
Observing the results of these experiments, we believe EQuIKa can be deployed
for the real life applications. Nevertheless, finding out applications where local-
135
CHAPTER 8. IMPLEMENTATION
closed word reasoning and thus introspective capabilities are demanded is yet a








In this chapter we compare our approach with several related approaches which
we divide into 1) classical approaches, where the standard semantics for epistemic
DLs is adopted and 2) modern approaches, where new semantics have been de-
vised for different extensions of DLs.
9.1 Classical Approaches
Donini et al. present one of the earliest approaches to extending DLs with an
epistemic operator where the DL ALC is endowed with the operator K and is
called ALCK [DONINI et al. 1992b]. We have seen that this operator is used
to formalize the notion of what is known in the knowledge base and resem-
bles the necessity modality in modal logics [BRAÜNER and GHILARDI 2006].
The semantics adapted for ALCK is based on the standard possible-world ap-
proach [BRAÜNER and GHILARDI 2006] where the accessibility relation is a total
and equivalence relation. To cope with problems like domain of quantification and
cross-domain interpretation of constants (individual names), the aforementioned
assumptions regarding the rigidity of the constants and the commonality of the do-
mains are adopted. In Chapter 7, we have seen that such an approach is suitable
for DLs up to SRIQ\U , however, the classical semantics fail to handle DLs that
allow for nominals or universal role together with number restriction. In this work,
we have taken a similar direction. Compare to our approach,
• firstly we have devised a procedure that translated epistemic axioms into
non-epistemic ones. Thus in our approach all one needs to implement is
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the translation functions we presented in Definition 44. Thus our approach
allows us using state-of-the-art available reasoners. Note that implementing
a complete new reasoner requires quite much time.
• secondly, in our approach we considered SROIQ as the knowledge base
language unlike the classical approaches where we need to restrict the
knowledge base language to SRIQ\U .
The description logic of minimal knowledge and negation as failure (DL-MKNF)
is presented in [DONINI et al. 1997]. In such a formalims, a standard DL is aug-
mented with two modal operators: K for representing knowledge and A for rep-
resenting default assumptions. The semantics for DL-MKNF is similar to the se-
mantics employed for ALCK where the operator A is interpreted similar to the K
operator. Nevertheless, when defining the notion of models, the semantics requires
the maximality of the set of interpretations considered for the operator K only. Re-
stricting DL-MKNF to A-free queries, we compare it with our work. The semantics
employed for DL-MKNF imposes the two assumptions, namely, the common do-
main assumption and the rigid term assumption. Due to these assumptions, the
semantics suffers from the same problems as the classical semantics for epistemic
extensions of DLs for expressive knowledge base languages like SROIQ.
9.1.1 Modern Approaches
We now discuss some modern approaches to extending DLs with non-monotonic
features, which avoid the semantics problems. In Section 4.2.3, we pre-
sented an overview of MKNF+ knowledge bases [MOTIK and ROSATI 2008].
The formalism is expressive enough to capture many of the existing ap-
proaches to non-monotonic extension of DLs and to integrate DLs with rules
(see [ROSATI 2006b, BAADER and HOLLUNDER 1992, CALVANESE et al. 2007,
EITER et al. 2008, LUKASIEWICZ 2010a] etc). Thereby, the expressiveness of the
underlying language is not restricted to some less expressive DL rather it can be
any fragment of first-order logic. As a recall, an MKNF+ KB K is a pair (O,P)
where O is a description logic KB and P a general logic program. Thus, by def-
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inition, a DL KB O is an MKNF+ KB with empty program part. The semantics
employed for MKNF+ is the standard MKNF semantics [LIFSCHITZ 1991] except
that the standard name assumption is required to be satisfied by the interpretations.
Such a semantics is capable of handling the problems mentioned in Chapter 7.
Nevertheless, there is a subtle difference between MKNF+ semantics and our se-
mantics. The basic difference is how both semantics treat the equality relation .=.
In our approach we exploit .= locally i.e., given a world, our semantics respects
the .= relation between individuals. This is not the case in MKNF+. To see this,
we present an example. Suppose we have an knowledge base Σ containing the
following axioms:
> v {a, b, c} {a} v {b, c}
b 6 .= c A(a)
We can see that Σ is consistent. Similar to epistemic description logics, Σ has a
unique MKNF+ model which is the set of all first-order models of Σ. We denote
this model by MMKNF(Σ). Note that although a
.= b is not asserted in Σ, there
are first-order models in MMKNF(Σ) where a is interpreted congruent to b. Let
I ∈ MMKNF(Σ) be one such model. Of course there are models where this is not
the case. Note that in (I,MMKNF(Σ)) the following holds:
¬KA(b), KA(a) a .= b
which is not intuitive as under I , a .= b are congruent, and KA(a) holds as it is
asserted, nevertheless since there are interpretations where a is not congruent to b,
A(b) does not hold in all interpretations, i.e., ¬KA(b) holds.
Now considering the extended model of M̃(Σ) of Σ. Again there is an extended
interpretation Ĩ in M̃ such that Ĩ |= a .= b. Since KA(a) holds in each extended
interpretation in Σ (so is asserted in Σ), we have that Ĩ,M̃ |= KA(a) i.e., Ĩ(a) ∈
KAĨ,M̃. But then we have aĨ = bĨ . Thus bĨ ∈ KAĨ,M̃. Hence, Ĩ,M̃ |= KA(b).
Besides the difference we just mentioned, the entailment under both semantics do
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not coincide. As an example, we note that Σ entails the axiom
> v ∃U.({b, c} u KA)
under the extended epistemic semantics i.e.,
Σ ||=e > v ∃U.({b, c} u KA).
However, this axiom is not entailed by Σ under the MKNF+ semantics. The
reason is as follows: Σ enforces the equality of a to exactly one of b or c since
{{a} v {b, c}, b 6 .= c} ⊆ Σ. Further each element is connected to both b and c
via the universal role U . Earlier we have seen that in a model M̃ of Σ, for every
extended interpretation Ĩ ∈ M̃ we have either Ĩ |= a .= b or Ĩ |= a .= c and that
Ĩ,M̃ |= KA(a). Thus for every Ĩ ∈ M̃ we have that either Ĩ,M̃ |= KA(b) or
Ĩ,M̃ |= KA(c). Thus Ĩ,M̃ |= > v ∃U({b, c} uKA). It can be checked that this
is not the case for MKNF+ .
We believe that our treatment of equality in local worlds (interpretations) is more
intuitive in the sense that given a world, equal individuals possesses the same
characteristics: the characteristics of some a, b ∈ NI such that a
.= b holds (in a
local worlds), are the same in that world. Hence, if some facts are known for a,
the same facts are known for b as well.
Besides the aforementioned semantical differences, one of the main advantages
of our approach over MKNF+ is the ability to translate epistemic queries to
non-epistemic ones. It is this procedure that allows us to use off-the-shelf
highly optimized standard reasoners for answering epistemic queries. Thus, the




As a main objective of this work, we have presented an approach of answering
queries formulated in epistemic extension of SROIQ that we called SROIQK.
To this end, we conclude by summing up the accomplishments resulted in address-
ing issues raised in Section 1.4. Finally, we set some goals as for future work
directions.
10.1 Addressed Issues
We enumerate the results of our work with respect to the goals we set in Section 1.4.
10.1.1 Epistemic DLs under Classical Semantics
In Chapter 6 we have considered SROIQK as a query language to SRIQ\U
knowledge bases. The classical semantics imposes the common domain assump-
tion and the rigid term assumption. The former requires all the interpretations
under consideration to share a common infinite domain, whereas the latter
requires the uniformity of interpretations of individual names across different
interpretation. We think of these restrictions as the main reason of in-applicability
of the classical semantics for the case of SROIQK knowledge bases. This also
leads to the non-UNA-backward compatibility of SROIQK.
We then presented a method for translating SROIQK queries into standard DL
queries. This is in contrast to the classical methods (mainly Tableaux based) for
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answering epistemic queries. Further, we have seen that we had to enforce the
unique name assumption explicitly in the knowledge base under consideration to
acquire correctness of our method.
10.1.2 Extended Epistemic Semantics
We discussed the main reasons behind the in-applicability of the classical epis-
temic semantics to SROIQK by showing examples of knowledge bases which
exhibit finite models only. We then presented a new semantics that we called
extended epistemic semantics based on the notion of extended epistemic models.
The idea is that we introduce an abstraction layer that assigns abstract individual
names to domain elements. The abstraction layer (which in our case was the
set NI ∪ N) serves as a common ground for the different interpretations with
different domains. Now interpreting an epistemic concept C requires interpreting
it locally, then taking the abstractions of extensions of C in all the interpretations.
As these abstractions are from a common set NI ∪ N, we can simply take all the
common elements in these abstractions. This is very similar to the intersecting of
extensions in the classical semantics. The extension of C in a given interpretation
is simply all those elements which have members of the common abstraction as
their designator. This is better understood by Figure 7.1, 7.2 and 7.3.
We have shown that the new proposed semantics is backward compatible with
the standard semantics as well as behaves similar to the classical semantics
when the knowledge base language is restricted upto SRIQ\U . Further, our
proposed semantics does not enforces the unique name assumption either. Later
we presented a method of translating epistemic axioms into non-epistemic ones.
Subsequently, we showed that answering an epistemic query can be performed via
standard entailment checking.
10.1.3 EQuIKa: Epistemic Query Answering Tool
We provided an implementation of the method we introduced in this work for
answering epistemic queries. EQuIKa takes a black-box approach by utilizing off-
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the-shelf standard DL reasoners for answering epistemic queries. Consequently,
we avoided implementing full-fledged reasoners from the scratch with epistemic
reasoning capabilities.
In order for EQuIka to be practically feasible, we invented several optimization
rules that we proved to be correct. Later we showed through experiments that these
rule indeed improved the computation time performance of EQuIKa to a great
extent. Finally, our experiments showed that EQuIKa performs almost similar to
the standard reasoners. Thus, we provided an epistemic query answering tool that
is feasible in practice.
Besides the aforementioned accomplishment, we compared our work with
many existing approaches. The approach of MKNF+ knowledge bases, pre-
sented [MOTIK and ROSATI 2008], is usually seen as one of the most mature work
as it captures many of the existing approaches. We showed that our treatment of .=
is intuitive in the sense that given a particular interpretation (world) our semantics
respects the .= relation between individuals. Through example, we have seen that
this is not the case in the MKNF+ approach. Further, we also showed that both
approaches do not agree on entailment of axioms in general.
10.2 Future Work
There are several goals as the future directions of our work. In the following we
consider some of the important ones.
10.2.1 Embedding K into Knowledge Bases
For this work, we considered answering of epistemic queries posed to SROIQ
knowledge bases. The nice property of a K-free knowledge base is that it has
a unique (extended) epistemic model. This actually allows us to translate epis-
temic queries to non-epistemic ones. However, this property is lost once we allow
SROIQK as the knowledge base language, i.e., if we allow K within the knowl-
edge base. As an example consider the following SROIQK knowledge base
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Σ = {> v KC1 t KC2}
which has E(M1) and E(M2) as its only extended epistemic models where,
M1 = {I|I |= > v C1} and M2 = {I|I |= > v C2}. As mentioned in
Section 7.2, for a set of interpretationsM by E(M) we mean the set of extended
interpretations obtained by extending every interpretation I inM with all possible
surjective mapping from NI ∪ N to ∆I . The first model corresponds to those ex-
tended interpretations where C1 is interpreted as the> concept whereas the second
model corresponds to those extended interpretations where C2 is interpreted as the
> concept. As a result, the translation procedure we introduced in this work does
not work anymore, simply because it is based on the standard entailment of axioms
from a knowledge base thus we consider all the models of the knowledge base.
Whereas in this case we have a split of the interpretations into two sets namely,
E(M1) and E(M1).
We will thus investigate if our method of translating epistemic queries into standard
ones, can be extended to the cases where we do allow for the K to occur within the
knowledge base as well. Note that as argued in [DONINI et al. 2002], we then
would require the operator A as well.
10.2.2 Embedding K in OWL Syntax
In Section 8.2 we presented two examples demonstrating a possible way of rep-
resenting the epistemic operator K in OWL syntax. The current syntax does not
support such non-standard features. Thus it is highly desirable to extend OWL syn-
tax with constructs like the epistemic operator. Though a simple task, extending
OWL with non-standard constructs requires motivating the whole community to
acquire consensus.
10.2.3 EQuIka in Real Life
We tested and evaluated EQuIKa on a populated version of the Wine ontology. But
how does it perform in real life applications is an open question. Note that we first
need to find some real life application where one requires epistemic query answer-
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ing. Only then, we can evaluate EQuIka in practice. To accomplish this task, we
have to introduce the notion of closed-world reasoning in an easy-to-understand
way to the practitioners (of Semantic Technologies) and advocate its advantages.
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[HITZLER et al. 2009] Hitzler, P., Krötzsch, M., and Rudolph, S. (2009). Founda-
tions of Semantic Web Technologies: Chapman & Hall/CRC. (Cited on page 42.)
[HORROCKS et al. 2006] Horrocks, I., Kutz, O., and Sattler, U. (2006). The Even
More Irresistible SROIQ. In Proceedings of the 10th International Conference
on the Principles of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning (KR 2006), pp.
57–67. (Cited on pages 10, 17 and 19.)
[HORROCKS et al. 2004] Horrocks, I., Patel-Schneider, P. F., Boley, H., Tabet,
S., Grosof, B., and Dean, M. (2004). SWRL: A Semantic Web Rule Lan-
guage Combining OWL and RuleML. W3C Member Submission. Available
at http://www.w3.org/Submission/SWRL/. (Cited on page 33.)
152
[ISO/IEC 24707:2007 2007] ISO/IEC 24707:2007 (2007). Information technol-
ogy – Common Logic (CL): a framework for a family of logic-based languages:
International Organization for Standardization. (Cited on page 1.)
[KACZMAREK et al. 1986] Kaczmarek, T. S., Bates, R., and Robins, G. (1986).
Recent developments in NIKL. In Proceedings of the 5th National Conference
on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI’86), vol. 2, pp. 978–985: Morgan Kaufmann.
(Cited on page 6.)
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